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**REINFORCEMENT
OF
CAPACITIES
FOR
PREVENTING
AND
COUNTERING
VIOLENT
EXTREMISM
IN AFRICA**



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Publisher : APSTA Secretariat

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Address : APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon

Website : www.apstaafrica.org

Email : apsta@apstaafrica.org

Tel : +237 6 99 65 65 32

+237 6 96 84 57 53

+237 6 94 42 52 01

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Reinforcement of Capacities for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

APSTA Conference Proceedings (LES ACTES)

An AU-APSTA International Colloquium, Yaoundé Cameroon, October 2021

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	6
Abbreviations & Acronyms	8
Editorial Board	8
African Peace Support Trainers Association	11
Preface	14
Foreword	15
**Executive Summary	16
****Introduction	22
*****Goodwill Remarks	23
*****Opening Remarks – MINREX	24
*****Opening Remarks – SED	24
*****Objectives of the Colloquium	25
*****Inaugural lecture	29
Session One : Strategies on Preventing and	34
Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE)	
*****Presentations/Discussions	35
*****Highlights	
*****Conclusion	
*****Recommendations	
Session Two : Ad Hoc Coalitions and Counter	77
Terrorism Operations in Africa	
*****Presentations/Discussions	78
*****Highlights	
*****Conclusion	
*****Recommendations	
Session Three : Deradicalization and whole-of-Society	86
Approach to PCVE	
*****Presentations/Discussions	87
*****Highlights	
*****Conclusion	
*****Recommendations	
Session Four : Emerging Issues and Challenges	99
for Training & Research on PCVE	
in Africa	

*****Presentations/Discussions	100
*****Highlights	
*****Conclusion	
*****Recommendations	
Final Report	102
Conclusion	116
*****Conclusion & Recommendations	117
*****Communiqué	120
Annexes	122
*****A. Colloquium Recommendations Implementation	123
plan	
*****B. Concept Note: APSTA Secretariat	124
*****C. Mot de Circumstance: S.E.M. Ministre de	127
Relations Exterieur	

List of Tables

*****Typologies of methods and techniques for	40
TF in Africa	
*****Table of Colloquium Recommendations	123
Implementation Plan	



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Acknowledgements

Member Institutions of APSTA

First and foremost, APSTA expresses its profound gratitude to Heads of Member Institutions (MIs) across the continent, for the trust and confidence reposed in the Secretariat, which continues to propel the Secretariat towards greater heights. On this basis, the Secretariat faithfully and enthusiastically continues to discharge the Association's mandate.

Government of the Republic of Cameroon

Second, APSTA remains greatly indebted to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon, for accepting to domicile and support the Association's Secretariat, as an international organization with diplomatic status, which is most adequate in facilitating the discharge of the Association's mandate. APSTA is particularly grateful to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon, for the funding support, allowing for the relocation of the Secretariat as well as the recommencement of its programmes and activities since 2020.

Political Affairs Peace and Security Commission, African Union Commission

Third, the Association extends its sincere gratitude to the African Union Commission (AUC), particularly the Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security (CPAPS), Amb Adeoye Bankole, for his guidance and directives, leading up to APSTA's Roundtables and international Colloquium on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE), proceedings of which make up this volume. The Secretariat also thanks the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) for continued collaboration, as well as expressed interest to review the AUC-APSTA MoU 2008, to support the AUC beyond coordination of capacity building for the African Standby Force (ASF) and to cover related defence and security capacity building coordination issues across the entire African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as well as serving as continental think-tank, repository and one-stop-shop for the AUC.

Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms

Fourth, the Association also thanks the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), especially ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC and EAC, for readily making experts available for the Association's policy dialogues as well as other programmes and activities.



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Partners

Fifth, APSTA sincerely thanks its partners, particularly the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR); the Dallaire Institute for Children Peace and Security (Dallaire Institute), Canada; and the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS); Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI); Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres (AAPTC); Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training (BIPSOT); European Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (EAPTC) and the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). We are proud of the modest achievements of our collaboration within the period and look forward to greater and mutually beneficial partnership in the years ahead.

Training and Research Centres of Excellence

Sixth, the Association also extends its heartfelt gratitude to other Training and Research Centres across the continent, especially the Africa Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) Algeria. APSTA Secretariat over the last two years has achieved modest outcomes thanks to collaboration with these institutions. The Association therefore looks forward to welcoming these institutions as de jure members soon.

Embassies & Diplomatic Organisations

Seventh, APSTA sincerely thanks all embassies, diplomatic missions and international organisations, for supporting the Association's programmes and activities in varied ways, and most especially for always having your high-level representatives at APSTA events, even at very short notice.

APSTA Experts and Experts Working Groups

Finally, APSTA Secretariat would not have achieved much without the support and sacrifice of our experts and expert working groups across Africa and beyond. The Association is indeed grateful to you all.



Abbreviations & Acronyms

AAPTC	Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AGM	Annual General Meeting
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
APSTA	African Peace Support Trainers Association
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
ALCOPZ	Asociacion Latinoamericana de Centros de entrenamiento para operaciones de Paz
BIPSOT	Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training
CCCPA	Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa
CPAPS	Commission for Political Affairs Peace and Security
EAN	Environmental Aid Nigeria
EAPTC	European Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
EMPABB	Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GLOCEPS	Global Centre for Policy and Strategy
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
ICC	Interregional Coordination Centre
IMPACT	Impact for Development and Change
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
IPSS	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KAIPTC	Koffi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
MI	Member Institutions – of APSTA
MINDEF	Ministry of Defence - Cameroon
MINREX	Ministry of External Relations – Cameroon
MLAILPKC	Martin Luther Agwai International Leadership and Peacekeeping Centre
MS	Member States – of the African Union

NDC	National Defence College - Nigeria
PCVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
POTI	Peace Operations Training Institute
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RM	Regional Mechanisms
RPA	Rwanda Peace Academy
PSO	Peace Support Operations
TCE	Training Centres of Excellence
TNA	Training Needs Assessment
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research



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Editorial

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**African
Peace Support
Trainers
Association
(APSTA)**



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The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) was founded in 2001 and formally established in 2002, as a non-profit making organization and as the African Chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). The Association became the framework for improving the capacity of peacekeeping training institutions by facilitating the exchange of best practice and capacity development support, as well as for enhancing the impact of peacekeeping initiatives by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).

Registered as an international Diplomatic Organization, with Secretariat now domiciled in Yaoundé, Cameroon, it exists to facilitate the development of African capacity for peace and security through coordination, advocacy, harmonisation and standardisation of training, research and policy implementation support among its member institutions pursuant to the AU-APSTA 2008 MOU. Thus, the capacity building initiatives of member institutions contribute towards the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), notably the African Standby Force (ASF).

Vision

To be an independent Pan-African Association that promotes and harmonizes training for Peace Support Operations (PSO) towards a peaceful and stable Africa.

Mission

To facilitate the development of African capacity for peace and security through coordination, advocacy, harmonization and standardization of training, research and policy implementation amongst member institutions and in support of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Standby Force (ASF).

Our main Objective

To facilitate the development of African capacity for peace and security through coordination, advocacy, harmonization and standardization of training, research and policy implementation support among member institutions, towards a peaceful and stable Africa.

Programme Plan 2020-2022

APSTA Programme Plan 2020-23 derives from four (4) critical Pillars of engagements earmarked for the Secretariat of APSTA by the Board of Directors. The Pillars are: Policy, Research, Training Enhancement as well as Institutional Enhancement Programmes. These pillars guide the programmes, projects and activities of the Secretariat within



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the 3-year period. The Pillars are built on four (4) crucial factors that significantly determine the African peace and security landscape, viz: dynamism, multilateralism, multi-dimensionalism and partnerships. The Secretariat is always open to partnership and collaboration, as these characterise the essence of its *modus operandi*.





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Preface

The “Reinforcement of capacities for preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) in Africa”, was undertaken by APSTA for three (3) critical reasons. First, Political Violence declined across the world in 2020, except in Africa, where terrorism, violent extremism and internal conflicts significantly contributed to deteriorating peacefulness. Moreover, according to the Global Peace Index 2020, civil unrests in sub-Saharan Africa rose by over 800% between 2011 and 2018. In addition, this region accounted for over 80% of human displacements caused by conflict and violence in 2021.

Second, the Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security, African Union Commission, during audience with APSTA high-level representatives in AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 6th August 2021, expressly requested that APSTA Secretariat embark on this project, against the background of outcomes of previous roundtables on the theme by APSTA in June 2021. Prior to the audience, the imperative for this project had been presented as Strategic Objective 8.1.1, of the ASF Training Directives 2020-2023.

Third, Defence and Security training institutions and research centres, of which there are more than 140 in Africa, offer thousands of training courses each year, yet the challenge continues unabated in its geographic expansion as terrorists and violent extremist groups (VEGs) grow more resilient and audacious across the continent. Furthermore, African Heads of State and Governments, were also seized with this grave concern, during the African Union (AU) 16th Extraordinary Summit, May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.

Motivated by these reasons, APSTA Secretariat hosted a hybrid (in-person and online) colloquium of directors of training and research drawn from institutions across the continent, to underscore capacity gaps on the theme. The Colloquium featured presentations and discussion from experts including the directors, as well as comments from a high-level delegation from the AU Commission, led by the Chief of Staff, African Standby Force, Air Vice Marshal (AVM) John Brian CHIKONZO.

It is noteworthy that deliberations focused on violent extremism in contrast to terrorism – a concept inundated by vast definitional and politico-theoretical controversies. Thus, the Proceedings consist of presentations, highlights of discussion, and key recommendations targeted at capacity building stakeholders on PCVE. Accordingly, the Association remains grateful to all participants, especially directors and experts from Member Institutions as well as the delegation from the AUC. Suffice it to re-affirm here, our due acknowledgement of efforts by all partners who contributed in various ways, towards realising this project.

Dr. OYONO Née THOM Cécile
Executive Secretary



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Foreword

In audience with a high-level delegation of APSTA representatives in August 2021, I got credible insight into the mission and objectives of this 20-year-old Association.

Delighted at APSTA's pledge of support to the AU Commission, through research and capacity building, specifically on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE); understanding the emergence and import of Ad Hoc Coalitions; as well as the management of forced displacements across Africa, I eagerly expounded the five (5) pillars of action for realizing our vision for the AU Political Affairs Peace and Security Commission.

In particular, I emphasized the imperative to re-energize early warning, conflict prevention and mediation, through investment in preventive diplomacy. I also re-iterated our intention to set up inter-regional knowledge platforms on conflict prevention and mediation, for improved cross-regional learning on best practices and resilience building against triggers of conflicts. These I had explicated earlier during an interview with the Daily Trust (27th February 2021).

I am therefore pleased to recommend this compilation of proceedings of APSTA's international colloquium on PCVE in Africa, made up of informed perspectives from prominent and leading experts on the theme, from across the continent, including a high-level delegation from the AU Commission led by the Chief of Staff, African Standby Force, Air Vice Marshall John Brian CHIKONZO.

Thus, the Compilation serves as a working document, and responds to the much-desired collaborative initiatives necessary for addressing the multiple cross-regional insecurity challenges confronting our continent, - in this case, violent extremism and terrorism.

Most importantly, the interrogation of emerging trends and dynamics of the menace as well as recommendations on various domains of capacity reinforcement on the problematique, serve as crucial reference for training and capacity building institutions, policy-makers and other stakeholders across the continent. This Collection should also function as veritable 'Bibliography' for tertiary institutions and research centres across the continent and beyond. I therefore strongly enjoin its wide readership and use.

Ambassador Bankole Adeoye

Commissioner, Political Affairs Peace and Security
African Union Commission
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Executive Summary



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The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), in partnership with the African Union and with the multifaceted support of the Government of the Republic of Cameroon, organized from October 28 to 29, 2021, the International Colloquium of Directors of Training and Research on the theme :

Reinforcement of capacities for integrated approach to preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa.

The objective of the gathering was to question the training deficits identified and to articulate skills in order to build strategies based on real needs in the specific fields of training and research. The desired outcome was to achieve integrated operational, multisectoral and interregional solutions. The framework for reflection adopted in this conference made it possible to sensitize various actors of the peace and security process in Africa on the need to restructure and update the policies, standards and doctrines of the African Union as well as training to prevent and counter violent extremism across the continent.

To counter violent extremism in Africa with the involvement of ad-hoc coalitions (Joint Force of G5 Sahel and Force Multinationale Mixte), a group of experts made up of training and research directors from APSTA member centers, met under the auspices of the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, who sent a strong delegation headed the Chief of Staff of the African Standby Force.

Participants consisting of experts from the political, diplomatic and scientific spheres, as well as the Defense and Security sector, followed with interest the keynote presentation by Prof. Jean-Emmanuel PONDI, Vice-Rector of the University of Yaoundé II, prior to their interrogation of experts' presentations.

Summary of main highlights of presentations and discussion is as follows :

- Emerging trends and dynamics on PCVE are crucial to reinforcing strategies for a more efficient PCVE;
- An inclusive approach to PCVE in Africa holds better prospects and must be multidimensional and multisectoral to circumvent the dynamics of violent extremist groups;
- Terrorism financing, child soldiery, regional criminal justice system, and de-radicalization are critical to PCVE;
- AU appropriation of Ad Hoc Coalitions within regional security framework and subsidiarity principle is possible;
- APSTA's documentation database on knowledge production by its member institutions and the African Union should serve as one-stop-shop for all;



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- Outcomes of Colloquia of this nature and research based on African realities should inspire regional and continental decision-making/action;
- Information exchange between AU and training institutions/ research centers is possible via the instrumentality of APSTA.

The main recommendations are as follows :

On Integrated Approach to Preventing and Countering violent Extremism (PCVE) in Africa, stakeholders should :

- Coordinate and integrate PCVE efforts with regional economic communities/regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as member states;
- Coordinate and integrate efforts with RECs/RMs on interdiction of terrorism financing, strategic communication and people-centred approaches to PCVE;
- Facilitate women and youth empowerment and inclusion into planning and implementation of PCVE strategies;
- Raise awareness on the crucial role of communities and religious leaders in the prevention and countering of violent extremism;

On Leveraging Ad Hoc Coalitions on Regional Security in Africa; the AUC, RECs should :

- Develop mechanisms to integrate existing and future multilateral institutions into the APSA;
- Expand the scenarios for ASF deployment beyond the extant six (6) scenarios to encompass operations of Ad Hoc Coalitions;
- Determine under which circumstances it could disburse funds from the Peace Fund, to support Ad Hoc Coalitions as well as leverage such support for control, such as aligning/synchronizing the military and political strategies;
- Develop rigorous accountability, compliance and human rights mechanisms for Ad Hoc Coalitions similar to the UN HRDDP;
- Implement a revised Peace Fund to ensure sufficient, flexible and sustainable funding in support of common and shared multinational operations;
- Adopt Ad Hoc Coalitions as FIRST RESPONDERS (similar to the ACIRC concept) to regional threats that other actors are unwilling or unable to address;
- Articulate a viable conflict resolution strategy and provide for Memorandum of Understanding with the Ad Hoc Coalitions.



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On De-radicalization and Whole-of-Society Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism; the AUC, RECs, Governments, TCEs should :

- Advocate investment in economic development that provide immediate and long-term empowerment opportunities and job creation in society;
- Promote religious tolerance and moderation among governments and stakeholders especially through strategic communications;
- Advocate holistic approach to building resilience among the population, especially through education that promotes critical thinking to enable citizens question negative religious teachings;
- Advocate security sector reforms that address injustices, human rights abuses and overt authoritarianism associated with defence and security agents, as well as enhance oversight and accountability;
- Promote national reconciliation and cohesion by governments on the continent, as well as inclusion the population in governance processes;
- Advocate good parenting as well as provision of good education for all from very early ages.

On Addressing Capacity Deficits for Integrated Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa, the AUC, RECs, Governments, TCEs, should leverage APSTA to :

- Increase the number of qualified professionals, experts and trainers through increased training courses;
- Increase and improve infrastructure for training through support for Training centres/ institutions;
- Support and collaborate on development of curriculum and modules on training guided by the peculiar contexts of the regions across the continent;
- Provide in collaboration with Training Institutions, updated guidance frameworks for training;
- Support training institutions and research centres in efforts to raise funds for capacity building for the continent.

On Addressing Capacity Deficits for Integrated Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa, the AUC, RECs, Governments, TCEs, should leverage APSTA to :

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institutions;

- Support and collaborate on development of curriculum and modules on training guided by the peculiar contexts of the regions across the continent;
- Provide in collaboration with Training Institutions, updated guidance frameworks for training;
- Support training institutions and research centres in efforts to raise funds for capacity building for the continent.

Protection Against Recruitment and Use of Children in Violence

- States and Training Centres should accentuate the politico-juridical, socio-economic and the strategic communication approaches in protection against recruitment.
- Training / Research Centres should devise means for increased involvement of women / females in CT/CVE/COIN strategies via training and capacity building.
- States and Training Centres should advocate / implement women empowerment programmes in addressing root causes of radicalization and extremism via family care

Attenuating Terrorism Financing in Africa :

- The CFT systems should focus on preventing and detecting criminal activity rather than merely meting regulatory punishment for non-compliance, In terms of overall governance and compliance.
- Governments should proactively and holistically commit resources for the development and implementation of mass sensitization programs to enhance public awareness on TF. This promotes a culture of community policing.
- African governments need to invest in institutional capacity building of their respective law enforcement and regulatory agencies in terms of policies and legal framework, operations, monitoring, finances, logistics, personnel costs, technology, and training that incorporates and mainstreams Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Counter Violent Extremism in Military academies/ training schools and police colleges rather than remain affixed to only Counter insurgency training.
- The authorities need to embark on specialized training programs for LEAs, judicial officers, security forces, and financial sector professionals on CFT.
- African governments should commit resources to facilitate smooth inter-agency, bilateral, and international cooperation against TF.
- There is need for extensive resource mobilisation to design, effectively implement, and monitor and evaluate various CFT programs.
- The KYC systems should enhance background checks to capture red flags, improve transaction monitoring, and also check publicly available 'other information' such as social media postings rather than just collecting documentary requirements.



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Strengthening Criminal Justice System in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism :

- Affected States should be assisted in strengthening criminal justice system response to counter terrorism via training/capacity building among others.
- Training Centres should articulate modules for dedicated training of officers on human right-compliant criminal investigation.
- Affected States should be assisted in handling of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in accordance with UNSC Res 2178 (2014) via training and capacity building for personnel.
- Training Centres should integrate modules that address linkages of terrorist activities and organized criminal groups, in training and capacity building.
- Affected States should be assisted in interfacing CT laws with IHL and IHRL through specialized trainings or modules.

De-radicalization

- Training Centres should review relevant modules dealing with de-radicalization to integrate capacity for apt planning and programming of de-radicalization at hotspots across the continent.
- Training Centres should distinguish, in related modules, the three (3) phases in the process of radicalization, viz: sensitization, membership and participation, during training.

Introduction



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Goodwill Remarks

The President-in-Office of APSTA – Colonel Souleymane SANGARE

Speaking as Chairperson, Colonel Souleymane SANGARE after welcoming the participants, stressed the importance of such a meeting both to harmonize practices between African States and to fill the skills gap faced by human resources. In view of the current security issues, he also raised the need to revise the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and APSTA so that it meets the security requirements of the day. Finally, he wished to thank the Cameroonian government through the President of the Republic H.E Paul BIYA for the support he gave in organizing the conference, he thanked the AU as well for its constant support.

African Union Representative – Air Vice Marshall John CHIKONZO

Mr John CHIKONZO deplored the impact of terrorism and extremism on the lives of member states before dwelling on the inseparable line that exists between politics, peace and security. According to him, this conference is an opportunity to rethink African approaches to peacekeeping and to train the actors involved in this process. Likewise, before thanking the organizers and the State of Cameroon, he returned to the need to revise the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and APSTA.

APSTA Executive Secretary – Dr. OYONO Née THOM Cécile

Dr Cécile OYONO visited, in her introductory remarks, the process that led to the creation of APSTA as an international organization before presenting the circumstances which led to the present symposium in Yaounde. She commended the efforts of the government of Cameroon and the AU in peacekeeping operations in Africa and recommended that participants formulate concrete proposals, as well as the sharing of good practices to combat terrorism and violent extremism.

The Nigerian High Commissioner - H.E. Amb. (Gen. rtd) Gabriel Abayomi Olonisakin

In his speech, the High Commissioner of Nigeria put into perspective the current African security situation and raised the challenges pertaining to training faced by the African strategies to deal with violent extremism. Also, by thanking APSTA, the government of Cameroon and the AU for these meetings, he pledged to always encourage APSTA in the accomplishment of its missions.



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MINREX representative – Mr. Alain NGODWE (D.A.I)

Mr. Alain NGODWE, like the previous speakers, recalled the consequences of violent extremism on the development of States, deplored the instrumentalisation of youth and the attacks on schools, hospitals and places of worship. He welcomed the holding of this workshop and encouraged the participants as well as APSTA to respect the commitments made and to take advantage of the recommendations to be formulated within the framework of the prevention and the fight against violent extremism in Africa.

Secretary of State for Defense in charge of the National Gendarmerie - Mr Galax Yves Landry ETOGA

The Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defense in charge of the National Gendarmerie, proceeded on behalf of the Minister Delegate to the Presidency in charge of Defense at the opening of the proceedings. While reaffirming the constant support of the Government to APSTA and congratulating the initiatives of the African Union in the prevention and the fight against terrorism, he urged the speakers and participants in the symposium to seize this opportunity to reflect profoundly on these issues. He urged member states and actors involved in the prevention of violent extremism to make better decisions for the Hemisphere.



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Rationale of the Colloquium

It has become evident through the Global Counterterrorism Framework that all nation states and all regions must be equipped and sufficiently prepared to preserve peace and security. In this perspective, any person belonging to a public institution and all relevant staff of state and non-state agencies must acquire the skills required to face the growing threat of violent extremism.

First Commissioner of the African Union to combine the portfolio of Peace, Security and Political Affairs, His Excellency Bankole Adeoye since his election has shown his determination to make Peace and Security the number one priority of the African Union and strengthen cohesion between the African Union, sub-regional organizations and strategic partners on issues of peace and security. In this perspective, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security received the APSTA delegation in a high-level audience on August 6, 2021. The Head of the Support Operations Division peace (PSOD), had recommended this hearing during the working visit of the PSOD to the APSTA secretariat in Yaoundé from March 2 to 5, 2021. The hearing aimed to take advantage of the collective capacities domiciled in member institutions and other centers training excellence of the African Standby Force (ASF) in Africa. All these initiatives are geared towards supporting the achievement of Commissioner Bankole Adeoye's vision on the consolidation of peace and security through a coordinated regional approach.

