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AFRICAN PEACE  
SUPPORT TRAINERS  
ASSOCIATION

## WORKSHOP REPORT

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# COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA

1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023

APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon



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WORKSHOP REPORT  
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Africa**  
1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023, APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon

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The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), organized an international workshop on : **"Countering the financing of terrorism in West and Central Africa"** on 1st and 2nd June, 2023. APSTA is a Pan-African Association mandated to harmonize and standardize Peace Support Operations training. The Association thus contributes to strengthening the capacities of actors to respond effectively to peace and security challenges in a dynamic African strategic environment. This constant reinforcement of capacities guarantees the efficiency of peace support operations under the aegis of the African Union.

The Yaoundé workshop is a high-level scientific and professional meeting, whose objective was to equip participants with best practice on countering the financing of terrorism in Africa, and raise awareness on the instruments, mechanisms as well as global and sectoral challenges against response. The participants are high-level actors and stakeholders on countering terrorism financing, drawn from various related sectors, particularly the defence and security sector, peace and security training institutions and centres, as well as practitioners and academics working on countering the financing of terrorism. The international workshop comprised an opening ceremony, presentations, panel discussions, plenary sessions and a closing ceremony.

The opening ceremony, held on Thursday 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2023, interspersed with remarks by dignitaries, viz: welcome address by Police Commissioner, Dr OYONO THOM Cécile, Executive Secretary of APSTA; Opening Remarks by Colonel SOULEYMANE SANGARE, Director of the Alioune Blondin Bèye Peacekeeping School in Bamako Mali and Chairperson of APSTA's Board of Directors; keynote address by Mr. Philip DIVETT, Programme Officer Terrorism Prevention Branch of United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC/TPB), Vienna, Austria; and the opening address by Mr. SAID KAMSOULOUM, Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence, representing the Minister Delegate at the Presidency, in charge of Defence.

In her welcome address, **Police Commissioner, Dr. OYONO THOM Cécile, Executive Secretary of APSTA**, reiterated the mission and status of APSTA, as a Pan-African institution mandated by the African Union Commission to standardize and harmonize training on peace support operations in Africa. She noted that pursuant to this mandate, APSTA partners and collaborates with related international organizations, such as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The Executive Secretary further noted that the Association is a beneficiary of support from national governments, particularly the

Government of the Republic of Cameroon, through the Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of Defence. She expressed APSTA's profound gratitude for this support. Regarding the workshop, she emphatically stressed the detrimental effects of terrorists' access to funding, as it contributes to their resilience and expansion despite substantial efforts by States and international actors. Thus, she affirmed the critical importance of the international workshop, aimed at furnishing participants with grids of fresh knowledge and action against a phenomenon still poorly defined.

In his opening remarks, **Colonel SOULEYMANE SANGARE, Chairperson of APSTA's Board of Directors**, emphasized the mission, objectives and areas of interest of APSTA. He highlighted the research activities carried out over the years thanks to the support of partners. In particular, he stressed the fact that the Sahel region has become the epicentre of terrorism, noting that recent studies reveal financing of terrorism as a major factor in terrorists' resilience. Thus, he affirmed the imperative of organizing workshops of this nature as well as conducting specialized training to strengthen capacities in countering the scourge.

The Chairperson recalled that since its establishment in 2002, as the African Chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, APSTA has indeed come a long way in the discharge of her mandate, facilitating the standardization, harmonization and coordination of training and sundry capacity building, in support of the development of the African Standby Force, pursuant to the 2008 MoU with the African Union. He further noted that APSTA, through its Secretariat, has facilitated the exchange of ideas, lessons, experiences and best practice among member institutions and other stakeholders, as depicted once again by today's workshop on "Countering the Financing of Terrorism in West and Central Africa".

He, however, noted that the continued fulfilment of this noble mandate, would have probably been terminated some years ago, if not for the timely intervention of the Government of the Republic of Cameroon, who, upon the request of members of the Board of Directors, endorsed an Agreement with the Association in 2019, to domicile the Secretariat of APSTA in Yaoundé Cameroon, granting it the desired standing of an international organization with diplomatic status. He noted that the Agreement included annual grants to offset most of the Secretariat's yearly operational costs. Thus, he expressed the Association's gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Cameroon, recalling that the workshop interlaced with the Open Day event, aims to showcase the instance and operations of APSTA in and from the territory of Cameroon.

In conclusion, he affirmed the Secretariat's diligence in implementing the renewed vision of the Board of Directors since 2020, as well as the expressed intention of the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs Peace and Security, who requested APSTA's support on strengthening capacities for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. He therefore expressed the Association's profound gratitude to the Terrorism Prevention Branch, of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime for the support. Finally, he commended the Executive Secretary and her team for a job well done, and enjoined more partners to support APSTA. Consequently, he urged participants to take advantage of the workshop, for the exchange of lessons, experience and best practice aimed at strengthening requisite capacities, noting that without peace, there cannot be sustainable development.

In his keynote address, **Mr. Philip DIVETT, Programme Officer, CFT Focal Point (UNODC/TPB), UNODC-Vienna**, first expressed his gratitude to APSTA for the opportunity to address dignitaries, experts and participants of the international workshop. Secondly, he critiqued the temptation of an overt focus on hard security in countering terrorists, while paying less attention to the more crucial planning phase of terrorists' acts, which includes recruitment, radicalization and sophisticated training – all of which make financing imperative. He thus, affirmed financing as a key component, required to cater for the operational cost of terrorism, regardless of complexity and context. He noted that the planning phase presents a good opportunity