The Commissioner, expressing the wish for a hearing, welcomed APSTA's pledge of support, in particular in the areas of capacity building and research, the imperative was to take into account existing and emerging threats to peace and security across the continent. In this regard, he called for the immediate finalization of the operationalization of the Memorandum of Understanding between APSTA and the African Union Commission. To reiterate the urgency of an integrated approach, the Commissioner granted another hearing to all heads of member institutions and other training centers of excellence, under the auspices of the Association and under the coordination of the Secretariat of APSTA.

At the same time, to operationalize the Association's integrated support to the AU Commission, the APSTA Secretariat was tasked with organizing, in collaboration with the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union, a symposium of of training and research officers.



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Justification of the Theme

Many internal crises on the Continent mainly relegated to the background by the management of the Covid 19 pandemic require a rapid, coordinated and integrated response from the African Union, which has been accused by many observers of neglecting them. In recent times, rebel and extremist groups, armed terrorist groups have invaded government forces and taken control of large swathes of territory in many countries and regions on the continent. These terrorist and extremist groups continue to kidnap civilians, launch violent attacks, and inflict massive human and material injuries on these countries and regions. The African continent therefore continues to suffer from considerable violence and instability from violent extremists who pose precarious socio-economic challenges and enormous security problems for the populations. Numerous studies show that the increase in the activities of these groups is not a simple coincidence since there has been a constant growth of unemployment, corruption, poverty, social inequalities, religious intolerance to name only these few causes. This makes it easier for these groups to recruit and radicalize their supporters, especially young people.

To try to deal with it effectively, an integrated and trans-regional approach remains one of the most viable options for building a peaceful and secure Africa, as reaffirmed by Commissioner Bankole Adeoye's vision. However, this approach has so far been far-fetched, particularly due to the siloed approach to peacebuilding adopted by actors across the continent. Thus, violent conflicts continue to intensify across Africa. For example, political violence decreased around the world in 2020, except in Africa, where terrorism and internal conflicts continued to grow.

An integrated approach to peace and security is understood to mean the integration of several factors and causes of conflict at all stages and at all levels of policies, programs and projects aimed at peace, security and development. Even if several causes are common to the outbreak of violence, in certain situations of internal conflicts, violent extremism or terrorism have different manifestations, that vary according to the countries, regions or sub-regions which develop over time. The purpose of the integrated approach to peacebuilding is to take these differences into account when designing, implementing and evaluating policies, programs and projects so as to make them useful and decisive. For all stakeholders. It aims to remedy the continent-wide dysfunctions and capacity gaps in conflict prevention, and aid the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. It is therefore a strategic tool for achieving the stabilization and pacification of the Continent.

To avoid remaining on the sidelines of these issues, the APSTA secretariat organized a roundtable in June 2021, in consultation with member institutions (MI), on «The upsurge in violent extremism in Africa: questioning capacity deficits». The roundtable



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was in line with strategic objectives 8.1.1 of the 2021-2023 ASF training guidelines regarding the imperative of research on the impact of emerging dynamics of pandemics, counterterrorism and violent extremism, on peace and security in Africa.

The main conclusion of this round table was to put into perspective the crucial capacity deficits in the strategies aiming to face the evolution of the dynamics of prevention / fight against violent extremism; as well as the imperative to put in place an intergovernmental / whole of society response to PCVE; a challenge that continues in the absence of an integrated approach among peacebuilding actors across the continent. Thus, an integrated interregional approach to the consolidation of peace and security has become imperative for Africa.

Objectives of the Conference

The main objective of the conference is to interrogate capacity deficits and articulate capacity building strategies aimed at integrated interregional solutions. The idea is to sensitize actors and other stakeholders in the peace and security process in Africa, on the need to structure peace consolidation policies capable of taking into account the integrated approach.

Concretely, the conference will help to:

- Familiarize training and research directors with the vision of the Commissioner in charge of Political Affairs, Peace and Security on capacity building and strengthen the work plan on training and research;
- Assess training needs in response to changing dynamics of violent extremism, ad hoc coalitions and management of forced displacement;
- Evaluate the ongoing review of the ASF training framework documents,
- Evaluate the 2020 regional training review for senior mission officials;
- Lay the basis for reflection to finalize the review of the revised 2008 MoU in a new format before its approval;
- Prepare a Communique for the Commissioner on the results of the conference.

Expected Results

The main expected outcome of the symposium is the contribution of the various directors of training and research as well as other experts, to the reinforcement of PCVE training and innovative approaches specific to the whole of Africa, in the face of related peace and security challenges.

The symposium should, among other things, articulate an integrated / regional capacity building program / work plan aimed at addressing identified capacity gaps. In addition, the symposium will articulate a framework to operationalize capacity building for a




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government-wide and whole-of-society approach to PCVE and similar challenges in Africa.

Specifically concerning APSTA, it intends, through the contributions of experts and various partners to :

- Contribute to the involvement of all actors in concerted efforts to fight terrorism, prevent conflicts and violent extremism;
- Share and document the expectations of the different actors involved in the prevention and management of conflicts, violent extremism and peacebuilding at each phase;
- Share APSTA's expertise, particularly in the coordination of training and research policies on issues of peace and security in Africa.
- Contribute, based on training and research, to a permanent dialogue between States, RECs, the AU and international partners on the implementation of an integrated approach to conflict prevention and violent extremism;
- Encourage and offer standard and specific academic and professional training modules related to the prevention of conflict and violent extremism to donors and development partners.





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Leçon inaugurale

“Renforcement des capacités pour une approche intégrée de la prévention et de la lutte contre l’extrémisme violent en Afrique”

- Professeur Jean-Emmanuel PONDI

I - Bref récapitulatif des actions menées par les institutions africaines à l'échelle sous régionale ou continentale

Ces dernières années, des groupes rebelles et extrémistes ont défié les forces gouvernementales et pris le contrôle de vastes étendues de territoires sur notre continent, en particulier le nord du Nigeria, le Mali, le Niger, le Burkina Faso, des développements au Ghana, au Cameroun. Quasiment aucune partie du continent n'est épargnée. L'Afrique du Nord, l'Afrique de l'Est et surtout la région des Grands Lacs et la Bassin du Lac Tchad, continuent de souffrir d'une violence et d'une instabilité considérables de la part des extrémistes violents qui accentuent les défis socio-économiques et accroissent les problèmes de sécurité pour le continent africain. Dans le même temps, des groupes terroristes continuent d'enlever des civils, de lancer des attaques violentes, et d'infliger des blessures humaines, psychologiques et matérielles massives à nos populations et nos gouvernements.

TORGBUI FITI, le chef suprême d'Aflao, une ville côtière au sud-est du Ghana affirmait au cours d'une conférence en juin dernier que « personne n'est né extrémiste violent – les extrémistes violents sont fabriqués et alimentés »

L'augmentation des activités des groupes terroristes et de l'extrémisme violent n'est pas une simple coïncidence en Afrique, puisqu'on observe par ailleurs une croissance constante du chômage, de la corruption, de la pauvreté, des inégalités sociales, de l'intolérance religieuse pour ne citer que ces quelques facteurs qui facilitent le recrutement et la radicalisation des partisans de l'extrémisme violent, en particulier chez les jeunes.

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, de nombreuses études montrent que la menace posée par les groupes extrémistes violents qui s'appuient sur des récits religieux fondamentalistes a considérablement augmenté à travers l'Afrique. Les conséquences de la colonisation également et les régimes antidémocratiques qui ont caractérisé de nombreux gouvernements post-indépendance ont généré des comportements anti-occidentaux et djihadistes avec de sérieuses répercussions sur les équilibres sociaux en Afrique. Dans les années 1990, ces idéologies avaient commencé à se répandre en Afrique, dans un contexte où des frontières sont poreuses, des appareils de sécurité faiblement équipés dans de nombreux pays, des modes de gouvernance très souvent



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générateurs de corruption et de divisions ethniques, sans oublier le chômage très élevé des jeunes qui créent des conditions dans lesquelles les extrémistes violents prospèrent.

II - Exploration de quelques carences constatées

Pour freiner la menace croissante du terrorisme, l'Union africaine, les Communauté économiques régionales et les gouvernements africains avec l'appui important de partenaires externes et les bailleurs de fonds, ont développé diverses stratégies et mécanismes. La gestion des conflits, la lutte contre le terrorisme et la prévention de l'extrémisme violent sont ainsi devenus des sujets de préoccupation majeure pour les Africains.

La Stratégie de lutte contre le terrorisme et le Plan de mise en œuvre de la CEDEAO adopté en 2013, constituent, par exemple, un outil stratégique important. Cette stratégie recommande aux États membres d'utiliser une approche à trois piliers pour lutter contre le terrorisme : prévenir, poursuivre, et reconstruire. La « prévention » exige que les États membres adoptent et mettent en œuvre des dispositifs qui éliminent, autant que faire se peut, les causes profondes du terrorisme, améliorent les systèmes d'alerte précoce et le renseignement opérationnel, ainsi que la promotion des valeurs démocratiques et les droits de l'homme. La « poursuite » permet aux États membres d'entreprendre des actions rapides contre les attaques terroristes. La « reconstruction » vise à reconstituer la cohérence globale des sociétés endommagées et fragmentées par le terrorisme en restaurant le lien social.

Se greffant à l'Architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité, et notamment les dispositifs de la Force Africaine en Attente, de nombreuses coalitions ad-hoc ont, par ailleurs été créées pour répondre à l'offensive opérationnelle des groupes armés terroristes. La Force multinationale mixte créée en avril 2012 et renforcée en 2015 dans le bassin du Lac Tchad pour contenir Boko Haram - est constituée du Tchad, Nigeria, Niger et Cameroun, avec l'importante contribution du Bénin.

La Force conjointe du G5 Sahel est un partenariat de sécurité entre le Burkina Faso, le Niger, le Mali, le Tchad et la Mauritanie. Celle-ci vise à juguler le terrorisme, la criminalité transfrontalière et le trafic illicite dans la région du Sahel. Cette Force a été autorisée par le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'UA en avril 2017 et renforcée par les Résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies en juin 2017.

Les partenaires internationaux, notamment l'ONU, les États-Unis, l'Union européenne, la France, la Chine, la Russie et la Turquie joué un rôle pour lutter contre le terrorisme.

Quelques limites et la nécessité d'une approche intégrée

S'il est clair que toutes ces initiatives et ces mécanismes ont aidé à enregistrer des



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victoires contre le terrorisme et l'extrémisme violent, il est également incontestable d'observer que ces phénomènes continuent de prospérer sur le continent. Selon de nombreux rapports et études, les attaques terroristes depuis 2017 ont généré des statistiques inquiétantes : **2,5 millions de personnes déplacées** en moins de quatre ans, **6,9 millions de personnes en situation d'insécurité alimentaire grave**, **15 000 enfants souffrant de malnutrition aiguë**, et **11 millions de personnes avec un besoin urgent d'assistance**.

Ces données statistiques froides montrent évidemment que les approches axées sur la sécurité ne parviennent pas à contenir l'empreinte géographique du terrorisme et de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique. Cela provoque, comme on l'observe à travers le continent, l'émergence de nouvelles approches axées notamment sur le développement, telles que les initiatives de prévention de l'extrémisme violent (PVE), afin de mieux s'attaquer aux racines politiques et aux causes socio-économiques de l'extrémisme. Des acteurs comme le PNUD se positionnent très utilement dans cette démarche.

Dans cette perspective, le renforcement des capacités et des compétences pour une approche intégrée de la prévention et de la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent en Afrique devient un impératif central dans la prospective stratégique africaine.

Par approche intégrée en matière de paix et de sécurité, il faut entendre l'intégration d'une perspective de plusieurs facteurs et cause des conflits à tous les stades et à tous les niveaux des politiques, des programmes et des projets visant la paix, la sécurité et le développement. Même si plusieurs causes sont communes à l'éclatement de la violence, certaines situations de conflits internes, d'extrémisme violent ou de terrorisme connaissent des réalités différentes selon les pays, les cultures, les régions ou sous-régions qui se développent au fil du temps pour s'imposer, par diffusion, par imitation ou par imposition, à l'ensemble des pays ou régions. L'approche intégrée dans la consolidation de la paix a pour objet de tenir compte de ces différences lors de l'élaboration, de l'application et de l'évaluation des politiques, des programmes et des projets de manière à les rendre utiles et décisifs pour l'ensemble des acteurs. Elle vise à combler à l'échelle du continent des dysfonctionnements et déficits capacitaires dans la prévention des conflits, la lutte contre le terrorisme et l'extrémisme violent. Elle est donc un outil stratégique pour parvenir à la stabilisation et la pacification du Continent Mesdames/Messieurs, Je ne saurais conclure mon propos sans formuler ici quelques recommandations



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III - Quelques Recommandations

1 - Il semble impératif de mettre l'accent sur les mesures préventives et les réponses à apporter aux causes profondes de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique, notamment par l'utilisation de la prévention par le biais de la médiation, de la protection du lien social qui est un processus moins onéreux que la conduite des opérations de lutte contre le terrorisme.

2 - Les dispositifs de prévention et de riposte opérationnelle contre le terrorisme arrivant très souvent tardivement dans les priorités gouvernementales, il est important de s'assurer que des mécanismes d'alerte précoce soient rigoureusement renforcés pour remédier aux lacunes d'anticipation stratégique à l'échelle nationale, régionale et continentale. En subissant les actes et attentats terroristes, les Etats privilégient toujours la force faute de la prise en compte de l'alerte précoce. Une erreur stratégique qui fragilise nos économies, notre potentiel humain et nos capacités à rattraper nos multiples retards.

3 - Afin de mieux tenir compte des spécificités sous régionales, il semble important de renforcer la collaboration entre les directeurs de formation et de recherche de divers organismes avec l'ASPTA qui peut jouer et joue déjà un rôle déterminant en réunissant différents acteurs de nature à contribuer à la prévention multisectorielle de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique. Plus efficace, il serait souhaitable d'établir un relais pédagogique entre les formations dispensées dans ces centres et les systèmes d'éducation des pays concernés en établissant des passerelles.

4 - Pour un meilleur déploiement de l'APSTA, la nécessité d'un financement régulier, prévisible et durable de la Commission de l'Union africaine via le Commissariat en charge des Affaires politiques, de paix et de sécurité ainsi que de l'ensemble des partenaires pourrait être décisif dans la réalisation de ses ambitions dans cette perspective s'avère fondamental. A ce titre, l'APSTA pourrait bénéficier d'engagements à long terme provenant d'autres sources de financement, de manière bilatérale ou multilatérale.

5 - Il semble crucial de mettre l'accent sur les efforts de coordination et d'interaction entre l'ensemble des Communautés économiques régionales du Continent. Exhorter la Commission de l'Union africaine à renforcer ses liens avec les institutions financières internationales dont l'expertise de terrain est précieuse.

6 - 70% des victimes des exactions de cette violence extrême sont des femmes et des enfants. Il est fondamental de continuer d'accroître l'importance du rôle des femmes dans la prévention et la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent.



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7 - Répondre efficacement à l'impératif d'introduire des politiques, des structures et des mandats conformes au développement intersectoriel des capacités des acteurs clés de la société civile porteurs d'une valeur ajoutée dans la prévention et la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent.

Il est donc clair, en fin de compte, que le développement de l'approche intégrée tel que débattu dans le cadre de ce colloque poursuit entre autres objectifs, le renforcement de la collaboration, la réduction de la vulnérabilité et la faiblesse de certains dispositifs, le renforcement des capacités de formation et de recherche qui prennent en compte le traitement des causes de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique.

Je vous remercie de votre bien aimable attention !



Session One

*Strategies on Preventing and Countering
Violent Extremism in Africa*



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Strategies for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Presentation One :

Exposé : Dr Emile Sunjo Department of International Relations and Conflict Resolution, University of Buea, Cameroon

I - What is Violent Extremism?

- Like «terrorism», there is no universally agreed definition of the term «violent extremism».
- The terms can sometimes be employed interchangeably and confusingly.
- The U.S. FBI defines violent extremism as «encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals.»
- The terminology of preventing and countering violent extremism has been constructed in an effort to repackage the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
- This shifts the initial focus away from the over-militarized responses of the 1990s and early 2000s, to methods linked to social support and prevention.
- P/CVE programs therefore aim at developing resilience among communities that may be prone to violent extremism.

II - Drivers of Violent Extremism

- socio-economic issues;
- discrimination;
- marginalization;
- poor governance;
- human rights violations;
- remnants of violent conflict;
- collective grievances;
- and other psychological factors

III - Preventing Violent Extremism

- Enhanced education: building young people's resilience to violent extremist messaging and fostering a positive sense of identity and belonging.
- Youth participation and belonging: creating an enabling environment for the empowerment and democratic participation of youth, in order to ensure that young people have the opportunities to become active global citizens.
- Media and online coalitions: particularly youth, policy-makers, researchers and media



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actors- to take effective actions, both online and offline, to prevent and respond to violent extremism and radicalization on the Internet.

- Celebrating Cultural diversity: youth need to be engaged in the protection of all forms of heritage and the promotion of cultural diversity to foster more fair, inclusive and peaceful societies.

IV - Countering Violent Extremism

- This entails the gamut of proactive, non-coercive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate and enable violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence.
- In the last 20 years, Global War on Terror, the approach to counter-terrorism has remained overwhelmingly focused on security-dominated responses, despite such approaches repeatedly proving insufficient to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism across the globe.
- Despite empirical evidence that strategic, comprehensive, and holistic approaches are more sustainable and impactful in countering of violent extremism, it remains under utilised.
- The recent withdrawal of the US after 20 years of a security-focused approach and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan aptly support this claim
- A more successful approach ought to address the myriad of factors that fuel violent extremism: discrimination and marginalisation, poor governance and lack of accountability of the state.
- Such an approach should actively work to strengthen human rights and the rule of law in communities affected by terrorism and violent extremism.
- Approaches should inherently be multidisciplinary:
- They should complement the efforts of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, but also empower a vast network of actors at the local, national, regional, and global level.
- Policymakers and practitioners should be prepared to engage with youth, women, religious leaders, civil society organisations (CSOs), healthcare providers, teachers, correctional officers, etc.

Countering Violent approaches should be grounded in a robust M&E framework, finding a way to build upon lessons learned and best practices while remaining tailored to the local context

Highlights of Presentation One

Strategies for Preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) - Dr Émile SUNJO, University of Buea (Moderator)



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Key Points

Violent extremism and terrorism in Africa are primarily caused by socio-economic and political crises. Thus, to truly combat them, it is necessary to tackle these crises with African methods and approaches and not only with those from elsewhere.

Strategies to end violent extremism must take into account its causes in order to be effective and efficient. As strategies, we must put an end to the various forms of terrorist financing on the continent, as well as identify the real sources of extremism in Africa. However, it is necessary to put the population at the center of solutions to combat terrorism and violent extremism and not just limit itself to military action.

Finally, Africa needs financial resources to consolidate its development and thus fight violent extremism because whoever controls Africa's finances also controls its agenda in the fight against the challenges it faces.

It must be kept in mind that military action or the use of force is good for defense and military threats. It is therefore very poorly suited to the fight against violent extremism or terrorist ideology.

Young people need concrete guidelines against ideologies that carry the genes of violent extremism across the continent.

Recommendations

- Identify the real sources of violent extremism in Africa in order to provide appropriate responses;
- Establish close and frank communication between AU bodies, states and populations who are also the main actors in the fight against extremism and terrorism.
- Include methods of conflict resolution and combating violent extremism in school and academic curricula.
- Identify, stop and close the channels of terrorist financing in Africa.
- Increase the participation of young people in decision-making;
- Improve media communication against terrorism and violent extremism;
- Person-centered approaches are much better than institutional approaches that impose responses through the use of force without first identifying exactly what people want to express.
- Our behavior, customs, context or environment are very important and should be taken into account when formulating the solutions to counter extremism.
- The social contract between populations and government decisions must be called into question in order to redress human rights violations committed in peacetime.



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Strategies for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Presentation Two: Terrorism Financing in Africa

Exposé : Mr. Elias Benyu, Training Specialist, African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT/CAERT)/ Loyola Rule of Law Fellow

Synopsis

The global community is tormented by terrorism and violent extremism. Africa, in particular, has become a de facto inter-continental convergence zone for terrorist, violent extremist, and transnational organized criminal groups that incubate in, enter, traverse, and/or exit Africa depending on geo-political and strategic operational developments. Such movements and operational dynamism have been enabled by vibrant and ever evolving terrorist financing (TF) methods and techniques coupled with challenges and critical capacity gaps by the respective governments or stakeholders. This has resulted in the rapid rise in TF on the continent which has had deleterious impact on peace, security, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and development. This paper covers the definition of terrorism financing, its sources and trends in Africa, and the key challenges as well as critical capacity gaps in nipping the phenomenon in the bud.

Keywords

Terrorist financing, drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, capacity gaps, Know-Your-Customer (KYC).

Introduction

The global community has, for a long time, been tormented by terrorism and its associated phenomena such as, inter alia, transnational organized crime, money laundering, terrorism financing, drug trafficking, racketeering, violent extremism, human trafficking, as well as pillage of minerals, fauna and flora. These phenomena have progressively evolved or mutated over time depending on the relevant real or purported push, enabling, and pull factors.

Africa has not been spared from the ebbs of terrorism over the years and this has had deleterious socio-economic impact on the continent. Terrorist groups have been formed in or moved to Africa from mainly the Middle East as part of strategic responses to operational outcomes.



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The groups that operate or have operated in Africa include, inter alia, Boko Haram; Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al Mourabitoun; Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP); Macina Liberation Front (MLF); Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM); Islamic State (IS) in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt; Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa; Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP); Allied Democratic Forces (ADF); and the Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ) in Mozambique.

The terrorist operations in Africa have been perpetuated due to financing from various sources. TF has been a matter of great concern as it has evolved over time to higher levels of technologically-driven sophistication and continued to threaten humanity, human rights, the rule of law, peace and security, development, and democracy.

This paper covers the definition of terrorism financing, its sources and trends in Africa, and the key challenges as well as critical capacity gaps in efforts to nip the phenomenon in the bud.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2009) defines TF as 'the act of providing the funds or something of value to individual terrorists or terrorist groups or persons and groups engaged in terrorist activities or engaging in financial transactions with terrorist groups knowingly and unlawfully.' According to Núñez Cifuentes (2020), TF '...covers both economic and logistical means, because terrorists require weapons, ammunition, vehicles and fighters willing to fight for their cause.'

The phenomenon facilitates terrorism hence the Financial Action Task Forces (FATF) Special Recommendations' calls for countries to implement various measures to thwart TF through, inter alia, ratifying and fully implementing the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; other relevant United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373; and criminalising TF, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations.

Sources and Trends of Terrorism Financing in Africa

Caballero (2018), citing a report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), estimates that 'West Africa is losing, according to conservative estimates, around 40.5 billion euros a year due to drug trafficking, ivory smuggling, human trafficking, oil theft, and piracy.' The estimate excludes the losses in North Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as Southern Africa whose combined estimates would evidently eclipse the West Africa's figures. Table 1 below shows the typologies of methods and techniques for TF in Africa.



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Table 1. Typologies of methods and techniques for TF in Africa

Typologies of methods and techniques for TF in Africa		
Illicit Trafficking	Natural Resources	Finance System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small and Light Weapons trafficking (Arms transfers among terrorist networks) • Drug trafficking • Human trafficking • Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) • Diversion from national stockpiles • Extortion • Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations, charity organisations, and levies. • Donations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minerals (gold, diamonds, etc.) • Livestock rustling • Fauna exploitation (Fishing, ivory, wild animals) • Flora (timber, Khat/qat) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Money Value Transfer Service (MVTSS)/ informal mechanisms e.g. Hawala system • Local Commercial Enterprises • Taxes • Cash couriers • Shell Companies • Trade-based Money Laundering (TBML)

Source : Adapted from NÚÑEZ CIFUENTES, A. (2020)

FATF-GIABA-GABAC (2016), identifies **extortion** as one of the major sources of funding for Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in West and Central Africa. However, it has lost its relative importance as a source of funding for the terrorist group owing to the success of the offences carried out by the Lake Chad Basin countries which have resulted in the terrorist groups losing significant territory.

Terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, Islamic State (IS), al Qaeda, and Al Shabaab seek to **exploit locally operating charities** to effect seemingly authentic funds transfers (Financial Action Task Force, 2016). A case in point is when The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) , following the occupation of northern Mali by various terrorist groups around 2012 and 2013, collected funds/‘Zakat’ - the obligated provision of funds for charitable religious purposes - from the population of Bourem community (in the form of ‘Zakat’,) on behalf of MUJAO (ibid).

Regarding **poaching**, Kukutschka (2018) points out that the UNODC observed that “wildlife crime in recent years has grown into a significant and specialised area of transnational organised crime, driven by [...] high demand and facilitated by a lack of effective law enforcement and low prioritisation as a serious crime, weak legislation, and non-commensurate penalties [...] and resulted in ‘global proceeds estimated to amount to between US\$7 billion and 23 billion annually.’” The phenomena is reportedly rampant



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throughout the continent, particularly in terrorist hotspots like in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Central Africa Republic, and the Sahel belt.

Drug trafficking ranks as a major source of terrorist financing in Africa. It is a common phenomenon throughout the continent whereby the Atlantic ocean's shores; the Mediterranean, Mozambican, Somalian, and the Gulf of Guinea coastlines; as well as the Sahel and Sahara belts are reportedly hives of drug trafficking activities where smuggling syndicates work in cahoots with and pay terrorist groups for protection purposes.

Paoli and Bellasio (2017) posit that one major consequence of the Arab Spring and follow-on geopolitical tumult has been a shift in smuggling and trafficking networks throughout the Middle East and North Africa, with criminal groups and terrorist organisations taking advantage of continued instability in key geographic hubs throughout the Mediterranean region.' The phenomenon also extends to the Sahel belt, especially the Liptako-Gourma region where terrorists, according to Assanvo, Danoko, Thérroux-Bénoni, and Maïga (2019), are involved in 'trafficking in weapons, drugs, motorcycles and fuel, along with cattle rustling, artisanal gold mining[,] and poaching.' This has also been echoed by, according to GIABA (2019), the Institute for Security Studies' (ISS') research finding that, in the Liptako-Gourma's tri-border, there exists a symbiotic relationship between traffickers and violent extremist groups that facilitates the furtherance of illicit activities.

Human trafficking is also a growing source of TF for some terrorist groups in Africa. FATF (2016, *ibid*), observes a rapid rise in kidnappings and trafficking in persons which Boko Haram has capitalized on to extract concessions from the Nigerian and other governments and also reports the existence of 'direct or indirect collaboration of AQIM and MUJAO to facilitate migrants gaining ground in exchange for compensation.'

Napoleoni (2016) also argues that ISIS forces in Libya regulate the numbers of refugee boats, number of refugees per boat to 120, and taxes them half of their profits - reportedly, about \$ 20 million for every 10 thousand migrants in 2015 - for permission to cross the Mediterranean. She also notes that "the boats that smuggle and traffic humans to various destinations in the Persian Gulf 'never go back empty [,]' [wherefrom] they almost always bring weapons back to trading hubs and arms bazaars throughout the region and even further afield to the Horn of Africa." Furthermore, she claims that '[o]verall, the kidnapping industry today is bigger than the illegal drug trade and worth hundreds of billions of dollars annually.'

Diversion from national stockpiles has also emerged as a major source of TF in Africa especially in Libya, Mali and Mozambique. This is mainly facilitated by battlefield capture of weapons and logistical supplies by terrorist groups, thus bolstering their



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arsenals (Shane and Becker, 2016). According to ICCT Report (March, 2021), these diversions have mainly occurred in Libya and Mali following the Tuareg insurrection in 2013 - which got backing from terrorist organizations in the region – that preceded the Malian forces' hasty and off balance withdrawal from the military bases in the country's North leaving packed armouries reportedly got looted by terrorist and violent extremist groups for both operations and income generation (ibid p.23).

Anders (2018) concludes that **arms transfers among terrorist networks** have become a significant source of TF in Africa. This is supported by the discovery of same model, sequentially serial-numbered, and similarly defaced weapons which were 'used in attacks carried out by different al-Qaeda affiliates, including against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, the Cappuccino restaurant and Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, and the resorts in Grand Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire, between 2015 and 2016.'

Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) is a primary source of TF. Van Offelen (2020) points to the extensive use of KFR by al-Qaeda affiliated groups in the Sahel-Sahara region in the past two decades, hence the emergence of a 'lucrative kidnapping industry.' This is in sync with Micallaf, Farrah, Bish, and Tanner (2019)'s finding that abduction revenues constituted at least 90 percent of TF in the Sahel region between 2005 and 2010. They attribute the recent decline in the number of KFR for foreigners largely to the scarcity of potential foreign targets in the region than the emergence of alternative and more lucrative financing strategies.

Key Challenges in countering terrorism financing in Africa

Africa's efforts to stem TF are hamstrung by a plethora of capacity gaps and deficits. These include, inter alia, lack of understanding and awareness of complex TF methods; limited domestic inter-agency and cross-border co-ordination, information sharing, and co-operation; inadequate capacity to investigate and prosecute such illicit activities; lack of capacity to detect suspicious transactions; porous borders coupled with limited border control capabilities; lack of funding for counter financing of terrorism (CFT) activities; growing cash-based, informal economy that makes it tougher to track, monitor, and regulate couriers and funds transfers/hawalas; socioeconomic and political environments, corruption, and collusion that are propel the financing of terrorism; inadequately skilled, trained, equipped security forces, law enforcement agencies (LEA), and judicial personnel; and technological inadequacies in the face of increased criminal use of technological innovations.



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Conclusions

TF has been on a steady rise largely owing to the mushrooming of terrorist and organised crime groups; increasing sophistication of the various financing methods; and the inadequacies of the government agencies and stakeholders that are mandated to stem the various facets of TF. From the foregoing discussion, the following conclusions can be drawn :

- Terrorist organisations and associated criminal gangs in Africa use both legitimate and illegitimate means to raise funds, and formal and informal channels to move the funds.
- The financial regulatory agencies in Africa have generally weak capacities to identify illicit financial flows (IFF) related to TF mainly due to the largely informal cash economies and hawala money transfer systems, as well as inadequate skills and technologically advanced equipment to detect such IFFs.
- The LEA, intelligence services, judiciary, and security forces in Africa lack of capacity (skills and resources) to effectively thwart TF including defending their bases thereby leading to looting of national armouries. The net effect is rampant smuggling; poaching; kidnapping; human trafficking; pillage of minerals, flora, and fauna, as well as undeterred attacks on military bases and national key installations.
- Generally, all African countries have porous borders and weak surveillance systems that enable infiltration of cash couriers and cash, criminal gangs, terrorists, small arms, and light weapons.
- Limited inter-agency or cross-border CFT cooperation hampers the national efforts and facilitates the rise in and perpetuation of TF.

Recommendations

In light of the sources discussed, capacity gaps identified, and conclusions, the following recommendations are prescribed:

- In terms of overall governance and compliance, the CFT systems should focus on preventing and detecting criminal activity rather than merely meting regulatory punishment for non-compliance.
- Governments should proactively and holistically commit resources for the development and implementation of mass sensitization programs to enhance public awareness on TF. This promotes a culture of community policing.
- African governments need to invest in institutional capacity building of their respective law enforcement and regulatory agencies in terms of policies and legal framework, operations, monitoring, finances, logistics, personnel costs, technology, and training that incorporates and mainstreams Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Counter Violent Extremism in Military academies/ training schools and police colleges rather than remain affixed to only Counter insurgency training.
- The authorities need to embark on specialized training programs for LEAs, judicial officers, security forces, and financial sector professionals on CFT.



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- African governments should commit resources to facilitate smooth inter-agency, bilateral, and international cooperation against TF.
- There is need for extensive resource mobilisation to design, effectively implement, and monitor and evaluate various CFT programs.
- The KYC systems should enhance background checks to capture red flags, improve transaction monitoring, and also check publicly available ‘other information’ such as social media postings rather than just collecting documentary requirements.
- The stakeholders need to focus, not only on the flow of TF but, on the overall enabling conditions contributing to the emergency or perpetuation of the phenomenon.

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Strategies for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Discussion :

Intervention à l'APSTA sur la recrudescence de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique : interrogations sur les déficits capacitaires

Au début des années 90 apparut une nébuleuse sans lien avec un quelconque Etat que les occidentaux dénommèrent « Al Qaeda » mais qui s'identifiait en réalité comme le « Front Islamique pour le Jihad contre les juifs et les croisés ». D'autres organisations similaires verront le jour par la suite dans plusieurs parties du globe et principalement en Afrique.

Si l'extrémisme violent se manifeste communément via des actes de terrorisme, il a bel et bien des manifestations autres. Les termes « terrorisme » et « extrémisme violent » sont souvent utilisés de manière interchangeable alors qu'ils reflètent des réalités bien différentes. C'est pourquoi tout amalgame entre ces deux notions entrainerait de facto l'échec des moyens de lutte strictement antiterroriste généralement utilisés. En effet, la labélisation et la désignation d'individus et de groupes comme « terroristes » réduit le champ des réponses au sécuritaire/militaire et présente le risque de brouiller les lignes entre leaders, « acteurs », « soutiens » et sympathisants, et de pousser certains de ces derniers vers une plus grande radicalisation.

Par conséquent, la première étape dans l'élaboration d'une stratégie de prévention de l'extrémisme violent doit être la définition de la problématique, avant de chercher des solutions et de prescrire des réponses. Bien que la résolution 2178 (2014) du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations unies ait laissé la latitude aux Etats membres de définir les notions de « terrorisme » et d' « extrémisme violent » en conformité aux obligations que leur impose le droit international, le terrorisme est défini comme l'usage indiscriminé de la terreur, notamment la violence meurtrière, alors que l'extrémisme violent se réfère à une pensée dogmatique qui préconise des modes d'action violents même si la radicalisation ne mène pas forcément à la violence.

En quelques années, la problématique du terrorisme et de l'extrémisme violent est devenue centrale en Afrique et à l'analyse du thème de ce jour, à savoir « la recrudescence de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique : interrogations sur les déficits capacitaires », on est en droit de se poser les questions suivantes : De quoi parle-t-on ? Qu'est-ce que l'extrémisme ? Comment expliquer ce phénomène ? Y a-t-il des spécificités à la radicalisation en Afrique ? Quels sont les facteurs qui provoquent et soutiennent l'extrémisme violent et quels sont les voies de prévention ? Quels liens entre les groupes opérant dans cet espace et au moyen orient, exploitant la marginalisation économique



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et sociale, les frustrations politiques et socioculturelles et les conflits locaux identitaires ? Que dire de la crise de la relation États-citoyens ? Quel bilan de la montée d'un extrémisme religieux, facteur de déstabilisation

Cependant la question centrale demeure celle de savoir si la recrudescence de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique est **la conséquence directe du déficit capacitaire de ses états**.

L'inadéquation entre les réponses étatiques et la problématique de l'extrémisme violent est la cause principale de la recrudescence de ce phénomène observé sur le continent. Pour mieux comprendre ce phénomène, nous à travers un bref historique faire un état des lieux de cette problématique sur le continent, puis rappeler les facteurs favorisant l'extrémisme violent avant d'exposer les manifestations de cet extrémisme violent dans les domaines de la paix et de la sécurité, du développement durable et des droits de l'homme. Les mesures de lutte contre l'extrémisme violent seront présentées par un autre intervenant.

I. Etat des lieux de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique

L'Afrique, continent au potentiel de développement inégalé et qui fut longtemps épargné par la montée en puissance de l'extrémisme violent est aujourd'hui dans une situation d'extrême insécurité en raison de la recrudescence de ce phénomène en pleine expansion. En quelques années, cette problématique est devenue centrale dans la zone sahélo-saharienne avec AQMI (Al Qaïda au Maghreb islamique), Ansar Dine, et Al Mourabitoun, et des liens dans la zone du lac Tchad avec Boko Haram et sa branche dissidente Etat Islamique en Afrique de l'Ouest. L'émergence des groupes dans les régions du Nord-ouest et du Sud-ouest du Cameroun ainsi que les récentes attaques de Al Shabaab à Palma au Mozambique montrent à suffisance qu'aucune région du continent n'est épargnée.

Ayant en partage une idéologie basée sur l'intolérance qu'elle soit religieuse, culturelle ou sociale, ces groupes extrémistes exploitent et renforcent les divisions entre les groupes sociaux et sapent le contrat social entre les citoyens et leurs gouvernements. De plus le pouvoir démultiplicateur que leur offre les réseaux sociaux tend à mettre en péril les valeurs de paix, de stabilité, de sécurité, de justice et de dignité humaine.

La propagation de l'extrémisme violent aggrave les crises humanitaires déjà sans précédent qui s'étendent au-delà des frontières d'un Etat ou d'une région. Les dangers liés à l'extrémisme violent se sont multipliés ces dernières années et sont de plus en plus liés au niveau local, régional et international.



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II. Situations et facteurs favorisant le développement de l'extrémisme violent

Bien que les chercheurs ne se soient pas encore accordés sur les causes réelles de l'extrémisme violent qui est en pleine évolution, il convient néanmoins que deux grands types de facteurs favorisant le passage d'idées abstraites et du mécontentement à l'action violente. Ceux qui poussent vers l'EV et ceux qui attirent.

A. Eléments structurels et conjoncturels propices à l'EV

Quel que soit le pays ou la région où sévit l'EV, l'analyse des données fait apparaître des facteurs communs.

Absence des capacités étatiques

Les pays africains concentrent en général les structures étatiques au niveau de leur capitale et grandes villes qui le plus souvent sont loin des zones frontalières, terrains des groupes extrémistes. Dans ces espaces « abandonnés » par l'état les capacités étatiques de tous ordres sont presque souvent soit absentes soit insignifiantes. Ainsi lesdits espaces sont immédiatement occupés par ces groupes sur surfent sur le sentiment d'abandon éprouvé par la population.

Absence de perspectives économiques

Les pays ne parvenant pas à avoir une croissance forte et durable pour créer des emplois décents, réduire la pauvreté et chômage, combler les inégalités, endiguer la corruption et gérer les relations intercommunautaires ont des fortes chances d'être victime de l'EV.

Marginalisation et discrimination

Bien que la diversité ne soit pas un facteur de vulnérabilité à l'EV, la précarité des ressources combiné à l'accaparement de l'existant par un groupe, si nombreux soit-il augmente le risque de tensions intercommunautaires, d'inégalité, de marginalisation, d'exclusion et de discrimination.

Mauvaise gouvernance et violations des droits de l'homme et de l'état de droit

L'EV a tendance à prospérer en cas de déficit démocratique ou quand règne la mauvaise gouvernance, l'impunité et la corruption. Généralement la mauvaise conduite des affaires publiques va de pair avec des politiques répressives et des pratiques contraires au droit



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de l'homme et à l'état de droit. Les violations des droits de l'homme commises au nom de la sécurité de l'état peuvent favoriser l'extrémisme violent en ce qu'elles marginalisent des individus et suscite l'hostilité envers l'état des groupes de populations, qui en retour soit soutiennent les actes extrémistes violents, soit éprouvent une sympathie à leur endroit lorsqu'ils ne sont pas simplement complices.

Conflits prolongés et non réglés

Ces derniers sont des terrains fertiles pour l'extrémisme violent en raison d'une part de la détresse occasionnée par l'état de guerre et les problèmes de gouvernance qui s'en suivent, et d'autre part par la possibilité d'exploiter le ressentiment que ces conflits créent.

La radicalisation en prison

Je ne voudrais pas m'étendre davantage sur ce sujet qui sera développé par un autre exposant mais je voudrais juste dire que les mauvais traitements infligés dans les lieux de détention peuvent déboucher sur un nombre considérable de recrutements par les groupes extrémistes. A surpopulation carcérale, l'inadaptation des locaux, la consommation des stupéfiants, l'insécurité, la corruption des agents de sécurité sont des facteurs qui poussent les détenus à chercher la protection des groupes.

B. Facteurs humains et motivations

Ces derniers constituent deux éléments complexes qui jouent un rôle dans le passage du mécontentement et de l'idéologisation à l'action violente.

Parcours et motivations personnelles

La bascule est plus probable pour les individus au parcours personnel difficile dont l'expérience trouve écho dans les idéologies extrémistes violentes. Les motivations varient de l'envie de revenge suite à la torture, la mort d'un proche tué par les forces de sécurité, la perte d'un bien, l'humiliation d'un parent, etc.

Victimisation et mécontentement collectif

Les extrémistes violents mettent à profit des émotions issues de la victimisation pour faire croire que seul la vengeance de l'opresseur permettra d'honorer la mémoire des victimes ou lutter contre les formes actuelles de l'oppression.



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Déformation et détournement des croyances et idéologies politiques, et exagération des différences ethniques et culturelles

Les groupes extrémistes violent dénaturent la foi, exagèrent les différences ethniques et pervertissent les idées politiques pour légitimer leurs actes, justifier leurs revendications et diviser les nations, les cultures et les peuples.

Rôle des dirigeants et des réseaux

L'extrémisme violent a besoin d'un cadre social pour structurer les éléments tels les circonstances, l'histoire personnelle et le mécontentement collectif. C'est à ce niveau qu'intervient le dirigeant charismatique et ses réseaux de connaissances ou familiaux.

III. conséquences de l'extrémisme violent

L'extrémisme violent sape les efforts déployés par les Etats et les Institutions pour

- (A) maintenir la paix et la sécurité
- (B) favoriser le développement durable
- (C) protéger les droits de l'homme et promouvoir l'Etat de droit.

Les groupes extrémistes violents contribuent à la spirale de l'insécurité et des conflits armés constatés sur le continent.

En Afrique de l'Ouest et du Nord

Al Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique(AQMI) et les autres entités présentent dans la région (Etat Islamique au Grand Sahel, Mouvement pour l'unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, Ansar Dine, etc) cherchent à contraindre les gouvernements à changer leurs politiques via des campagnes virulentes ou des attaques spectaculaires.

Ces groupes ont tiré avantage du conflit armé qui sévissait en Libye, de la porosité des frontières de la plupart des pays africains et de l'instabilité qui régnait déjà aux confins de la frontière commune au Burkina Faso, au Mali et au Niger. En effet le retour de près de 2.000 combattants de Libye et la prolifération d'un nombre non estimé de munitions et d'armes légères et de petits calibres des dépôts libyens a considérablement aggravé une situation déjà fragile.



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En Afrique centrale

Boko Haram et l'état Islamique dans la province West africaine (ISWAP) veulent évincer les Etats existants et effacer les frontières ce qui déstabilise non seulement les territoires concernés mais également les régions avoisinantes. Ils tirent profit de la criminalité transfrontalière organisée pour accroître leurs ressources financières. Les traites d'êtres humains, enlèvement contre rançon et trafics de tout genre.

L'Armée de résistance du Seigneur (LRA) continue de conduire des attaques contre les populations, pillant des villages, enlevant femmes et enfants pour les transformer en enfants soldats ou esclaves sexuels.

En Afrique australe et de l'Est

Même si les actes de piraterie maritime ont drastiquement diminués au large des côtes somaliennes, les Shebaab demeurent très actif en Somalie et au-delà. Les récentes attaques de la ville de Palma au Mozambique n'ont fait que confirmé la capacité de nuisance détenue par ce groupe qui bénéficie de l'appui d'autres groupes extrémistes et de combattants étrangers. Beaucoup de ces combattants sont retournés dans leur pays et sont à la tête des cellules dormantes.

C. Développement durable

De nombreux pays africains n'ont pas obtenu des bons résultats en ce qui concerne les objectifs du millénaire en raison des violences généralisées en leur sein. Les troubles répétés et le sentiment d'insécurité engendrés par l'extrémisme violent compromettent la croissance économique. De nombreux pays africains ont vu leur économie régressé du fait de l'absence de touristes. Le Mali a été particulièrement affectée par la destruction des sites historiques et culturels classés au patrimoine de l'UNESCO à Tombouctou. Cet extrémisme exploite les problèmes de développement tels la pauvreté, les inégalités et la mauvaise gouvernance pour entraîner tout particulièrement les groupes marginalisés dans leur cercle vicieux. L'éducation étant une menace pour la diffusion de leur idéologie, les groupes extrémistes s'en prennent aux jeunes.

Nous avons toujours en mémoire l'enlèvement des jeunes filles à Chibok au Nigéria par Boko Haram en 2014, le massacre d'étudiants par les Shebaab à Garissa au Kenya en 2015 ou le massacre d'enfants dans une école à Kumba au Cameroun l'an dernier. Voilà quelques exemples des manifestations les plus odieuses de l'extrémisme violent qui constituent également des atteintes directes aux droits de l'homme.



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D. Droits de l'homme et état de droit

Les groupes extrémistes violents menacent directement l'exercice des droits et libertés de l'homme, qu'il s'agisse du droit à la vie, du droit à la sécurité, du droit à la liberté, de la liberté de pensée, d'expression ou de religion. Dans des messages vidéo le leader de Boko Haram avait promis de marier de force certaine des jeunes filles enlevées à Chibok. L'absence de responsabilités dans les zones de conflit contribue à la multiplication de crimes abominables.

De plus, les groupes extrémistes violents empêchent l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et limitent l'accès des organisations humanitaires aux zones qu'ils contrôlent laissant ainsi les déplacés et réfugiés de ces zones à leur merci.

Une autre conséquence visible est l'exacerbation des problèmes de gouvernance et d'inégalités déjà présents dans certains pays augmentant de facto le risque de conflits violents.

Conclusion

La crise des relations Etats-sociétés remet en question le rôle fondamental de l'Etat comme ayant le monopole sur l'exercice de la violence légitime face à la montée de la violence non étatique par des acteurs exclus du champ légal. S'il est vrai que certains mouvements extrémistes offrent aux individus des éléments de réponses que ni la société ni l'Etat n'a réussi à leur apporter, notamment des réponses aux questions existentielles, une voie d'action pour combattre l'injustice et les inégalités perçues, et un sentiment d'appartenance, il n'en demeure pas moins que l'extrémisme violent est un cancer qui représente une grave menace aussi bien pour le continent que pour l'humanité toute entière.



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Déformation et détournement des croyances et idéologies politiques, et exagération des différences ethniques et culturelles

Les groupes extrémistes violent dénaturent la foi, exagèrent les différences ethniques et pervertissent les idées politiques pour légitimer leurs actes, justifier leurs revendications et diviser les nations, les cultures et les peuples.

Rôle des dirigeants et des réseaux

L'extrémisme violent a besoin d'un cadre social pour structurer les éléments tels les circonstances, l'histoire personnelle et le mécontentement collectif. C'est à ce niveau qu'intervient le dirigeant charismatique et ses réseaux de connaissances ou familiaux.

III. conséquences de l'extrémisme violent

L'extrémisme violent sape les efforts déployés par les Etats et les Institutions pour

- (A) maintenir la paix et la sécurité
- (B) favoriser le développement durable
- (C) protéger les droits de l'homme et promouvoir l'Etat de droit.

Les groupes extrémistes violents contribuent à la spirale de l'insécurité et des conflits armés constatés sur le continent.

En Afrique de l'Ouest et du Nord

Al Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique(AQMI) et les autres entités présentent dans la région (Etat Islamique au Grand Sahel, Mouvement pour l'unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, Ansar Dine, etc) cherchent à contraindre les gouvernements à changer leurs politiques via des campagnes virulentes ou des attaques spectaculaires.

Ces groupes ont tiré avantage du conflit armé qui sévissait en Libye, de la porosité des frontières de la plupart des pays africains et de l'instabilité qui régnait déjà aux confins de la frontière commune au Burkina Faso, au Mali et au Niger. En effet le retour de près de 2.000 combattants de Libye et la prolifération d'un nombre non estimé de munitions et d'armes légères et de petits calibres des dépôts libyens a considérablement aggravé une situation déjà fragile.



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En Afrique centrale

Boko Haram et l'état Islamique dans la province West africaine (ISWAP) veulent évincer les Etats existants et effacer les frontières ce qui déstabilise non seulement les territoires concernés mais également les régions avoisinantes. Ils tirent profit de la criminalité transfrontalière organisée pour accroître leurs ressources financières. Les traites d'êtres humains, enlèvement contre rançon et trafics de tout genre.

L'Armée de résistance du Seigneur (LRA) continue de conduire des attaques contre les populations, pillant des villages, enlevant femmes et enfants pour les transformer en enfants soldats ou esclaves sexuels.

En Afrique australe et de l'Est

Même si les actes de piraterie maritime ont drastiquement diminués au large des côtes somaliennes, les Shebaab demeurent très actif en Somalie et au-delà. Les récentes attaques de la ville de Palma au Mozambique n'ont fait que confirmé la capacité de nuisance détenue par ce groupe qui bénéficie de l'appui d'autres groupes extrémistes et de combattants étrangers. Beaucoup de ces combattants sont retournés dans leur pays et sont à la tête des cellules dormantes.

C. Développement durable

De nombreux pays africains n'ont pas obtenu des bons résultats en ce qui concerne les objectifs du millénaire en raison des violences généralisées en leur sein. Les troubles répétés et le sentiment d'insécurité engendrés par l'extrémisme violent compromettent la croissance économique. De nombreux pays africains ont vu leur économie régressé du fait de l'absence de touristes. Le Mali a été particulièrement affectée par la destruction des sites historiques et culturels classés au patrimoine de l'UNESCO à Tombouctou. Cet extrémisme exploite les problèmes de développement tels la pauvreté, les inégalités et la mauvaise gouvernance pour entraîner tout particulièrement les groupes marginalisés dans leur cercle vicieux. L'éducation étant une menace pour la diffusion de leur idéologie, les groupes extrémistes s'en prennent aux jeunes.

Nous avons toujours en mémoire l'enlèvement des jeunes filles à Chibok au Nigéria par Boko Haram en 2014, le massacre d'étudiants par les Shebaab à Garissa au Kenya en 2015 ou le massacre d'enfants dans une école à Kumba au Cameroun l'an dernier. Voilà quelques exemples des manifestations les plus odieuses de l'extrémisme violent qui constituent également des atteintes directes aux droits de l'homme.



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D. Droits de l'homme et état de droit

Les groupes extrémistes violents menacent directement l'exercice des droits et libertés de l'homme, qu'il s'agisse du droit à la vie, du droit à la sécurité, du droit à la liberté, de la liberté de pensée, d'expression ou de religion. Dans des messages vidéo le leader de Boko Haram avait promis de marier de force certaine des jeunes filles enlevées à Chibok. L'absence de responsabilités dans les zones de conflit contribue à la multiplication de crimes abominables.

De plus, les groupes extrémistes violents empêchent l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et limitent l'accès des organisations humanitaires aux zones qu'ils contrôlent laissant ainsi les déplacés et réfugiés de ces zones à leur merci.

Une autre conséquence visible est l'exacerbation des problèmes de gouvernance et d'inégalités déjà présents dans certains pays augmentant de facto le risque de conflits violents.

Conclusion

La crise des relations Etats-sociétés remet en question le rôle fondamental de l'Etat comme ayant le monopole sur l'exercice de la violence légitime face à la montée de la violence non étatique par des acteurs exclus du champ légal. S'il est vrai que certains mouvements extrémistes offrent aux individus des éléments de réponses que ni la société ni l'Etat n'a réussi à leur apporter, notamment des réponses aux questions existentielles, une voie d'action pour combattre l'injustice et les inégalités perçues, et un sentiment d'appartenance, il n'en demeure pas moins que l'extrémisme violent est un cancer qui représente une grave menace aussi bien pour le continent que pour l'humanité toute entière.





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Strategies for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Discussion:

Countering Terrorism Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Africa

Exposé : Dr. C. Nna-Emeka Okereke

Research Fellow, National Defence College Nigeria

Synopsis

This paper argues that to appreciate the dynamics of Counterterrorism-Counter insurgency (CTCOIN) and counter violent extremism in Africa, it is important to understand the causes and facilitators as a sure recipe to guide policy measures. Subsequently, it reflects on the dynamics of terrorism on the continent and the extant measures adopted by African countries at national, regional and continental levels to exorcise the spectre.

Introduction

The history of states in post-colonial Africa in the last 50 years is the history of evolving insecurities sometimes effectively contained and sometimes escalated beyond the capacities of individual states to contain. This assertion is drawn from a critical reflection on the trends in governance and security in Africa since the dawn of political independence in the 1960s. The wave of insecurities have ranged from diseases and environmental threats to physical security challenges associated with armed conflicts and wars among others.

While it is accepted that African governments have made efforts at the pursuit of security, stability and human development, the scourge of insecurity have persistently posed threats to the pursuit of rapid development.

Specifically, since the end of Cold War that accompanied the collapse of defunct Soviet Union, the scourge of violent conflicts has escalated in Africa with a resultant increase in the incidences of civil wars and resistant movements in Africa. Countries like Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo, former Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire among others experienced endemic conflicts beyond the capabilities of the defunct Organisation of African Unity could contain.

The apparent weakness of the OAU at containing insurgencies and armed conflicts in Africa was further buttressed by the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism that erupted in North Africa and the Maghreb in 1990s in the aftermath of the Mujahideen rebellion in Afghanistan.



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Although the OAU adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism at Algiers in 1999 and the African Union adopted the Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 2002, the scourge of terrorism, insurgencies and violent extremism in Africa has escalated significantly that virtually every region of the continent is currently being threatened. This paper therefore reflects on the engagements in counter terrorism, counter insurgencies and counter violent extremism in Africa with a view to make recommendations.

Overview of Terrorism in Africa

In the first two decades of the 21st Century, African continent have been confronted by escalating terrorist aggressions perpetrated by various groups such as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)/Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabab al Mujahideen, Movement for Tawhid (Unity) and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Lord Resistance Army (LRA), the Boko Haram, Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mouwakoune Bi-Dima also known as Signers in Blood Battalion (SBB) among others.

Following the return of several North Africans that fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan alongside the Mujahideen, North Africa and the Maghreb witnessed the escalation of terrorism. The Armed Islamic Groups unleashed deadly attacks in Algeria when they were prevented from taking over government through the 1991 elections which they were poised to win. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt sustained attacks in the Sinai and Luxor between 1990 and 1995 and by 1998, terrorist elements linked to Osama ibn Ladin executed audacious attacks on United States embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in August 1998. These incidents among others brought to the fore the imperative of robust continental response to terrorism, insurgencies and violent extremism on the continent.

The evolving threat of terrorism in Africa escalated across the continent in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) on 11 September 2001. The initial status of Southern Africa as a region largely spared from the scourge of terrorism have been punctuated by the penetrations of elements of the Al Shabab al-Mujahideen suspected to have fled from counterterrorism offensives in Tanzania into Cape Delgado in Mozambique from where they formed the nucleus of what later emerged as the ISIS linked groups threatening Mozambique in Southern Africa.

Presently, the local terrorist groups across the continent have largely come under two major global terrorist networks notably the Al Qaeda Network (AQN) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and now operate as cells of both groups in various countries. In West Africa, the Jamaát Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) is the umbrella affiliation



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of Al Qaeda linked groups while the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) and the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) represents the ISIS in some West and Central African countries.

Accounting for the spread of terrorism in Africa, scholars and policy makers have identified the internal and external factors that facilitates terrorism in Africa to include the growing discontent with governance deficits including the perceived overstay in power by political leadership especially in countries with records of governance deficits. This is heightened by the growing loss of confidence in the political processes that have repeatedly tilted to favour the ruling dynasties in power to the extent of supporting and sustaining the transfer of power within biological families as evident in Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad.

In addition, the growing dissatisfaction of significant proportion of the local population with domestic and international trends that sometimes-posed existential threats to their livelihood contributed to facilitate radicalisation and recruitment of the vulnerable for extremism that leads to terrorism whose narratives tended to provide new interpretations of history and hopes for lives.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attack on the WTC and accompanying Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) by the United States and its allies, several territories in Africa especially south of the Sahara which had weak institutions of governance and porous under-controlled territories emerged as sanctuaries for terrorist groups which were under intense counterterrorist offensives in other regions of the world.

Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa especially the Sahel and Horn of Africa became more vulnerable to activities of the AQN and were utilized for recruitment, training and generating funds for their global and regional operations. The Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) became active in northern Mali with spill over to Niger and Chad while the Al Shabaab al Mujahideen became a major challenge to Somalia and like the and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) launched cross border assaults in East Africa, Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

In the Lake Chad basin, the vulnerability to terrorist aggression was heightened in the Arab Spring in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) especially the violent overthrow of the Ghadaffi regime in Libya and the decline to evolving politics in Egypt that culminated in the military overthrow of Mohammed Morsi administration in 2013 whose logical consequence was the decline to armed resistance by Morsi supporters with established historical background in the ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt has since then witnessed sustained terrorist aggression which continue despite official counterterrorism measures.

As for Libya, the eventual resort to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led armed struggle to overthrow the Ghadaffi regime and the continued conflict for grip on



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political and territorial space by rival groups in the aftermath of the Ghadaffi regime has stimulated new security threats in West Africa, Maghreb and the Sahel belt. This is not unconnected with the huge weapon flow looted from Ghadaffi's armoury and widely merchandised to increasingly mushrooming NSAGs in West Africa and the Sahel.

It is therefore not a coincidence that the scourge of terrorism, insurgencies and violent extremism escalated astronomically in West and Central Africa few months after the killing of Ghadaffi in October 2011 and accompanying collapse of his dynasty. It is instructive that rebels of the Front for Change and Concord (FACT) in Chad use Southern Libya as base for training, recruitment and logistics.

Reflections on the Counterterrorism, Counter-Insurgency and Counter Violent Extremism in Africa

There is no doubt that African countries have adopted several measures at national, regional and continental levels to address the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. On 3rd July 1977, member states of the defunct OAU adopted the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa which is considered as the first related counterterrorism instrument.

This convention criminalized the resort to mercenaries against another state and eventually came into force on 22 April 1985 following the ratification and fulfillment of other obligation by required number of member states. Subsequently, member states of the OAU pledged commitment to combat terrorism and violent extremism in 1992 when they adopted the Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States.

On the occasion of the 30th Ordinary Session of the Summit of the OAU held in Tunis from 13-15 June 1994, the Heads of State and Governments also adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations in which member states rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism irrespective of religious sect, ideology or ethnic and other identities.

These preceding treaties crystallised in the Organisation of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted at Algiers (Algiers) on 1st July 1999 but it eventually entered into force on 6th December 2002. This Convention among others, requires State parties to criminalise terrorist acts under their national laws in line with the provisions of the instrument.

In 2001, the OAU also adopted the Dakar Declaration against Terrorism which laid emphasis on the importance of strengthening inter-state cooperation to exorcise the triple tragedies of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Other initiatives adopted at the continental level to strengthen the fight against terrorism include:



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- a. The 2002 Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism which aims among others, to strengthen existing commitments of state parties to implement the Convention while also strengthening aspects of police and border control.
- b. Adoption of a Protocol to the 1999 Convention on 1st July 2004 which among others recognises the growing threat of terrorism in the continent and the growing linkages between terrorism and illicit transnational trafficking, money laundering and financing of terrorism.
- c. Adoption of a Decision on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism by the Assembly of the African Union in Dakar (Senegal) on 27 July 2010 in which the AU appointed a Special Representative for Counterterrorism Cooperation.

This position was designated to the Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, Algiers.

Beyond continental measures at CTCOIN and CVE, the respective regional organisations in Africa have also taken measures at combating these threats. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

It is pertinent to note that the political leadership in several African states have sometimes labelled opposition elements as terrorist in the bid to sustain the suppression.

In Libya, the Supreme Leader of the Arab Jamahiriya, Colonel Muammar Ghadaffi sought to justify his repression of the domestic political opposition and attempts at popular uprising against his regime as counterterrorism efforts.

Similar justifications have also been utilized by the Governments in Cameroon against Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) clamouring for independence in the English-speaking regions of Southern Cameroons since 2017. In like manner, the Government of Nigeria proscribed the Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) which is an organisation seeking for the independence of former Eastern region of the country which attempted secession as the Republic of Biafra between 1967 and 1970.



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Strategies for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Discussion:

Violent Extremism in Africa and Child Soldier Prevention/Protection.

Exposé : Pr. Rémy MBIDA MBIDA

Introduction Generale

L'implication des enfants dans les conflits en Afrique n'est pas un phénomène nouveau. Cependant, l'utilisation des enfants par les groupes extrémistes violents et terroristes est une problématique qui intéresse la communauté internationale depuis quelques années. L'extrémisme violent « renvoie aux opinions et aux actions de ceux qui approuvent la violence ou y ont recours au nom d'objectifs idéologiques, religieux ou politiques ». Ce phénomène connaît en Afrique une croissance importante depuis les années 2000 suite à l'explosion du terrorisme djihadiste sur le continent. Les activités terroristes sont présentes en Afrique de l'Est, en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre ; l'Afrique du Nord ayant connu le terrorisme depuis les années 1990. L'extrémisme violent en Afrique est l'œuvre des groupes extrémistes et terroristes dont les principaux depuis les années 2000 à nos jours sont Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), MUJAO, Al-Shebaab, Boko Haram.

Les groupes terroristes djihadistes en Afrique ont la particularité d'opérer dans plusieurs pays avec les actions qui dépassent le seul cadre d'un Etat. Boko Haram effectuent des attentats terroristes au moins dans 4 pays : Nigéria, Cameroun, Niger, Tchad. MUJAO mène des activités terroristes dans 4 pays : Mali, Niger, Algérie et Burkina-Faso. Al-Shebaab opère dans 6 pays entre 2007-2016 : Somalie, Kenya, Ethiopie, Ouganda, Tanzanie, Djibouti. Le terrorisme djihadiste est ainsi devenue une véritable gangrène en Afrique subsaharienne depuis la fin des années 2000.

L'explosion de l'extrémisme violent en Afrique s'est accompagnée de l'extension du phénomène des enfants soldats. **Les enfants soldats sont des personnes de moins de 18 ans qui sont utilisés dans le cadre des conflits armés.**

Si le phénomène en Afrique a été longtemps évoqué dans le cadre des conflits internes, l'extrémisme violent a placé le recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes au cœur des préoccupations internationales. Selon le Rapport du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies sur le sort des enfants en temps de conflit armé, les enfants ont été utilisés par le Mouvement des Chabab au Kenya et en Somalie, par le Mouvement pour l'unification et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, Ansar Eddine et Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique au Mali et dans les pays voisins.



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Dans le cas spécifique de Boko Haram, le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies a estimé que depuis 2009 environ 8 000 enfants ont été enrôlés et utilisés par Boko Haram au Nigéria . L'usage des enfants soldats par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes est une réalité sur le continent. Comment prévenir efficacement le recrutement des enfants soldats par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique ? Telle est la question centrale à laquelle nous allons tenter de suggérer une réponse selon une démarche en deux temps. Dans un premier temps, nous allons analyser le recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes (I), puis effectuer des propositions sur la prévention contre ce recrutement (II).

I. Le Recrutement Des Enfants Soldats Par Les Groupes Extremistes Et Terroristes En Afrique

Le recrutement des enfants est un sujet de préoccupation majeure pour les Etats et les sociétés. Il est important d'en saisir les facteurs (A), les modes et méthodes de recrutement utilisés par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes (B).

A. Les facteurs de recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique

Il convient pour comprendre le phénomène de recrutement et d'utilisation des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes met en face deux types d'acteurs dont les motivations sont parfois différentes ou peuvent se rencontrer. D'où la nécessité de ressortir les motivations des groupes extrémistes et terroristes à recruter les enfants soldats et celles des enfants à rejoindre ces groupes.

1. Les motivations des groupes extrémistes et terroristes

Les motivations des groupes extrémistes et terroristes dans le recrutement des enfants sont essentiellement liées au fort pourcentage des enfants dans la population dans les zones d'opération en Afrique et aux avantages liés à leur usage.

- **Un fort pourcentage des enfants dans la population totale**

Les enfants sont un groupe d'âge qui est majoritaire dans les pays africains. Par exemple, les enfants représentent plus de 50 % de la population totale dans chacun des pays touchés par la crise liée à Boko Haram, ce pourcentage atteignant 60 % dans certains cas .Ils sont donc une cible importante du recrutement pour les groupes terroristes.

- **Les avantages liés à l'usage des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes**



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Pour les groupes extrémistes et djihadistes, le recrutement des enfants présente trois avantages majeurs pour eux. Du point de vue économique, le traitement des enfants est moins coûteux que celui des adultes en termes de revenus et de prise en charge. Du point de vue de l'exécution des tâches, les enfants sont plus faciles à contrôler et enclins à la loyauté envers les chefs du groupe. Du point de vue tactique, les enfants éveillent moins de soupçons, ils peuvent exécuter efficacement les missions d'attentat-suicide ou de transport de message d'une part ; et d'autre part ils peuvent être utilisés comme des instruments pour les groupes terroristes et extrémistes pour créer des chocs dans la société.

2. Les motivations des enfants

Les motivations peuvent être classées en deux grands groupes de facteurs désignés respectivement « facteurs de répulsion » et « facteurs d'attraction ». Les facteurs de répulsion peuvent être définis comme des circonstances négatives auxquelles l'enfant tente d'échapper en rejoignant un groupe extrémiste, tandis que les « facteurs d'attraction » représentent les incitations positives qui attirent les enfants et les amènent à rejoindre un groupe extrémiste.

- Les facteurs de répulsion

La pauvreté, la marginalisation et la discrimination

Ce sont des raisons qui poussent les enfants à rejoindre les groupes extrémistes et terroristes. Le facteur économique est ainsi un facteur de répulsion important et concerne davantage les enfants des rues, les pauvres vivant en milieu rural, les enfants réfugiés et les enfants déplacés à l'intérieur de leur pays. La vulnérabilité des enfants aux conditions économiques difficiles ouvre la porte aux groupes extrémistes et terroristes. Selon PNUD, la majorité des recrutés « jeunes » en Afrique par les groupes extrémistes sont venus des régions frontalières aggravées par le manque de développement .

- Le manque d'encadrement familial et les tendances idéologiques des parents

Certains enfants sont vulnérables dans les zones d'opération privilégiée des terroristes en raison parfois du fait qu'ils se retrouvent seuls sans leurs parents ou les membres de leurs familles. Ils sont exposés aux groupes extrémismes. Par ailleurs, les parents qui épousent les idéologies des extrémistes peuvent livrer volontairement leurs enfants ; même parfois pour les avantages matériels.



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- Le sentiment d'injustice et de manque de repères et d'identité

La méfiance envers l'Etat, ses institutions et ses responsables peut alimenter la radicalisation et l'extrémisme dans le cœur des enfants. Selon le rapport du PNUD, au terme d'enquêtes réalisées chez les jeunes, anciens recrues des groupes shebaab et Boko Haram, « 83% (estiment) que les gouvernements ne défendent que les intérêts d'une minorité, et plus de 75% n'ont aucune confiance ni dans les responsables politiques ni dans les dispositifs sécuritaires de l'État ». Le sentiment d'injustice est un facteur d'extrémisme.

Par ailleurs, le manque de repères et d'identités peut plonger les enfants dans le désespoir ne voyant pas à l'horizon les possibilités de réussite sociale. Ils peuvent ainsi plonger dans l'extrémisme violent.

- Les facteurs d'attraction

Le sentiment de pouvoir être utile

Le fait pour des enfants qui ont une enfance difficile caractérisée par la marginalisation ou l'exclusion sociale, appartenir à un groupe extrémiste et terroriste peut apparaître comme une motivation dans le sens où ils se sentiront utiles et appartenant à une « famille ».

- La recherche de l'argent

Le chômage, la pauvreté chronique peut pousser les enfants à se tourner vers les groupes terroristes et extrémistes violents qui leur suggèrent prestige, honneur et pouvoir.

Le partage des idées religieuses du groupe, l'esprit de vengeance et identification indirecte avec les victimes de la violence

Les enfants peuvent adhérer à des groupes terroristes et extrémistes dans le but de se venger de « l'ennemi » selon eux. Cette colère peut les pousser à adhérer au combat mené par un groupe, surtout encore plus lorsqu'il partage les idées religieuses du groupe terroriste.

Les motivations dans le recrutement des enfants par les groupes terroristes sont de part et d'autre. Il convient dès lors d'analyser les modes et méthodes de recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique.



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B. Les modes et méthodes de recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique

On distingue deux modes de recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes. Le recrutement volontaire et le recrutement forcé. Le recrutement volontaire est le fait pour l'enfant lui-même de solliciter une adhésion à un groupe extrémiste et djihadiste. Dans le cadre des activités de l'Etat Islamique, il avait été observé le déplacement des mineurs d'Europe vers la Syrie pour être utilisé par l'organisation dans leurs activités.

Les groupes extrémistes violents et terroristes se livrent principalement au recrutement forcé et souvent brutal de nombreux enfants en Afrique. Ceux-ci peuvent être kidnappés, enlevés, contraints par la menace lors des attaques des villages. C'est le cas de Boko Haram. On se souvient de l'enlèvement des filles de Chibok.

Une fois recruté de manière forcé ou volontaire, les enfants sont utilisés à divers tâches. Ils ont un rôle d'appui ou de combattant. Les enfants ont été utilisé comme des Kamikazes par Boko Haram. Selon l'Unicef, en 2017 près de 135 enfants ont été utilisés par Boko Haram pour mener des attentats-suicides au Nigeria et au Cameroun en 2018, soit cinq fois plus qu'en 2016. Le comble est que les filles sont davantage utilisées par Boko Haram pour commettre les attentats-suicides. Selon l'UNICEF, les filles ont représenté les trois quarts des enfants impliqués dans des attentats-suicides menées par des enfants pour le compte de Boko Haram entre janvier 2014 et février 2016. Dans le cadre du rôle de soutien, en tant que messagers, porteurs, contrebandiers ou espions. Parfois, les enfants notamment les filles sont traitées comme des esclaves et systématiquement soumis à des violences et à l'exploitation sexuelles.

Les groupes extrémistes violent et terroristes utilisent des méthodes précises pour recruter les enfants. Selon une étude réalisée en 2017 par le Bureau régional du Programme du Développement des Nations unies pour l'Afrique intitulée, la « la dynamique du processus de recrutement » reposent sur trois méthodes majeures :

- *La propagande sur internet*

Les groupes extrémistes et terroristes utilisent la propagande pour influencer les orientations idéologiques, intellectuelles et doctrinales des enfants/jeunes. Ils mettent des vidéos sur le net pour la propagande. Ces vidéos de propagande constituent un outil essentiel dans la stratégie de recrutement des groupes terroristes destinée principalement aux jeunes. Les groupes terroristes utilisent les réseaux sociaux, particulièrement YouTube, Facebook et Twitter pour diffuser ces vidéos de propagande qui se caractérisent par un professionnalisme plus ou moins important. Il apparait ainsi que internet est une plate-forme essentielle utilisée par les réseaux terroristes pour recruter leurs adeptes.



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- **La force**

Les groupes extrémistes et terroristes recourent à la force aussi pour recruter les enfants. Le groupe Boko Haram par exemple utilise beaucoup la méthode du Kidnapping et des enlèvements pour recruter les enfants soldats.

- **Les agents de recrutement**

Les groupes terroristes utilisent des agents de recrutement qui peuvent être positionnés dans les lieux de culte, les villages pour chercher à convaincre les enfants d'adhérer à leurs idéaux. L'agent recruteur exerce une influence sur l'enfant pour le pousser à désirer le recrutement.

Le recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique est une réalité qui, demeure néanmoins complexe. Il faut lutter contre ce mal.

II. La Protection Des Enfants Contre Les Groupes Extremistes Et Terroristes En Afrique

La protection des enfants contre les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique est un enjeu important pour le continent. Il faudrait d'abord considérer qu'il existe un cadre juridique qui consacre la protection des enfants contre l'extrémisme violent (A) avant de voir les mesures préventives nécessaires pour une meilleure protection des enfants contre les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique (B).

A. La consécration de la protection des enfants contre les groupes extrémistes et terroristes en Afrique par le droit international

Le droit international pose le principe de l'interdiction de recrutement des enfants par les groupes armés non étatiques parmi lesquels les groupes terroristes. Selon l'article 4, alinéa 1 du Protocole facultatif à la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant, concernant l'implication d'enfants dans les conflits armés adopté en 2000 : « Les groupes armés qui sont distincts des forces armées d'un État ne devraient en aucune circonstance enrôler ni utiliser dans les hostilités des personnes âgées de moins de 18 ans ». En ce qui concerne explicitement l'extrémisme violent et le terrorisme, l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies à l'occasion du cinquième examen biennal de la Stratégie antiterroriste mondiale de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, dans sa résolution 70/291, a condamné fermement le recrutement et l'emploi systématiques d'enfants pour la perpétration d'attentats terroristes, ainsi que les violations et atteintes commises par les groupes terroristes contre les enfants, soulignant que ces violations et atteintes pourraient constituer des crimes de guerre.



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Le droit international invite les Etats à jouer un rôle actif dans la protection du recrutement des enfants soldats en général et donc des enfants par les groupes terroristes et djihadistes. C'est pourquoi des mesures préventives appropriées doivent être prises pour lutter contre le recrutement des enfants.

B. La prévention contre le recrutement des enfants dans l'extrémisme violent

La prévention contre le recrutement forcé ou volontaire des enfants est la lutte contre les facteurs d'enrôlement de ces derniers dans les groupes extrémistes violents. Il convient de souligner au préalable que selon le PNUD, il y'a trois groupes de pays en Afrique exposés à l'extrémisme violent

- **Les pays de l'épicentre** : Libye, Mali, Nigéria, Somalie
 - **Les pays secondaires** : Cameroun, Kenya, Mauritanie, Niger, Tchad et Tunisie
 - **Les pays à risque** : Maroc, Ouganda, RCA, Sénégal, Soudan et Tanzanie.
- Selon nous, trois approches sont à prendre à compte par les Etats africains.

1. L'approche politico-juridique

Elle consiste pour les Etats africains à renforcer la démocratie et l'Etat de droit car les défaillances à l'Etat de droit et à la bonne gouvernance sont des terrains propices à la radicalisation. Il faut donc une consolidation de la démocratie sur le continent pour renouer la confiance entre l'Etat et les jeunes (enfants). La bonne gouvernance est à renforcer pour prévenir la radicalisation des enfants pour que ces derniers ne soient pas exposés aux discours et doctrines qui leur présente l'Etat comme leur ennemi.

Sur le plan juridique, il faut mettre un accent particulier sur la prévention globale des jeunes (enfants inclus) contre l'extrémisme dans les dispositifs existants par exemple sur la lutte contre le terrorisme. La pénalisation des discours haineux est aussi une mesure importante à intégrer dans le droit pénal pour dissuader ceux qui seront tentés de s'y livrer. Le Cameroun a intégré la condamnation des discours de haine dans son droit pénal.

2. L'approche numérique

Cette approche consiste essentiellement au contrôle et à l'analyse des publications véhiculant des contenus extrémistes sur les différents moyens et supports de communication et d'information notamment le web et les réseaux sociaux. Les Etats



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africains devraient approfondir leurs dispositifs de lutte contre la cybercriminalité et s'approprier davantage le cyberspace. L'impératif de prendre en considération le numérique dans la lutte contre l'extrémisme n'est plus à démontrer. Il faut une surveillance des activités extrémistes violents en ligne pour améliorer la sécurité des Etats et du continent. La coopération entre les Etats africains est en renforcer dans ce sens pour un échange de renseignement.

3. L'approche socio-économique

Le développement comme le soulignait le PNUD doit constituer une priorité dans la prévention du recrutement des enfants par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes. Il faut renforcer le développement des régions frontalières comme dans le bassin du Lac Tchad pour résoudre le problème de l'enclavement et créer un environnement propice au progrès économique qui satisfait le citoyen.

Un accent dans l'enseignement et l'éducation des masses dans les zones vulnérables est une piste à explorer constamment. Améliorer la qualité de l'enseignement et de l'éducation est indispensable dans l'équation de la prévention des enfants de l'extrémisme violent, car il est bien établi que les recruteurs se servent des plateformes éducatives, en Afrique comme ailleurs, pour mener à bien leurs desseins.

En définitive, l'implication des enfants soldats dans l'extrémisme violent en Afrique est une réalité. Il est question désormais de lutter contre le phénomène en prenant des mesures préventives appropriées permettant de résoudre à la base, les facteurs de recrutement. De même, les mesures curatives sont nécessaires pour la réintégration sociale des enfants qui ont été utilisés soit comme combattant soit comme soutien par les groupes extrémistes et terroristes. Le renforcement des capacités est une nécessité pour réussir ce combat.



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Strategies for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Discussion:

Violent Extremism and Terrorism across Africa: Interrogating Capacity Deficits.

Exposé : Maj Gen Josias Mokaloba

Introduction

Globally, political violence declined in 2020, except in Africa. Terrorism and internal conflicts have been the biggest contributors to the global deterioration in peacefulness.

Aim

The aim of this intervention is to identify the gaps in the current responses to conflict challenges on the continent and make intervention suggestion on how to change the approaches to the scourge.

Scope

- Definitions
- Background
- Threats and Challenges
- Current Efforts
- Conclusion

Threats and Challenges of Terrorism and Insurgency across Africa

- According to the Global Peace Index 2020, a total of 97 countries recorded an upsurge in terrorist activity, while only 47 had lower levels of terrorism.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remained the world's least peaceful region, being home to 4 of the 10 least peaceful countries in the world.
- Civil unrests in sub-Saharan Africa rose by more than 800 per cent, from 32 riots and protests in 2011 to 292 in 2018. Horrendous atrocities being committed daily on defenceless communities; Economic destruction of livelihoods and properties; Human displacements; Social disruptions; Causing of hunger, poverty, disease, homelessness and stagnation; Family dislocations; Orphaning of children, widows.



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- The need for resettlement, relocation, reconstruction, restructuring of governance systems, retraining of people for governance; Re-establishing governance systems; Re-growing and developing the economy; and stagnating human resource development.
- Then, 3 of the 10 conflicts to worry about in the world as from 2020 are located in Africa – Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Sahel. Moreover, shocks such as natural disasters and the COVID-19 have exacerbated conflicts on across hotspots on the continent.
- The number of natural disasters tripled in the last 4 decades, with their economic impacts rising from USD50 billion in the 1980s to USD200 billion per year in the last decade. Also, COVID-19 pandemic-imposed restrictions heightened political and social tensions as frustrations are compounded by economic decline and food shortages.
- According to ACLED 2020 Report, Nigeria recorded an increase of 883 events or 63 per cent, underscored by proliferation of gang and militia activities, with multiple agendas ranging from economic interests to political interests, and leveraging the large cache of small arms smuggled into the country from the Sahel. Undeveloped areas.
- In Nigeria, both Boko Haram factions and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were able to take advantage of lockdown measures and the limited presence of military personnel to expand activities as well as escalate attacks on IDP camps and military troops, contributing further to increase in political violence.
- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, an increase of 788 events or 46 per cent was recorded in the activities of non-state armed groups.
- Mali recorded an increase of 405 or 68 per cent counterinsurgency operations in the Sahel, as Jihadi militant activities surged in 2019, with the Al Qaeda affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISG-S) launching a simultaneous offensive in the 'tri-state border' region.
- In Cameroon, an increase of 365 events or 53 per cent were recorded, with the Amabazonian separatist conflict Ibid.
- Other countries across the continent, including Burkina Faso, Niger, and especially Mozambique, have all recorded worrisome spikes in levels of political violence.
- The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is currently seized with the situation in Mozambique, just as the African Union Commission have expressed serious concern over political violence in Chad.



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- Above all, increases in extremists' violence have also amounted to an escalation of violence against civilians, in the forms of attacks, abductions/forced disappearance and sexual violence across Africa.
- This very precarious security situation on the continent was vividly summed up in the request in April 2020 by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, for the relocation of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to Africa.
- Similarly, the Mozambique government wrote to the European Union in September 2020 requesting for help in training its armed forces to battle the insurgency within its territory. Thus, these requests appear to strongly underscore gross deficits in the continent's capacity for countering terrorism, insurgency and violent extremism, thereby necessitating a review and change in the way Africa confronts this challenge.
- The review and change desired should also accord with strategic objectives of new training directives by RECs/RMs and above all, issued by the AU for the period 2021-2023.

Currents Efforts

Response, frameworks to address violent extremism abound especially in the defence and security training institutions across the continent.

- The training and capacity building programs conducted at the national military and police academies, staff and defence colleges;
- Peace and Security training institutions have proliferated across Africa since the mid-1990s, after the debacles in Rwanda and Somalia, and the consequent reduction of 'Western' boots on African soil.
- As expected, the devolution to Africans, of greater responsibility for peace and security on the continent was matched with a corresponding increase in support for the development of African capacities for countering terrorism, insurgency and violent extremism, through a myriad of training and capacity building programs at African training institutions across the continent. Nevertheless, political violence continues to multiple across Africa.
- Operational efficiency depends on training and capacity building, terrorism, insurgency and violent extremism ought to have been significantly and progressively degraded, owing to the number of trainings and capacity building activities conducted by training institutions across the continent. But this has not happened. Why??????



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- The continent continues to record increases in number of political violence events. Causes arise from poor state governance and poor living conditions, inability of state security forces to contain the escalating violence and incentives that fuel the conflicts.

Critical Capacity Deficits

- Limited and unreliable Mission Support
- Dedicated Financial support for deployed missions
- Matching the responses capacities with armed groups operating tactics
- Our personnel are still operating on the conventional premise when the armed groups employ irregular warfare tactics
- Our personnel deploy in large units while armed groups operate in small sticks of three to four people and sometimes even two
- Armed groups melt into the communities during the day or when they see large security deployments and decimate them during the night
- Communications are not secure as they are vulnerable to interception
- Personnel deployed are not maximising on camouflage when in deployment
- Inadequately equipping our forces in deployment
- Managing to gain the support and trust of the communities where the armed groups operate and have an upper hand and control
- Understanding the strategies used by the armed groups to gain operational superiority
- Pushing the primacy of politics ahead of military options
- Managing to stifle the communications of the armed groups in order to disrupt their coordination and operations
- Failure by political leaders to understand what type of skills are required for deployment so as to counter the strategies used by the armed groups
- The need to understand the operational modalities of armed groups so that the deployed personnel have the appropriate skills that can disrupt armed groups plans
- The response to the atrocities perpetrated in Mozambique, the Sahel, the DRC, the



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Lake Chad Basin require a different mind set that will influence the decision on how to select what type of force structures to deploy.

- Financing the response to such operations should be dedicated but controlled differently for quick support
- Deployments into such operations should be very restricted in terms of what the public should know to avoid compromising the operations by alerting the armed groups to what is happening.

Way Forward

- Rethink deployments: Types of units with capacities that are appropriate for the current challenges (Special Forces)
- Mobilise dedicated financial support
- Seriously consider the primacy and impact of the primacy of politics
- Adequately and appropriately Equip our deployed forces for them to be confident, effective and efficient
- Identify armed groups leaders and engage in the Track II format
- Understand the grievances that armed groups use to drive their atrocities
- Establish the social and economic grievances affecting the local communities and address them
- Provide funding for economic activities of the locals for them to sustain themselves
- As security is restored provide security to the communities in order to build confidence and trust in the government
- Consider the minimisation of publicity of the intensions and modalities to be employed for response to challenges
- Organise productive leadership and community communication engagements to build exchange of ideas and local needs



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Conclusion

The presentation has identified the threats, challenges and problem as well as identified the gaps and deficiencies in the response efforts. It offered the way forward for consideration.

Thus, Africa should not be led by and rely on external deployments of capacities as Africa has these capacities. True, ISIS was significantly decimated in Iraq and Syria through the use of special forces and abundant provision of resources and equipment. However, radical as it may sound, the skills and capacities are available on the continent and that is what Africa needs right now.



Session Two

*Ad Hoc Coalitions and Counter Terrorism
Operations in Africa*



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Ad Hoc Coalitions and Counter Terrorism Operations in Africa

Discussion:

Coalition Ad-Hoc sur la sécurité régionale et les opérations antiterroristes en Afrique.

Exposé : Pr Ntuda Ebodé Joseph Vincent, *Professeur Titulaire des Universités hors Echelles en Science Politique, option Relations Internationales et Etudes Stratégiques*; Directeur du Centre de Recherche d'Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques (CREPS), de l'Université de Yaoundé II-Soa; Directeur du Séminaire de Géopolitique Afrique de la Défense à l'Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Guerre (ESIG), de Yaoundé. ntudaebode.joseph@gmail.com

Introduction

Pour faire face à ses nombreux défis sécuritaires post-guerre froide, la dynamique de l'Union Africaine est passée par deux étapes :

1. Le Mécanisme du Caire ; Prévention Gestion et règlement des conflits en Afrique (juin 1993) avec pour mandat essentiel la PREVENTION ;
2. Le Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité (CPS), décembre 2003 avec pour mandat les 6 missions suivantes, dévolues par l'article 7 :

1. l'anticipation, la prévention et le règlement des conflits ;
2. l'intervention dans le cadre d'une opération de maintien de la paix ;
3. les sanctions contre toute menace ou atteinte à la paix ;
4. la mise en œuvre de la politique de défense commune ;
5. la lutte contre le terrorisme ;
6. la coopération avec les mécanismes régionaux et les Nations Unies dans la préservation et le maintien de la paix.

Toutefois et pendant longtemps, c'est le maintien de la paix qui a occupé une grande partie du temps du Conseil de sécurité de l'UA, et ceci d'autant plus que, c'est l'Afrique qui concentre le plus d'opérations de paix dans le monde.

Mais depuis 2011, une tendance aux coalitions ad hoc a émergé. Entendues comme des groupes d'États déployant principalement des forces militaires pour stabiliser les zones menacées par des groupes armés non étatiques, généralement avec l'aide de divers partenaires extérieurs, ces coalitions ad hoc se produisent dans des zones de conflit sans véritable processus de paix global et sont chargés de affronter des acteurs spécifiques qui sont désignés comme des menaces à la paix et à la sécurité régionales.



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L'Afrique en a connu principalement trois :

- L'Initiative de coalition régionale contre l'Armée de résistance du Seigneur (RCI-LRA) autorisée en 2011 (qui comprenait également des troupes des États-Unis);
- La Force opérationnelle multinationale interarmées (MNJTF) déployée dans le bassin du lac Tchad en 2015 en réponse à Boko Haram;
- La Force conjointe du G5 Sahel , déployée pour combattre divers groupes armés non étatiques à travers le Sahel en 2017.

Pour les défenseurs de ces coalitions, c'est elles qui sont bien adaptées pour faire face aux groupes armés et terroristes transnationaux , jusque-là pas pris suffisamment en considération par l'architecture de paix et de sécurité de l'UA.

Pour les adversaires au contraire, ces coalitions posent le problème de leur légitimité, de leur financement et de leur efficacité. En d'autres termes, qui devrait les autoriser, les financer et fournir diverses formes d'assistance technique, logistique et sécuritaire? Ce propos introductif commence par les caractériser (I), avant d'envisager leurs futuribles ou les futurs possibles.

I. Les caractéristiques des coalitions ad hoc africaines

A. Sur le plan du droit

1. Les coalitions ad hoc sont basées sur l'autodéfense collective, ou ce que certains analystes appellent « l'intervention sur invitation ». Ils opèrent en vertu de l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies avec le consentement de l'État hôte et ne nécessitent donc pas une résolution explicite du Conseil de sécurité sous l'autorité du chapitre VII.

2. Ils s'alignent également sur la politique africaine commune de défense et de sécurité de l'UA, telle qu'énoncée à l'article 3, section (e) et à l'article 4, section (d) de l' Acte constitutif de l'UA .

B. Sur le plan politique

1. Ces coalitions reflètent l'esprit de sécurité collective et d'autonomie pour répondre à une menace partagée qui est au cœur de l'architecture africaine de paix et de sécurité (APSA). Mais ils opèrent en dehors du cadre officiel des huit Communautés économiques régionales (CER) et de deux Mécanismes régionaux—formés pour aider à constituer la Force africaine en attente (FAA)—qui sont reconnus comme des éléments constitutifs



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et des agents d'exécution de l'APSA. Les coalitions ne font pas non plus partie de la Force africaine en attente et ne sont donc pas conformes aux six scénarios originaux de la FAA pour les déploiements militaires, conçu en 2003. Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas d'une exigence légale de leur déploiement, jusqu'à présent, chaque coalition ad hoc a demandé l'autorisation du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'UA (CPS).

2. En tant que réponses régionales à des menaces partagées, elles ne sont pas surprenantes à deux égards.

Premièrement, ils sont composés de voisins régionaux car la plupart des menaces à la sécurité sont ressenties plus intensément sur des distances plus courtes.

Deuxièmement, les mécanismes africains de réponse aux crises existants – la FAA et la Capacité africaine de réponse immédiate aux crises (CARIC) – n'ont pas encore été déployés en tant que tels.

Mais de ces deux mécanismes de l'APSA, les coalitions ad hoc ressemblent davantage à l'approche ACIRC qu'aux forces régionales en attente de la FAA.

C. Sur le plan financier

Ces coalitions ne sont que partiellement autofinancées et sont donc dépendantes du soutien de partenaires extérieurs. Bien qu'elles aient sollicité l'aide financière de l'UA et, par l'intermédiaire de l'UA, des fonds provenant des contributions statutaires de maintien de la paix de l'ONU.

Jusqu'en 2020, cependant, le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU avait rejeté toutes ces demandes, à l'exception partielle de la Mission des Nations Unies au Mali (MINUSMA) fournissant un certain soutien à la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel.

D. Sur le plan militaire

Les coalitions ont pour mandat de poursuivre un mélange d'activités d'application de la loi, de stabilisation, de contre-insurrection, de contre-terrorisme et de contre-criminalité. Ils sont composés principalement de soldats, avec relativement peu de policiers et un très petit nombre de civils. Il s'agit principalement d'opérations nationales conduites sur le territoire national avec un nombre réduit d'opérations transfrontalières et véritablement multinationales.

Dans chaque cas, le quartier général de la force fournissait un commandement formel mais peu de contrôle opérationnel des activités quotidiennes, la coordination entre les forces nationales disparates étant sa fonction principale.



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II. Les futurs possibles

a. Améliorer l'alignement avec l'UA ?

Mieux aligner ces coalitions sur les outils de gestion des conflits de l'UA ne sera pas facile car, par définition, il est peu probable que les initiatives ad hoc soient pleinement intégrées dans le cadre de l'APSA sans perdre leur flexibilité opérationnelle et le consensus politique sur le processus de mandat et d'autorisation entre le CPS de l'UA et l'entité ad hoc. Ce qui débouche sur trois défis majeurs.

- Premièrement, l'UA ne contrôle pas ces coalitions ad hoc, ce qui complique l'alignement politique. Au contraire, les coalitions sont le produit de négociations entre l'UA et l'entité ad hoc concernée, qui peuvent ne pas toujours générer un consensus.

Une solution à cet égard pourrait être que l'UA développe un mécanisme pour intégrer les institutions multilatérales existantes et futures dans l'APSA, c'est-à-dire des entités au-delà des CER et des MR reconnues, telles que la Commission du bassin du lac Tchad ou le G5 Sahel.

Une autre option serait de maintenir ces entités en dehors du cadre officiel de l'APSA, auquel cas l'alignement nécessitera un consensus entre le CPS de l'UA et l'entité ad hoc en question concernant le mandat, les modalités et le financement de la mission.

- Deuxièmement, parce que ces coalitions ne correspondent pas aux six scénarios originaux de la FAA pour les déploiements militaires, l'UA pourrait élargir les scénarios potentiels pour les initiatives de l'APSA afin d'englober ces activités.

Cela pourrait déboucher sur une révision plus large de la doctrine de l'UA pour les opérations de soutien à la paix et les initiatives de sécurité de l'APSA. L'élément facilitateur ici est que ces coalitions ad hoc partagent certaines similitudes avec l'approche ACIRC - et sa flexibilité intrinsèque par rapport aux forces régionales de la FAA - qui a déjà été largement débattue au sein de l'UA.

- Troisièmement, ces coalitions ad hoc ne relèvent pas de la définition habituelle des opérations de paix.

Le problème majeur ici est que la plupart des opérations militaires impliquent des soldats opérant sur leur territoire d'origine. En conséquence, la plupart du temps, les pays contributeurs de troupes (TCC) qui composent ces coalitions ad hoc sont simultanément l'État hôte.



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Traditionnellement, les opérations de paix sont menées par des troupes étrangères sur un sol étranger ; d'où la nécessité d'accords sur le statut des forces. Le fait que les missions soient largement composées de soldats nationaux opérant sur leur territoire national pose d'énormes problèmes pratiques et politiques à l'UA.

Comment s'assurer que seul le nombre autorisé de troupes nationales est impliqué ? Comment assurer la surveillance et la responsabilité ? Et comment l'UA devrait-elle gérer le précédent des fonds destinés aux opérations de paix utilisés pour soutenir une armée nationale opérant sur son propre territoire, souvent à des fins de lutte contre le terrorisme ?

Cette dernière question en particulier pose un problème important. Prendre des mesures pour changer ce précédent suggère que l'UA devrait établir ces coalitions ad hoc en tant que catégorie distincte d'opérations distinctes de ses « opérations de soutien de la paix », qui ont jusqu'à présent toujours impliqué des troupes étrangères opérant sur un sol étranger.

L'UA devra alors déterminer les circonstances dans lesquelles elle soutiendra de telles initiatives et comment, ce qui ajoutera plus de couches à une relation déjà compliquée.

b. Tirer profit des retours d'expérience du terrain

Les initiatives de gestion de crise réussies en Afrique, comme ailleurs, nécessitent quatre éléments :

- 1) une stratégie et un mandat politiques réalistes et appropriés ;
- 2) des capacités appropriées (personnel ainsi que catalyseurs et multiplicateurs de force) ;
- 3) un financement suffisant, flexible et durable ;
- 4) un soutien politique soutenu et de haut niveau.

Si l'UA opte pour le soutien de telles coalitions ad hoc, elle devra s'assurer que les quatre éléments ci-dessus soient prioritaires.

C. Synchroniser les activités militaires et politiques

Bien qu'elles aient un certain lien avec les stratégies politiques, les coalitions ad hoc susmentionnées n'intègrent pas leurs activités militaires à une stratégie politique viable pour résoudre le conflit et offrir une voie vers la paix. Ils n'intègrent pas non plus efficacement les dimensions non militaires de la stabilisation.



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e. Développer des mécanismes de responsabilité, de conformité et de droits de l'homme

L'UA devrait développer des mécanismes rigoureux de responsabilité, de conformité et de droits de l'homme pour ces missions ; similaire à ce que l'ONU appelle sa politique de diligence raisonnable en matière de droits de l'homme. Cela reste un travail en cours, mais l'UA a récemment fait des progrès significatifs, y compris de nouvelles directives et procédures sur la prévention et la réponse à l'exploitation et aux abus sexuels ainsi qu'aux problèmes de conduite et de discipline dans ses opérations de soutien à la paix.

f. Améliorer la génération de forces adaptée à leurs mandats

En termes de capacités appropriées, la génération de forces pour des mandats d'exécution aussi difficiles doit s'améliorer considérablement. La plupart des États africains ne disposent pas des troupes, de police, de facilitateurs ou de multiplicateurs de force appropriés pour accomplir des tâches qui leur sont confiées dans des environnements asymétriques à haut risque. Les mécanismes de l'APSA nécessitent donc une aide importante des forces de sécurité des partenaires extérieurs, notamment l'ONU et l'Union européenne, ainsi que des États individuels tels que les États-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni...

g. Mettre en œuvre un Fonds pour la paix révisé

Pour assurer un financement suffisant, flexible et durable pour de telles coalitions ad hoc, l'UA devrait mettre en œuvre son Fonds pour la paix révisé et des réformes plus larges dans ce sens. Là encore, l'UA a fait des progrès significatifs, notamment en établissant les mécanismes de gouvernance du Fonds pour la paix et en recevant plus de 60 millions de dollars de dépôts initiaux.

Il serait cependant imprudent d'utiliser ce fonds pour soutenir directement les troupes nationales opérant sur leur propre territoire. Cela créerait un précédent inutile et brouillerait les pistes entre les opérations de paix et les activités nationales de lutte contre le terrorisme. Une utilisation plus appropriée des fonds pourrait être de soutenir les coûts communs et partagés des opérations multinationales. Dans un avenir prévisible, cependant, les fonds africains limités nécessiteront que des partenaires extérieurs fournissent un soutien supplémentaire important.

h. Elaborer une stratégie viable de résolution des conflits et prévoir la signature d'un memo entre l'UA et les entités ad hoc

Enfin, d'une volonté politique soutenue et de haut niveau dépendra l'élaboration d'une stratégie viable de résolution des conflits et d'une, ainsi qu'un accord entre l'UA et



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l'entité ad hoc en question. Idéalement, la mission obtiendrait également le soutien de l'ONU et d'autres pays non africains.

Conclusion

La question de savoir si les coalitions ad hoc peuvent apporter la stabilité se résume finalement à la façon dont elles peuvent synchroniser leurs activités militaires et potentiellement contre le crime organisé avec les aspects politiques de leurs mandats, et l'engagement international plus large avec la menace régionale.

À ce jour, les trois coalitions mentionnées plus haut ont été des instruments militaires plutôt inappropriés, qui souffrent de diverses faiblesses stratégiques et opérationnelles importantes comme l'ont montré les rapports sur la RCI-LRA, la MNJTF et la G5 Sahel Joint Force.

Au mieux, ces coalitions ad hoc peuvent servir de premiers intervenants utiles aux menaces auxquelles les autres acteurs ne veulent pas ou ne peuvent pas faire face.

Mais ils sont susceptibles de rester lourds sur le plan militaire, de présenter des lacunes en termes de capacités et de présenter des risques importants, notamment en termes de responsabilité et de violations des droits humains.

Il est également très peu probable qu'ils soient autonomes, malgré le fait qu'ils soient en grande partie composés de troupes nationales opérant sur leur sol d'origine.

Dès lors, il est difficile de voir comment ces coalitions achèveront avec succès leur mandat.

Néanmoins, si l'UA pense qu'ils méritent d'être soutenus, elle doit développer une stratégie commune qui trace la voie vers la paix, trouver un financement durable et veiller à ce que les activités militaires et politiques soient synchronisées.

Sinon, les coalitions ad hoc africaines finiront par coûter des sommes considérables tout en produisant relativement peu d'effets stratégiques positifs et durables. La question reste donc ouverte : pour mieux lutter contre le terrorisme que d'autre faut-il faire ? Densifier l'échange d'informations, mettre sur pied de nouveaux dispositifs sécuritaires-militaires ou renforcer le déploiement opérationnel des Forces Africaines en Attente et des coalitions Ad hoc ? Mais, comment le faire ???



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Highlights

Prof Joseph-Vincent Ntuda Ebode (Moderator)

Key Points

The mismatch that exists between the causes and the solutions provided in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism through the ad hoc Coalitions in Africa has been highlighted here. This is demonstrated by the fact that most of the solutions are national and not Community or regional. Also, it seems necessary to note that the human resources selection mechanisms that participate in the operationalization of ad hoc Coalitions are not always geared towards the best resources available in our States at the continental level.

In addition, the proliferation of ad hoc Coalitions at regional and continental level weakens and slows down the action of actors traditionally involved in conflict resolution. It is therefore necessary that the actions and operations of the ad hoc Coalitions in Africa be based on the Peace Architecture and the arrangements of the African Standby Force (ASF). Although it is worth mentioning that the ASF is more «theoretical» than practical since it relies mainly on the equipment of the member states. Nevertheless, the AU should strengthen the capacities of these Coalitions on the basis of the prior consensus established with them.

Recommendations

- Improve the alignment of ad hoc Coalitions by the AU by going beyond the currently known RECs;
- Take advantage of feedback from the field:

Successful crisis management initiatives in Africa, as elsewhere, require four elements:

- 1) a realistic and appropriate strategy and political mandate;
- 2) appropriate capacities (personnel as well as enablers and multipliers of force);
- 3) sufficient, flexible and sustainable funding;
- 4) sustained and high level political support.

- Synchronize military activities with political ones;
- Develop accountability and human rights compliance mechanisms;
- Improve the generation of forces adapted to their mandates
- Implement a peace fund with broader reforms;
- Develop a viable conflict resolution strategy and provide for the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the AU and ad hoc entities.

Session Three

*De-radicalization and whole-of-Society Approach
to PCVE in Africa*



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Deradicalization and Whole-of-Society Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Discussion:

Upsurge In Violent Extermism Across Africa: Interrogating Capacity Buildin Deficits in De-Radicalization.

Exposé : Brig Gen (Rtd) Dr. R. Kabage (Lead speaker), *Peace and Conflict Management Consultant*

Introduction

The end of colonialism in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s was heralded as a move through which Africa regained its dignity. However it triggered a series of other endemic conflicts, either caused by ethnicity, religious differences, fight over boundaries and lately by terrorism from radicalized elements.

Terrorism has ravaged the width and breadth of the continent; with AlQaida terror group actively operating in the Islamic Magreb in the North, the Movement for Unity and Jihad (MUJ) having a credible presence in West Africa, the Boko-haram operating in Nigeria and Cameroon and the entire lake Chad basin and Al Shabaab operating in the Eastern Africa region. This has led Africa unfortunately to be classified as the new battleground of violent extremism with the threat even spreading further to other areas, like the Great Lakes region, southern Africa region and to countries such as Mozambique.

According to a 2017 UNDP report on violent extremism titled; “Journey to extremism in Africa”, between 2011 and 2016, over 33,300 fatalities are estimated to have been caused by violent extremism attacks in the continent. This came with related displacements and economic devastation, contributing to among the worst humanitarian catastrophes ever seen in the continent.

Today, many countries in Africa continue to experience manifestations of this threat in the form of radicalized elements within the society. Such elements are easily willing to condone, support, facilitate and use violence to further their political, ideological, religious or other goals. With this phenomenon on the rise, the terrain of violent extremism and radicalized groups active in Africa continues to soar.





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1. One would ask, why is this happening in Africa?. As we shall see later in our discussion, radicalization in Africa is shaped by a mix of factors to include civil wars, cross border conflicts, insurgencies, criminal networks, un-governed spaces, and grievances relating to under development, poverty, joblessness, exclusion, injustice and repression.

Aim

2. The aim of the presentation is to underscore the contribution of radicalization to the spread of terrorism and other forms of violent extremism and identify training capacity deficits in addressing the vice in Africa.

Scope

3. Scope is as follows:

- a. Radicalization concept,
- b. Drivers of radicalization in Africa,
- c. De-radicalization initiatives and,
- d. Identify radicalization training capacity deficits in Africa

The Radicalization Concept

4. There are varying governmental and non-governmental definitional approaches to the concept of radicalization. However, they underscore that radicalization refers to a process by which an individual or a group of people comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice. They denounce principles and values that underpin a peaceful orderly and non-violent society. They instead espouse violence, terror and coercion as a pathway to change and realizing specific beliefs and vision of society. Such individuals then move further and support terrorism and other extremist activities that are associated with terrorist groups. Though everyone is a victim of radicalization, it has been established that it is children and the youth that are most vulnerable to the vice.

Drivers of Radicalization

5. This section seeks to answer the question; what pushes a handful of individuals to join radical and violent organizations and groups?. This is not a simple question to answer since the drivers of radicalization are multiple, complex and context specific and hence defy easy analysis of the phenomenon. They however can be grouped into religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions.



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- a. Religious extremism. This is religious commitment, which is expressed through deep loyalty to a belief system. Some of its characteristic features are isolation, criminalization and elimination of persons considered to be enemies of the religion. In the 2017 UNDP study on extremism in Africa, 51% of the respondents cited religious grounds as a reason for their joining radicalized groups.
- b. Lack of faith in political systems. This factor to radicalization was identified by Alleni Botha, in a 2015 study titled “Radicalization to terrorism in Kenya and Uganda; a political socialization perspective”. He observed that this comes about when individual’s anger is directed to agents of state, due to their role in protecting the incumbent regime, leading them to mete injustices; deprivation and desperation among the citizens. Such citizens are hence forced to revert to radical ideologies that present themselves as a challenge to the status quo and a form of escape.
- c. Deprivation in educational terms. Individuals living in environments where literacy and education levels are low are susceptible to join radicalized groups. UNDP in their study in 2017 observed that 57% of the respondents admitted that radicalization was contributed by limited or lack of understanding of religious texts due to low educational levels. They depend on intermediaries for interpretation, and this is at times misleading.
- d. Economic marginalization and Youth unemployment. Individuals growing up in environments where poverty is high with lived reality of unemployment and under-employment are prone to radicalization. Difficult economic factors lead to frustration especially among the young people. This becomes a key dimension of individual’s vulnerability to narratives that invite them to channel such grievances and associated desperation into the cause of radicalized organizations. This is attributed to failure by governments to ensure that the pace and benefits of growth keep up with economic development and expansion of the population, especially for the youth. When youth’s future seems to promise no path for advancement, they become attractive targets of radical groups.
- e. Political marginalization. Most radicalized individuals have grievances and limited confidence in governments, accusing them of neglect and political marginalization leading to disaffection. They believe that the government only looks at the interests of a few people in society while neglecting them and so they are ready to join other groups that might offer them with alternative governance systems. This was the case with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia in the 1990s following the fall of the Siad Barre regime.
- f. Lack of parental involvement in the early child’s life. This leads to child neglect when growing up which makes them to become more vulnerable to radicalization influences as they grow up.



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g. Protection of religion. This is when a segment of society feels that their religion is under threat. For Muslims, this is occasioned by the constant Islamophobic rhetoric that have intensified in response to violent extremism. Radical groups therefore feel they are duty bound to defend their religion.

h. Local community social networks. Recruitment to radicalization in Africa is largely and highly localized unlike in other regions where Internet is associated with recruitment into radical groups. This is attributed to local networks within the community that are effective platforms of mobilization to radicalization.

De-radicalization Initiatives

6. While there is no scholarly consensus on the definition of de-radicalization, most are of the view that it refers to the process of relative change, in which radical groups reverse their ideology and delegitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve their goals. It involves approaches employed to bring radicalized individuals back to non-violent life by addressing issues that spark and sustain radicalization. Such approaches could include:

a. Build resilience among the population. Adopt a holistic approach to build resilience among the population against radicalization through expansion of educational programs. Such programs will be used to promote critical thinking so that citizens are equipped with ability to question negative religious teachings. The other approach to enhance resilience is through use of mainstream development projects designed to reduce perceptions of marginalization among individuals and communities.

b. Promote religious moderation. This will involve undertaking efforts to promote religious moderation, including by use of radio, television and other on-line and off-line platforms of communication to transmit moderate religious teachings. This could also involve review of religious texts and syllabi to remove existing radical exhortations to violence. This could also be achieved through upgrade of school curricula that promotes civic engagement of values adopted from childhood.

c. Economic empowerment. Government and other stakeholders to invest in economic development activities and other incentives that provides immediate and long-term empowerment opportunities and job creation, especially for the youth. This will provide them with hope for the future.

d. Counter-messaging to radicalized individuals. Initiate a strategy of counter messaging for those already radicalized. This will help to undermine the appeal of violent extremist by making use of counter narratives provided by former terrorists. In Somalia, AMISOM



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and the Somali government are using Imams and religious scholars to sensitize local communities and to provide counter narratives against the violent rhetoric usually propagated by the Al Shabaab extremists.

e. Religious Quick Impact projects. Use religious focused QIPs to benefit the local population that are otherwise perceived as marginalized. This could involve rehabilitation of mosques, Islamic schools and Madrassas to provide a platform for community mobilization, reconciliation and peace building.

f. Inmate religious visits. This is carried out by moderate religious authorities in the community, who visit radicalized inmates, and lead prison-based prayers in an effort to get radicalized recruits to change and denounce violence. This is effectively practised in Morocco.

g. Reform of the security Sector. This is intended to address injustices, human rights violations and authoritarianism associated with security actors as they fight radicalization activities in society. This could be achieved through enhancing oversight and accountability by elected and judicial institutions. This helps to build bridges between security actors and communities, thereby reducing distrust and mutual suspicion, which encourages radicalization.

h. Promote national reconciliation. Governments to support national reconciliation, compromise and inclusion of the population that perceive social and sectarian polarization. Further efforts to deepen patriotism and sense of belonging as away of countering external forces and influences of radicalization to violent extremism is encouraged. There is also need to develop initiatives that enhance national identities, social cohesion and citizenship. Provision of community led mentoring and trauma counselling services for the de-radicalized individuals is also recommended.

i. Robust ideological push back. Use both on-line and off-line media platforms to reclaim, take charge and control information asymmetries where radical groups have gained ground. Further re-invigorate, re-engineer Muslims and Islamic institutions to position them to better and more effectively respond to increasing radicalization advances into violent extremism of Muslims in the continent.

j. Encourage good parenting. Support community led outreach on good parenting and ensure provision of education for all from early age.



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Radicalization/De-radicalization Training Capacity Deficits

7. In Africa, the African Standby Force (ASF) training architecture assigns training to three levels; to include the African Union Commission (AUC), the REC/RMs and member states. The AUC, being the headquarters of the ASF is mandated to provide strategic guidance for ASF training while the RECs/RMs provide operational guidance and training with support of Training Centres of Excellence (TCE) and other training, research and academic institutions in the regions. AU Member states are responsible for providing tactical level training in the form of pre-deployment training.

8. ASF training is guided by periodical Training Directives developed during training implementation workshops (TIWs), which are held annually and attended by all ASF training stakeholders. They review implementation of previous directives and identify future ASF training needs and capability development requirements.

9. Drawing lessons from performance of AU deployments against terrorist activities in Somalia (AMISOM), the Regional Coordination Initiative for Elimination of Lords Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), the Multi National Joint Task Force in the lake Chad Basin (MNJTF), and G5 Sahel operations, it is evident that development of Africa's capacities for countering violent extremism through training is lacking in effectiveness.

10. It is in this regard that the current 2021-2023 ASF training directives have identified, as one of the key strategic pillars, "the need for conduct of research on the impact of emerging dynamics to include pandemics, Counter Terrorism and violent extremism on peace and security in Africa and make their training more visible". APSTA is taking lead in the implementation of this pillar through this roundtable.

14. The outcomes of the Roundtable are expected to assist the AUC, RECs/RMs and TCEs to address ASF capacity deficits in addressing radicalization and counter terrorism operations in Africa. Such deficits include the following:

a. Inadequate funding support. This training requires significant resources due to its versatility, intensity and technological dependency. This calls for broad based partnerships involving international partners, governments and non-state actors to finance and support development and implementation of CVE programs to provide skills to security operators to conduct operations with due adherence to IHL and IHRL, uphold human rights, avoid arbitrary arrests and detentions, extra-judicial killings and compliance to Rules of Engagements.

b. Limited trained professionals in CVE operations. Africa still has limited counter terrorism professionals who are able to offer such training due to limited exposure in



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this field. This has led to over-reliance on external technical support from partners who at times are not able to relate to the African context. They over use lessons learnt from other regions in the world that are at times not applicable to the African environment.

c. Insufficient training infrastructure. CVE training is infrastructure dependent. It requires unique facilities equipped with modern equipments to support practical lessons and exercises during the training. This is missing in most African TCEs except for IPSTC, Kenya which has a modern and well equipped Amani Village, which is a practical training capability, that supports realistic training, and enables trainees acquire desired skills to counter those being used by terrorists in modern environments.

d. Limited curriculum development experts. Africa still suffers deficit of qualified, experienced experts to develop comprehensive CVE curricula and syllabi for use in TCEs. Most TCEs rely on external expertise, which sometimes fails to relate to CVE dynamics in the continent. Such curricula needs to incorporate African Union protection related issues and process as stipulated in the AU compliance and accountability framework that includes protection of civilians, Conduct and Discipline and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

e. Lack of updated regional CVE guidance frameworks. These instruments are required to guide future CVE operations and training needs in the continent. The existing ones were developed sometimes back, to include; the 1999 OAU convention on the Prevention and combating Terrorism and the 2002 Plan of action on the prevention and combating terrorism. These instruments require regular review and updating to incorporate contemporary challenges in the fight against terrorism and radicalization in Africa and offer guidance on how to address them.

Conclusion

Radicalization and violent extremism are among the current threat to peace and security in Africa. It undermines fulfilment of the aspirations of silencing the guns in the continent and the broader development blue print of agenda 2030. Since ASF training is at the centre of addressing this vice, identified training capability deficits impacting on Africa's ability to defeat this phenomenon needs to be addressed as a matter of priority.



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Highlights

Brig Gen (Rtd) Dr. R. Kabage

Key Points

Most of the crises and violent extremisms in Africa are caused by the neglect of the youth by both the family and the states, which is what justifies the persistence of certain crises in Africa. The direct involvement of children and youth in extremist violence is facilitated by the fact that they are recruited through social media. Thus, they are exposed to recruitment and exploitation, hence they play an important role in conflicts and terrorist attacks.

De-radicalization is a process which allows the socio-professional reintegration of people formerly enrolled in terrorist groups. This approach shows that peace is in every way the element sought. The search for peace, in this context, must take into account the pooling of efforts through different actors, be they military, political, economic, etc. Likewise, to better understand deradicalization, it is essential to question radicalization and its corollaries. Thus, radicalization is inherent in every culture and its understanding must take into account local and specific realities.

In any case, radicalization and violent extremism are brakes to development in Africa and for AU programs such as «silence the guns in Africa».

Recommendations

- Include religious institutions in deradicaliation and disarmament;
- Promote national reconciliation between the State and social strata that complain of marginalization;
- Create additional resources in training centers of excellence in Africa to fight radicalization.



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Deradicalization and Whole-of-Society Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Discussion:

Prevention of Recruitment and use of Children in Armed Conflicts in Africa.

Exposé : Dr Shelly Whitman, *Dallaire Institute for Children Peace and Security, Canada*

Thank you to APSTA and the esteemed colleagues that are present here today. I greet you all from Canada and pray for your good health and positive future. On behalf of the Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security, the opportunity to speak today about the challenges children face with respect to violent extremism is timely and critical.

The Dallaire Institute's mission is to progressively end the recruitment and use of children as soldiers. There is a need to shift attitudes that can lead to action, and a need to hear the voices of those who have been most impacted. Experiences of children from various parts of the world are often far more similar than we realize.

Children are vulnerable to a range of abuses in conflict zones but also to a range of abuses in peacetime. These realities include boys and girls used as human bombs, to the various support functions children undertake like being a messenger, spy, cook, porter, to the children born within an armed group, or the detention of children suspected of being associated with an armed group to the indoctrination processes that fuel misunderstandings and set the stage for the involvement of children in armed conflict and violent extremist activity.

Understanding the vulnerability of children, whether during wartime or peacetime, to being used by various types of armed groups, criminal networks, gangs, trafficking rings and child labour is critical to effectively prevent the recruitment of children.

In other words, general perceptions of “who is a child soldier” must be challenged and unpacked.

Breaking cycles of conflict requires the prioritization of children's protection as central to creating conditions for lasting peace.

Equally important is to understand not only what makes children vulnerable to recruitment and use – but the rationale and motivations that drive armed groups, forces and gangs to use children – how do we mitigate such motivations so as to counter effectively? This means understanding the situations from all possible angles – from the child recruited



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and used as a soldier to the recruiter and to the communities that are impacted.

What are the roles that each of us has in this puzzle – from the military to the police to the child protection organizations to civilians to the policy makers and academia– none of us can solve this alone. T

At the Dallaire Institute, we wish to create a world where the recruitment and use of children as soldiers is ‘unthinkable.’

In February 2020, I had the unique opportunity to bring together two individuals that who were recruited and used during their childhood in violence and armed conflicts.

Omar Khadr and Ishmael Beah provided their first-hand experiences and context on this issue.

Omar Khadr, born and raised in Canada, was forced to move to Afghanistan at the age of 13 to take up arms as a child under the guidance of his father. After being torn asunder in a firefight with American forces that claimed the life of Sgt. Christopher Speer, a Delta Force strategic forces soldier and special forces medic, allegedly by a grenade thrown by Khadr, he was detained in Guantanamo Bay for ten years. Canada, at the time of Khadr’s illegal incarceration, failed to act in accordance with international standards to protect children who are unscrupulously used as weapons of war. This failure had a negative impact on Canada’s image as a protector of children’s rights and brought into question our commitment to human rights.

An apology and compensation in 2017 was just the first step in a long healing process that has only just begun for this young man. When Khadr was finally released on bail on May 7th of 2015, he stated, “there is nothing I can do about the past, but there is something I can do about the future”.

The circumstances of Khadr’s youth, vulnerability, and being forced into conflict by adults is not unique. Ishmael Beah, is a celebrated author (his bestselling book: *A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier*) and a globally recognized human rights activist, was also 13 years old when he was coerced and used as a soldier in Sierra Leone for two years in the country’s brutal 11-year civil war. But unlike Khadr, Beah was rehabilitated rather than incarcerated with adults, and went on to live what he calls his “second life”. Additionally, Beah has argued that one of the problems with Khadr’s case is that people do not have compassion for Khadr but have compassion for children recruited and used as soldiers in other parts of the world. “If a 15-year-old child in Sierra Leone or Uganda kills someone in a war, he is a victim in need of rehabilitation, but as soon as that child is accused of killing an American soldier, legal standards no longer apply,” Beah says.



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International law is very clear that children who are recruited and used as soldiers are not to be held criminally responsible for their participation in armed conflict. This principle should apply regardless of where the child is recruited from, or by which armed group, gang or force and no matter what ethnicity, race, religion, gender or political views one holds.

At the same time, all children who are recruited and used in violence require effective rehabilitation and psycho-social support. The earlier the interventions, the higher the chances of long-term success.

The Dallaire Institute understands through our research and experience, that the use of children in conflict significantly increases the probability that the conflict will recur in the future. It also impacts the severity and length of the conflict - making it a generational problem.

We live in a time when war is complex, conflicts transcend boundaries, globalization impacts greed and grievance, and competition for short attention spans appears to be more important than taking the time to delve deep and question perceptions versus the realities.

People who control the world want you to think of narratives in binary terms – us vs them, good vs evil, right vs left...but the world we live in requires far more nuanced discussions.

Before we begin, I ask you all to take a moment to think of difficult times in your childhood. How did you cope? What are the lasting impacts? Did you have any control over that situation? Now ask yourself – imagine if that was amplified by living in a conflict zone or extreme poverty or criminal networks.

Why do we make a differentiation between Child soldiers vs. enemy child terrorist? Are all children deserving of our protection or only so long as they aren't our perceived enemy?

Do we see some children as purely Victims and others as perpetrators and how do we make such distinctions?

How much punishment is enough or appropriate? And does this approach bring peace or reconciliation?

Ishmael has often stated: “Adults are the masterminds to war, the funders of the war efforts, and the ones who reap any rewards from war.... they also have the power to stop it from happening.”




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Children are used to strategically create moral dilemmas - this in turn creates hesitation in soldiers who are not professionally trained to face children used as soldiers. We have countless examples of such dilemmas and it is irresponsible to send troops into contexts they did not create without effective preparation.

Understanding how to better interact with child soldiers, deescalate threats, and safely remove and transfer children to safety not only protects children, but also our soldiers. Therefore, the Dallaire Institute has worked tirelessly to create new global standards such as the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers, to improve the way training, preparation and planning is conducted by military and police and to continue to push for political commitments that will lead to a world where we make the recruitment and use of children “unthinkable”.

From Mozambique to Somalia to South Sudan to the DRC to Nigeria and Cameroon the Dallaire Institute is currently being called upon to help find better solutions for children, their communities and the security sector that is put in very challenging dilemmas. As I close my remarks today, I wish to highlight that from East to West Africa, we are witnessing the violation of children’s basic rights to peace and security as a result of the proliferation of violent extremist groups that exploit communities cries to end poverty. If we wish to truly build an Africa, and a world fit for children, then we have to understand the primacy of doing far better to put children as the priority for lasting peace and security.



Session Four

*Emerging Issues and Challenges for Training &
Research on PCVE in Africa*



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Emerging Issues in Training and Research on PCVE in Africa

1. Review of ASF Training Policy and Standards

- The directives and doctrines in the framework of the prevention of violent extremism at the African level must be rigorously adopted by the member states. This allows them to amplify their impact across the continent;
- It is important to review the concept of operation and the format of the African Standby Force: the troop numbers remain insufficient. An increase in these is therefore necessary;
- Training and research policies on capacity building of the ASF with regard to standards should be distinct from implementation strategies;
- It is necessary to take into account the role of religion in training centers for a better understanding of religious issues in the prevention and fight against violent extremism
- It is important to alternate the profiles and personnel selected both among executives and among the ranks of non-commissioned and civilian personnel. We must therefore make the workforce more dynamic during the selection of candidates for training. Recycling the same people is not very productive.
- It is necessary that training centers stop being closed in on themselves and that they develop strategies to open up more to other sectors and other actors;

2. Standardization / harmonization of Regional Senior Mission Leaders

- The training centers suffer from a lack of documentation for African Union training courses due in particular to the lack of coordination and harmonization of training programs. It is therefore necessary for APSTA to play the role of interface to make African Union documentation much more accessible and in return for it to have communication tools to popularize the work produced by the training centers;
- To boost training centers in the field of research, it is proposed to create a dynamic and multidisciplinary doctoral cycle that can accommodate executives who have the skills to do research;
- Training and research centers should articulate strategies to raise awareness of the role of religious leaders in the prevention and fight against violent extremism;



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- Training and research centers should increase awareness of the prevention and fight against violent extremism in the communities where they are established;
- It was suggested that the conceptualization of terrorism in Africa by training and research institutions be made in a guidance note to be submitted to the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union
- It was further recommended that APSTA organize a workshop on the conceptualization of the Peace and Security Architecture in Africa.

3. Some Suggested Training Modules

Themes to be explored:

- Early warning systems
- The human factor in terrorism: psychology and sociology of victims and assaulted persons
- humanitarian law
- Non-violent conflict management and gender awareness (mainly targeting people working in camps), child protection, gender in peace support operations.

Recommendations:

- Facilitate workshops on violent extremism
- Education and youth participation
- Specific training on violent extremism for religious leaders
- Course on displacement and human trafficking
- Synergies between civil society organizations and faith-based organizations
- Training of government forces
- Support for youth initiatives
- Use of social media to raise awareness of violent extremism
- The role and place of religious leaders

Final Report



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African Union - APSTA International Colloquium of Directors of Training and Research on “Enhancement of Capacities for Integrated Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa” held on 28th & 29th of October 2021 at Hilton Hotel and APSTA Secretariat, Yaoundé Cameroon.

INTRODUCTION

The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), in collaboration with the African Union Commission’s Political Affairs Peace and Security (PAPS) Department organized an international Colloquium for Directors of Training and Research in Africa on 28th & 29th October 2021, at the Hilton Hotel and APSTA Secretariat both in Yaoundé Cameroon. The two-day Colloquium was on the directives of the Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security (CPAPS) of the African Union Commission (AUC), issued during a high-level audience on 6th of August 2021 at the AUC in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The overall objective of the Colloquium was to interrogate persistent capacity deficits on integrated whole-of-society approach for preventing and countering violent extremism, devise strategies to better leverage Ad Hoc Coalitions on regional security as well as articulate ways to enhance management of forced displacements across Africa.

The first day of the Colloquium, held in the Bouma Hall, Hilton Hotel Yaoundé Cameroon, convoked about 70 high-level peace and security stakeholders from the political, diplomatic and scientific sectors; as well as 30 other experts from the continent and around the world who joined virtually. Dignitaries included the Chief of Staff, African Standby Force, Air Vice Marshall John Brian CHIKONZO, who led a five-member high delegation from the AUC; the Minister of Defence, Republic of Cameroon; APSTA Chairperson, Col. Souleymane SANGARE; the Executive Secretary of APSTA, Dr Cecile Oyono Nee THOM and Directors of Training and Research from Member Institutions of APSTA; the Ambassadors of Nigeria, Liberia, and Tunisia; Defence Attaches of the United States of America, Germany, Nigeria; representatives of international organizations domiciled in Cameroon; as well as members of the Academia.

Dignitaries, during the opening ceremony, extolled the aptness of the Colloquium’s theme as well as the imperative for addressing the problematic with urgency, to avert a bleak future across the continent, if left unchecked. Consequently, the efforts of APSTA in taking the lead was applauded. Goodwill messages further underscored the pertinence of the support of the Government of Cameroon for APSTA, as well as pledge of more support from other stakeholders, towards continued strengthening of the Association, as well as towards the implementation of the recommendations of the Colloquium.

Subsequently, Professor Jean Emmanuel PONDI, Vice-Rector of the University of Yaoundé II, delivered the keynote lecture on the theme, prior to subsequent sessions



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on the sub-themes. The Colloquium concluded on the second day with specialized work sessions by Directors of Training and Research, at the APSTA Secretariat, Quartier Golf, Yaoundé Cameroon.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Enhancement of Capacities for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Africa

In accordance with the objectives of the Colloquium, submissions from experts and discussants on enhancement of capacities for integrated approach to PCVE, affirmed the imperative of preventive measures, early warning mechanisms, prioritized governmental operational responses, synergy among multisectoral actors and links between training centres and national educational systems. Also highlighted were the urgency of coordination and integration of efforts with Regional Economic Communities, reinforcement of links with development partners, as well as emphasis on empowerment of women and youth for the crucial role they play in PCVE.

In particular, experts affirmed the crucial need to review and align training for critical actors, policy and institutional frameworks in conformity with emerging realities and contexts. In addition, experts advocated effective interdiction of terrorism financing, boost in strategic communication and expediting action on people-centred approaches (in preference to institutional approaches which impose use of force with vulnerabilities to human rights abuses) as well as youth empowerment and involvement in governance.

Conceptualization of Ad Hoc Coalitions on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Experts interrogated this sub-theme, in line with set objectives of the Colloquium, and noted critical points including 1) emergence of Ad Hoc Coalitions as realist-pragmatist response to lapses in ASF conceptualization and operationalization especially their adaptation to confronting armed groups and transnational terrorists, not effectively covered in the APSA framework (recall that neither ASF nor ACIRC has been deployed as such yet); and 2) challenges of legitimacy, financing and efficacy implied by these coalitions. Experts also affirmed the alignment of these Coalitions with Art. 51 of the UN Charter as well as the African Common Defence and Security Policy, pursuant to Art.3 and Art. 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

Experts further characterized the Coalitions as non-conforming to the definition of regions espoused by the ASF framework. Neither do they conform to any of the six (6) ASF scenarios for military deployment conceived in 2003. Nevertheless, while not a



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legal exigence of their deployments, the Coalitions have always requested authorisation of the AU PSC. In addition, the Coalitions are self-funded and dependent on external partner support. Experts further noted that except for MINUSMA support to G5 Sahel Joint Force, funding requests by the Coalitions to AU and through AU to the UN have been rejected by the UNSC.

More importantly, the Coalitions pursue a mix of law enforcement, stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and counter-crime operations; for these, they are made up of soldiers mostly, with relatively few police officers and an even smaller number of civilians, even though their mandates often include peacebuilding.

However, the Coalitions remain mainly national operations conducted on national territories with reduced number of cross-border and truly multinational operations. This latter is evident in the fact that in each case, the Force HQ provides formal command, but with little operational control over day-to-day activities. Coordination between disparate national forces it's the Force HQ primary function.

Leveraging Ad Hoc Coalitions on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Improve alignment with African Standby Force Framework – Coalitions will never be fully integrated into the APSA framework, without compromising their operational flexibility and leverage, political consensus on their mandate, and the authorisation process between these entities and the AU PSC. Inherent challenges therefore include lack of control by AU over these Coalitions, making political alignment difficult. Experts therefore advocated AU's development of mechanisms to integrate existing and future multilateral institutions into the APSA; expansion of the potential future deployment scenarios to encompass these activities, recalling that modus operandi of the Coalitions already bears some similarities to the ACIRC approach with its inherent flexibility, in contrast to regional ASF Brigades.

Again, national soldiers operating within own national territory in the Coalition's framework, pose enormous practical and political challenges for the AU, especially in terms of how to ensure oversight and accountability; as well as how AU deals with the precedent of disbursement of funds to national armies deployed within own territories for counterterrorism.

The AU will have to determine under what circumstances it could disburse such funds to support such initiatives and how; this consideration will add more layers to an already complicated relationship with Member States and regional entities. Experts therefore opine that if the AU opts to support Coalitions, then, it should prioritize: a) realistic and appropriate political strategy and mandates; b) appropriate capacities (personnel as



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well as enablers and force multipliers); c) sufficient, flexible and sustainable funding; and d) sustained and high-level political support.

Synchronize military and political activities - Experts observed that although Coalitions maintain some connections to political strategies, they mostly do not integrate their military activities into viable political strategy to resolve the conflict and provide a path to peace; nor do they effectively integrate the non-military dimensions of stabilization.

Develop accountability, compliance and Human Rights Mechanisms – Experts argued in favour of AU’s development of rigorous accountability, compliance and human rights mechanisms, similar to the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), while recognizing that AU has recently made significant progress, including new guidelines and procedures on the prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse as well as conduct and discipline issues in its PSOs.

Improve the generation of forces adopted to their mandates – Experts affirmed the need to considerably improve force generation (troops, police, force enablers and force multipliers) in view of appropriate capacities for implementing mandates in high-risk asymmetric environments; AU mechanisms require significant assistance from security forces of external partners, notably the UN and European Union, as well as from states such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

Implement a Revised Peace Fund - Experts further advocated AU’s expedited action to implement its revised Peace Fund and broader reforms in this direction, in order to ensure sufficient, flexible and sustainable funding for the Coalitions as well. They noted that the AU has made significant progress in this regard, including the establishment of governance mechanisms for the Peace Fund, and receiving over \$60million in initial deposits. However, it will be unwise to use these funds to support national troops operating on their territories, as this is likely to trigger an ugly precedent as well as blur the lines between peace operations and national counterterrorism operations.

A more appropriate use of the funds might be to support the common and shared costs of multinational operations. Nevertheless, African Funds, which are limited, will require significant additional support provided by external partners, for the foreseeable future.

Develop a viable Conflict Resolution Strategy and provide for the endorsement of MoU between the AU and Coalitions - finally, sustained and high-level political will shall depend on the development of a viable conflict resolution strategy and an agreement between the AU and the Coalition in question. Ideally, the mission would also gain support from the UN and other non-African countries.



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The Question of whether AHCs can bring stability ultimately comes down to how they can synchronize their military and potentially anti-organized crime activities with the political aspects of their mandates, and broader international engagement with the regional threat. To date, Coalitions have been rather inappropriate military instruments, which suffer from various significant strategic and operational weaknesses as the reports on the RCI-LRA, the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force have shown.

At best, these Coalitions can serve as useful First Responders to threats, that other actors are unwilling or unable to address; but they are likely to remain militarily heavy, have capability gaps and present significant risks, especially in terms of accountability and human rights violations. They are also highly unlikely to be autonomous, despite the fact that they are largely made up of national troops operating on their home soil. Therefore, it is difficult to see how these Coalitions will successfully complete their mandate.

Nonetheless, if the AU believes that they deserve to be supported, it must develop a common strategy that charts the path to peace, find sustainable funding and ensure that military and political activities are synchronized. Otherwise, African Coalitions will end up costing considerable sums of money while producing relatively little positive and lasting strategic effect.

The Question therefore remains open: what else should be done, to better fight terrorism? Intensify the exchange of information; set up new security-military devices or strengthen the operational deployment of the African Standby Force and Ad Hoc Coalitions? But how is this to be done? These provide grounds for further research into both the ASF, ACIRC and the Coalitions.

Leveraging Whole-of-Society Approach to De-radicalization and PCVE in Africa

Pursuant to stipulated objectives for the sub-theme, experts affirmed that violent extremism are rooted in negligence of children and youth by the family and the state. Recruitment happens through social networks; children and youth are exposed to enrolment and exploitation (radicalization) and subsequently deployed in conflicts and for terrorists' attacks.

There is consensus among experts that radicalization refers to a process by which an individual or a group of people adopts increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals thereby undermining contemporary expressions of freedom of choice. The drivers are multiple, complex and context specific, hence defy simplistic analysis. Identified drivers however, could be broadly grouped around religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. The most common drivers across the



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continent in recent time include religious extremism, lack of faith in political systems, educational deprivation, economic marginalization and youth unemployment, political marginalization as well as lack of parental involvement in the early life of the child.

Experts specifically noted that radicalized individuals are willing to condone, support, facilitate and use violence to further their political, ideological, religious and other goals. Furthermore, radicalization in Africa is shaped by a mix of factors including civil wars, cross border conflicts, porous borders, insurgencies, criminal networks in ungoverned spaces and other grievances.

On the contrary, Deradicalization allows socio-professional re-insertion of persons formally enlisted by terrorists or violent extremists. Most scholars concur on fact that de-radicalization refers to the process of relative change in which radical groups or individuals reverse their ideology and delegitimizes use of violent methods to achieve their goals. It involves approaches employed to bring radicalized individuals back to non-violent life by addressing issues that spark and sustain radicalization.

Thus, deradicalization must consider and integrate efforts from different peacebuilding actors – military, political, economic, development, etc. Therefore, to better comprehend deradicalization, radicalization process and its corollaries must be interrogated, taking specific local realities into account. From all perspectives, radicalization and violent extremism are clogs in the wheel of development, especially the programmes of the African Union such as ‘Silencing the Guns’.

Whole-of-Society Approach to Deradicalization

- a. Economic Empowerment – invest in economic development that provide immediate and long-term empowerment opportunities and job creation in society, especially for the youth.
- b. Promote Religious moderation – governments and stakeholders should promote religious tolerance, especially through the use of communication media, including radio, television and social media platforms, transmitting moderate religious teachings and removing existing radical exhortations to violence in the syllabi and curricula.
- c. Build Resilience among the population – adopt a holistic approach to build resilience among the population, through expansion of educational programmes, that promote critical thinking, so that citizens are able to question negative religious teachings.
- d. Reform the Security Sector – address injustices, human rights abuses and overt authoritarianism associated with security agents as they fight radicalization activities in



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society, by enhancing oversight and accountability of judicial institutions, in an effort to build bridges between security actors and communities.

d. Promote national reconciliation and cohesion – governments must be encouraged to support national reconciliation, compromise and inclusion of the population that perceive social and sectarian polarization through initiatives that enhance national identities, social cohesion and citizenship.

e. Encourage good Parenting – support community-led outreach on good parenting and ensure provision of education for all from early age.

Addressing Capacity Deficits for Deradicalization and Whole-of-Society Approach to PCVE

Lessons from AMISOM, MNJTF, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force underscore imperatives for enhancing capacities on PCVE generally. The Strategic Objective 8.1.1 of the ASF Training Directives 2021-23 highlighted this critical gap, recommending conduct of research on the impact of emerging dynamics to include pandemics, counter terrorism and violent extremism on peace and security in Africa as well as making training on them more visible.

Specifically, lingering training deficits in this domain, according to experts, derive from: 1) insufficient qualified professionals and trainers; 2) insufficient infrastructure for training; 3) insufficient curriculum development expertise; 4) lack of updated guidance frameworks for training; and 5) inadequate funding support.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Consequent upon set objectives of the Colloquium and the five (5) point Communique endorsed at the end of the technical sessions, Recommendations cover required action on critical issues interrogated. The main recommendations are as follows:

On Integrated Approach to Preventing and Countering violent Extremism (PCVE) in Africa; the AUC, RECs, Governments, TCEs should:

- Coordinate and integrate PCVE efforts with regional economic communities/regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as member states;
- Coordinate and integrate efforts with RECs/RMs on interdiction of terrorism financing, strategic communication and people-centred approaches to PCVE;
- Facilitate women and youth empowerment and inclusion into planning and



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implementation of PCVE strategies;

- Raise awareness on the crucial role of communities and religious leaders in the prevention and countering of violent extremism;

On Leveraging Ad Hoc Coalitions on Regional Security in Africa; the AUC, RECs should:

- Develop mechanisms to integrate existing and future multilateral institutions into the APSA;
- Expand the scenarios for ASF deployment beyond the extant six (6) scenarios to encompass operations of Ad Hoc Coalitions;
- Determine under which circumstances it could disburse funds from the Peace Fund, to support Ad Hoc Coalitions as well as leverage such support for control, such as aligning/synchronizing the military and political strategies;
- Develop rigorous accountability, compliance and human rights mechanisms for Ad Hoc Coalitions similar to the UN HRDDP;
- Implement a revised Peace Fund to ensure sufficient, flexible and sustainable funding in support of common and shared multinational operations;
- Adopt Ad Hoc Coalitions as FIRST RESPONDERS (similar to the ACIRC concept) to regional threats that other actors are unwilling or unable to address;
- Articulate a viable conflict resolution strategy and provide for Memorandum of Understanding with the Ad Hoc Coalitions.

On De-radicalization and Whole-of-Society Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism; the AUC, RECs, Governments, TCEs should:

- Advocate investment in economic development that provide immediate and long-term empowerment opportunities and job creation in society;
- Promote religious tolerance and moderation among governments and stakeholders especially through strategic communications;
- Advocate holistic approach to building resilience among the population, especially through education that promotes critical thinking to enable citizens question negative religious teachings;



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- Advocate security sector reforms that address injustices, human rights abuses and overt authoritarianism associated with defence and security agents, as well as enhance oversight and accountability;
- Promote national reconciliation and cohesion by governments on the continent, as well as inclusion the population in governance processes;
- Advocate good parenting as well as provision of good education for all from very early ages.

On Addressing Capacity Deficits for Integrated Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa, the AUC, RECs, Governments, TCEs, should leverage APSTA to:

- Increase the number of qualified professionals, experts and trainers through increased training courses;
- Increase and improve infrastructure for training through support for Training centres/institutions;
- Support and collaborate on development of curriculum and modules on training guided by the peculiar contexts of the regions across the continent;
- Provide in collaboration with Training Institutions, updated guidance frameworks for training;
- Support training institutions and research centres in efforts to raise funds for capacity building for the continent.

Protection Against Recruitment and Use of Children in Violence

- States and Training Centres should accentuate the politico-judicial, socio-economic and the strategic communication approaches in protection against recruitment.
- Training / Research Centres should device means for increased involvement of women / females in CT/CVE/COIN strategies via training and capacity building.
- States and Training Centres should advocate / implement women empowerment programmes in addressing root causes of radicalization and extremism via family care



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Attenuating Terrorism Financing in Africa:

- The CFT systems should focus on preventing and detecting criminal activity rather than merely meting regulatory punishment for non-compliance, In terms of overall governance and compliance.
- Governments should proactively and holistically commit resources for the development and implementation of mass sensitization programs to enhance public awareness on TF. This promotes a culture of community policing.
- African governments need to invest in institutional capacity building of their respective law enforcement and regulatory agencies in terms of policies and legal framework, operations, monitoring, finances, logistics, personnel costs, technology, and training that incorporates and mainstreams Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Counter Violent Extremism in Military academies/ training schools and police colleges rather than remain affixed to only Counter insurgency training.
- The authorities need to embark on specialized training programs for LEAs, judicial officers, security forces, and financial sector professionals on CFT.
- African governments should commit resources to facilitate smooth inter-agency, bilateral, and international cooperation against TF.
- There is need for extensive resource mobilisation to design, effectively implement, and monitor and evaluate various CFT programs.
- The KYC systems should enhance background checks to capture red flags, improve transaction monitoring, and also check publicly available 'other information' such as social media postings rather than just collecting documentary requirements.

Strengthening Criminal Justice System in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism:

- Affected States should be assisted in strengthening criminal justice system response to counter terrorism via training/capacity building among others.
- Training Centres should articulate modules for dedicated training of officers on human right-compliant criminal investigation.
- Affected States should be assisted in handling of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in accordance with UNSC Res 2178 (2014) via training and capacity building for personnel.



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- Training Centres should integrate modules that address linkages of terrorist activities and organized criminal groups, in training and capacity building.
- Affected States should be assisted in interfacing CT laws with IHL and IHRL through specialized trainings or modules.

De-radicalization

- Training Centres should review relevant modules dealing with de-radicalization to integrate capacity for apt planning and programming of de-radicalization at hotspots across the continent.
- Training Centres should distinguish, in related modules, the three (3) phases in the process of radicalization, viz: sensitization, membership and participation, during training.

On Review of ASF Training Policy and Standards as well as Research on Peace and Security issues in Africa; the AUC, RECs, TCEs should leverage APSTA to:

- Integrate Training and Research Centres/Institutions into the policy development and review processes of the African Union;
- Institutionalize and render accessible, a database of official/authorized AU documentation to guide research and studies on peace and security on the continent;
- Rigorously pursue further research on conceptualization of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa
- Engage academic and technical expertise available at training and research centres/institutions across the continent;

On Standardisation/Harmonization of African Union/Regional Senior Mission Leadership Training Course; the AUC, RECs, TCEs should:

- Consider the merits of the recommendations from the review of the Regional Senior Mission Leadership Course conducted by APSTA in year 2020, in view of enhancing the delivery and outcomes of the Course.

On the Revised Memorandum of Understanding; AUC and APSTA should:

- Expand the scope of APSTA support to the AUC beyond the 2008 MoU based on ASF;



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- Delimit APSTA support to the AUC within the peace and security scope of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA);
- Format the revised MoU in accordance with the new format prescribed by the AUC and available via the Personal Assistant at the Office of the CPAPS.

CONCLUSION

Radicalization and violent extremism are threats to Africa's aspirations to 'silencing the Guns' and attaining 'AU Agenda 2063', as well as the 'UN Agenda 2030'. Therefore, to effectively address these threats to the continent's aspiration to peace and development, identified capacity deficits must be offset as matter of urgency. Thus, pursuant to the recommendations from the Colloquium, 14 training and research projects have been earmarked for 2022-23.





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Conclusion



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Conclusion and Recommendations

To make the results of the conference consistent with the general policy and vision of the Commissioner in charge of Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the African Union, the opportunity was given to particularly sensitize the training and research officers present on the Commissioner's expectations in the realm of prevention and combating violent extremism.

The work in plenary and in small workshops made it possible to identify the following proposals:

- Pursue rigorously research on the appropriation of concepts on Coalitions, collaborations in the context of regional security and peace support operations.
- Continue the process to formalize the deployment of APSTA for the sharing and dissemination of information to troops and research centers on the continent
- Authorizes the formalization of the integration of training and research centers / institutions into the African Union policy development and review processes
- Allow the institutionalization of the authoritative functional channels for the dissemination of its documents in order to guide research and studies on peace and security on the continent
- Finalize and establish a database of experts and resource persons on peace and security issues for the continent
- Strengthen dialogue and action on the implementation of training and research proposals presented during this conference
- Make APSTA an interface area to make African Union research and documentation much more accessible. In return, APSTA has communication tools to popularize the work produced by training and research centers on the prevention and fight against violent extremism;
- Create a dynamic and multidisciplinary doctoral cycle that can accommodate executives who have the skills to do research in training and research centers;
- Articulate strategies to raise awareness of the role of religious leaders in the prevention and fight against violent extremism;



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- Strengthen awareness on the prevention and fight against violent extremism in the communities where they are established;
- It was suggested that the conceptualization of terrorism in Africa by training and research institutions be made in a guidance note to be submitted to the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security
- The organization by APSTA of a workshop on the conceptualization of the Peace and Security Architecture in Africa,
- The directives and doctrines within the framework of the prevention of violent extremism at the African level must be rigorously adopted by the Member States. This allows them to amplify their impact across the continent;
- It is important to review the concept of operations and the format of the African Standby Force: the troops are still insufficient. An increase in these is therefore necessary;
- ASF capacity building research and training policies with regard to standards should be separate from implementation strategies;
- It is necessary to take into account the role of religion in training centers for a better understanding of religious issues in the prevention and fight against violent extremism
- It is important to alternate the profiles and personnel selected both among executives and among the ranks of non-commissioned and civilian personnel.

We must therefore make the workforce more dynamic during the selection of candidates for training. Recycling the same people is not very productive.

- It is necessary that training centers stop being closed in on themselves and that they develop strategies to open up more to other sectors and other actors;
- Include religious institutions in de-radicaliation and disarmament;
- Promote national reconciliation between the State and social strata that complain of marginalization;
- Create additional resources in training centers of excellence in Africa to fight radicalization;
- Synchronize military activities with political ones;



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- Develop mechanisms for accountability and compliance with human rights;
- Improve the generation of forces adapted to their mandates
- Implement a peace fund with broader reforms;
- Develop a viable conflict resolution strategy and provide for the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the AU and ad hoc entities
- Identify the real sources of violent extremism in Africa in order to provide appropriate responses;
- Establish close and frank communication between AU bodies, states and populations who are also the main actors in the fight against extremism and terrorism.
- Include methods of conflict resolution and the fight against violent extremism in school and academic programs.
- Identify, stop and close the channels of terrorist financing in Africa.
- Increase the participation of young people in decision-making;
- Improve media communication against terrorism and violent extremism;
- Person-centered approaches are much better than institutional approaches that force responses without first identifying exactly what people want to express.
- Our behavior, customs, context or environment are very important and should be taken into account when checking the ultimate solutions to counter extremism.
- The social contract between populations and government decisions must be called into question in order to repair human rights violations committed in peacetime;

Finally, the conference opened the possibility of strengthening the positioning of APSTA for a better understanding of the critical needs and gaps in the operationalization of the African Standby Force, but also and above all of creating dynamic bridges with the Coalition ad hoc on regional security and other relevant actors at all operational levels. This goal, if achieved, will strengthen the full capacity of the AU to respond to peace and security on the continent.

The identification of training modules and targeted research programs, in the centers of



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excellence and under the coordination of APSTA, to fill the observed gaps could allow the development of an effective mapping of the work carried out in the member institutions. This inter-institutional, inter-regional and transnational synergy could promote better collaboration and better support for the AU, and in particular at the level of the Peace Support Operations Division.



Communique

African Union-APSTA
International Colloquium of Directors of Training and Research in Africa

Theme: Enhancement of Capacities for Integrated Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

28th – 29th October 2021 in Yaoundé Cameroon.

In order to diminish violent extremism in Africa with the collaboration of Ad Hoc Coalitions (G5 Sahel and MNJTF), a group of experts consisting of Directors of Training and Research from Member Institutions of the African Peace Support Trainers Association held a Colloquium on the 28th and 29th of October 2021 in Yaoundé Cameroon, under the auspices of the African Union, which deployed a high delegation led by Air Vice Marshall John Brian CHIKONZO, Chief of Staff of the African Standby Force.

Participants including political, diplomatic and scientific Stakeholders, as well as personnel from the Defence and Security sector, listened with keen interest to the inaugural lecture on theme, delivered by Professor Jean Emmanuel PONDJ, Vice-Rector of the University of Yaoundé II, prior to deliberations on the sub-themes of the Colloquium.

The main conclusions derived from the discussions are as follows:

- The need for evidence-based decision making derived from research grounded in African context or realities;
- The need to establish a multidisciplinary database on the documents produced by the African Union and its partner institutions;
- The need for APSTA increase the number of meetings with its member institutions;
- The need to develop and establish a whole-of-society approach to preventing and countering violent extremism;
- The need to collaborate or at least understand Ad Hoc Coalitions.



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The main recommendations formulated from the foregoing conclusions are as follows:

- Develop and implement programmes and research projects that takes African realities into consideration;
- Establish and make accessible a multidisciplinary database of documents generated by the African Union and its institutional partners;
- Establish a dynamic and functional consultation network between training centres and research partners under the auspices of APSTA;
- Develop and establish, a whole-of-society approach to preventing and countering violent extremism;
- Enhance the control and coordination mechanism for Ad Hoc Coalitions through regional economic mechanisms.

The Colloquium endorses these conclusions and recommendations articulated for the African Union, in view of preventing and countering violent extremism, and in order to reinforce durable peace and security in Africa for the well-being of its people.

Signed in Yaoundé this day 29th October 2021

 Colonel Souleymane SANGARE Director General, Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin BEYE, ASPTA President	 AVM John Brian CHIKONZO Chief of Staff, African Standby Force African Union
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Annexes



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Table 2 : Suggested African Union – APSTA Colloquium Recommendations Implementation Work Plan

s/n	Projects	Timeline	Cost (USD)
A.	Regional Trainings, Workshops & Policy Dialogues :		
	1. X 5 De-radicalization and youth participation	Q1 – Q2, 2022	250,000
	2. X 5 Interdiction of Terrorism Financing and Organized Crime	Q1 – Q2, 2022	250,000
	3. X 5 Awareness on Role of Religious Leaders in PCVE in Africa	Q3 – Q4, 2022	250,000
	4. X 5 Development approach to Management of Forced Displacements and PCVE	Q3 – Q4, 2022	250,000
	5. X 5 Strategic Communication in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism	Q3 – Q4, 2022	250,000
	6. X 5 Regional training on evidence-based criminal investigation	Q3 – Q4, 2022	250,000
	7. X 2 Regional Senior Mission Leadership Training integrating Development and Humanitarian Actors	Q1 – Q4, 2022	500,000
	Subtotal		2,000,000
B.	Regional Research/Study (Fieldwork & Workshops) :		
	1. Re-conceptualization of Whole-of-Society Approach to PCVE in Africa	Q1 – Q2, 2022	50,000
	2. Interrogation of Ad Hoc Coalitions and Implications for ASF/ APSA Framework	Q1 – Q2, 2022	50,000
	3. Re-evaluation of Management of Forced Displacements in Africa	Q1 – Q2, 2022	50,000
	4. Early Warning and Early Response to Conflict Issues: Child Protection, Radicalization, etc.	Q3 – Q4, 2022	50,000
	5. Review of ASF and ACIRC frameworks	Q3 – Q4, 2022	50,000
	6. Trans-regional legal cooperation on PCVE and CT in Africa.	Q3 – Q4, 2022	50,000
	7. Review of ASF Training Policy and Standards	Q1 – Q4, 2022	50,000
	Subtotal	Q1 – Q4, 2022	350,000
	Grand Total	Q1 – Q4, 2022	\$2,350,000



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Concept Note :

AFRICAN UNION - APSTA COLLOQUIUM OF DIRECTORS OF TRAINING AND RESEARCH IN AFRICA

Theme : Enhancement of Capacities for Integral Approach to Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

BACKGROUND

The African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security (AU CPAPS), received the delegation of African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) in high-level audience, on 6th of August 2021. The Head, Peace Support Operations Division, had recommended the audience during PSOD working visit to APSTA Secretariat, Yaoundé Cameroon, 2-5 March 2021. The audience was aimed at leveraging the collective capacities domiciled in Member Institutions and other ASF Training Centres of Excellence in Africa. All geared towards supporting the realization of the CPAPS vision of building peace and security via coordinated regional approach.

The Commissioner, during the audience, welcomed APSTA's pledge of support, particularly in the domains of capacity building and research, in consideration of existing and emerging threats to peace and security across the continent. He further directed immediate finalization of a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between APSTA and the AUC. To reiterate the urgency for an integrated approach, the CPAPS has granted another audience with all heads of Member Institutions, and other Training Centres of Excellence, under the auspices of the Association, coordinated by APSTA Secretariat.

Meanwhile, to operationalize the Association's integrated support to the AU Commission, APSTA Secretariat has been tasked to organize, in collaboration with office of the CPAPS, a Colloquium of Directors of Training and Research, to review capacity building, vis-à-vis emerging dynamics in critical security challenges across the continent.

RATIONALE

Ideally, an integrated and cross-regional approach remains one of the most viable options to a peaceful and secure Africa, as reiterated in the Vision of the new CPAPS. However, this approach hitherto had been far-fetched, due significantly to silos' approach to peacebuilding, adopted by actors across the continent. Thus, violent conflicts continue to escalate across Africa. For instance, political violence declined across the world in 2020 except in Africa, where terrorism and internal conflicts have been the biggest



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contributors .

This prompted APSTA Secretariat, to organize a Roundtable in June 2021, in consultation with Member Institutions (MIs), on “Upsurge in Violent Extremism across Africa: Interrogating Capacity Deficits”. The Roundtable accords with Strategic Objective 8.1.1 of the ASF Training Directives 2021-2023 regarding the imperative of research on impact of emerging dynamics of pandemics, counter-terrorism and violent extremism, on peace and security in Africa.

Key findings from the Roundtable underpinned crucial capacity deficits, in strategies to address evolving dynamics in preventing/ countering violent extremism; as well as the imperative for emplacing whole-of-Government / Whole-of-Society responses to PCVE; a challenge which is being prolonged in the absence of an integrated approach, and the silo mentality among peacebuilding actors across the continent. Thus, an integrated cross-regional approach to building peace and security has become imperative for Africa.

OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the colloquium therefore, is to interrogate identified capacity deficits, and articulate capacity building strategies aimed at integrated cross-regional solutions. Specifically, the colloquium will be leveraged to:

- a. Acquaint Directors of Training with Vision of CPAPS on capacity building;
- b. Assess training needs in response to evolving dynamics of violent extremism, ad-hoc coalitions and management of forced displacements, and firm up workplan;
- c. Evaluate on-going reviews of critical ASF training documents;
- d. Appraise the 2020 review of regional senior mission leadership training;
- e. Re-appraise the revised MoU 2008 in new format prior to endorsement;
- f. Articulate a communique for CPAPS on outcome of the colloquium.

METHODOLOGY

The Colloquium is planned as a two-day event, hosted by APSTA Secretariat Yaoundé Cameroon. An international conference to interrogate capacity building for critical security challenges on the continent will hold on Day One. Subsequently, on Day Two, a meeting of Directors of training will be held. It will bring together, directors of



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training, from Member Institutions and other Training Centres of Excellence; Regional Economic Communities; APSTA working Group of Experts and partners. The Colloquium is scheduled to hold as follows:

Date : 28th & 29th October 2021

Venue : APSTA Secretariat Yaoundé, Cameroon

Time : 09 : 00 - 16 : 00 Daily.

ESTIMATED BUDGET

Budget estimate for the Colloquium, covers honourarium for nominees and experts. This will be defrayed by the Government of Cameroon support to APSTA Secretariat.

EXPECTED OUTCOME

The Colloquium is expected, among others, to articulate an integrated/regional capacity building framework/programme/workplan aimed to address identified capacity deficits particularly in a Whole-of-Society approach to P/CVE and related challenges in Africa. In addition, the Colloquium will articulate a Communique as well as Policy Brief to the Office of the CPAPS.



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REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix-Travail-Patrie

MINISTERE
DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES



REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
Peace – Work - Fatherland

MINISTRY
OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS

MOT DE CIRCUMSTANCE

DE

**S.E.M. LE MINISTRE DES RELATIONS
EXTERIEURES**

**A L'OCCASION DE LA CEREMONIE SOLENNELLE
D'OUVERTURE DU COLLOQUE ORGANISE PAR
L'ASSOCIATION AFRICAINE DES FORMATEURS
AU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX (APSTA)
SUR LE THEME :**

***« Colloque international sur l'examen des capacités/formations
pour prévenir et lutter contre l'extrémisme violent en Afrique »***

Siège de l'APSTA, du 28 au 29 octobre 2021



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- **Madame la Secrétaire Exécutive de l'Association Africaine des Formateurs au Maintien de la Paix,**
- **Monsieur le Représentant du Ministre Délégué à la Présidence chargé de la Défense,**
- **Distingué Représentant de Monsieur le Commissaire aux Affaires Politiques, à la Paix et à la Sécurité de l'Union Africaine,**
- **Excellences Mesdames et Messieurs les Ambassadeurs et Hauts-Commissaires,**
- **Mesdames et Messieurs les Représentants des Communautés Economiques Régionales,**
- **Distingués invités,**
- **Mesdames et Messieurs,**

J'ai grand plaisir ce jour de prendre la parole dans cette enceinte, au nom de **S.E.M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures** empêché, à l'occasion du colloque international qu'organise l'Association Africaine des Formateurs au Maintien de la Paix (APSTA), en collaboration avec la Commission de l'Union Africaine. Il me charge de vous exprimer ses regrets et souhaite que les délibérations de ce colloque soient fructueuses et parviennent à des conclusions utiles.

D'emblée, je voudrais exprimer la gratitude du Ministère des Relations Extérieures à Madame la Secrétaire Exécutive de l'APSTA pour l'accueil qu'elle a bien voulu nous réserver au siège de sa prestigieuse Institution.

Je ne puis aussi m'empêcher de saluer la mobilisation particulière dont les présentes assises font l'objet aujourd'hui. En effet, cela traduit l'intérêt du thème retenu pour la circonstance, à savoir : « **Colloque international sur l'examen des capacités/formations pour prévenir et lutter contre l'extrémisme violent en Afrique** ».

Excellences,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

La principale préoccupation soulevée par ce thème, notamment la prévention et la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent est d'une actualité évidente. A cet égard, la montée de ce phénomène dans notre Continent depuis un certain nombre d'années réduit non seulement à néant les avancées en matière de développement, mais risque également de freiner ses perspectives.



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L'impact sur la vie et les moyens de subsistance des personnes ayant perdu des membres de leur famille, des amis et des collègues dans les nombreuses tragédies survenues sur les marchés, dans les universités, les lieux de culte et les écoles est incommensurable. Les effets indésirables sur l'emploi et les investissements ne sont plus à démontrer dans un Continent en quête d'une forte croissance économique. Les jeunes, majoritairement utilisés comme instruments pour perpétrer des actes de violence extrémiste, en payent le plus lourd tribut au même titre que les femmes et les enfants.

Au regard de ce qui précède, je voudrais me féliciter du choix porté sur cette thématique qui, je le souhaite vivement, donnera lieu à de brillantes présentations et à des échanges constructifs.

Par conséquent, je reste convaincu que l'apport du présent colloque sera énorme en termes de renforcement des capacités dans la perspective de relever ensemble le défi que représente la prévention et la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent en Afrique.

Excellences,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Je ne saurais terminer mon propos sans remercier l'APSTA qui a su régulièrement associer voire impliquer le Ministère des Relations Extérieures dans ses diverses activités et ce, en vertu des dispositions d'un Mémoire d'entente en vigueur entre l'Association et le Gouvernement du Cameroun depuis le 13 août 2019. Au nom de **S.E.M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures**, je voudrais ici réitérer la détermination du Gouvernement, en général, et du Ministère, en particulier, à soutenir l'APSTA dans le but de renforcer son statut en tant qu'institution internationale panafricaine.

Je vous remercie de votre aimable attention. /-



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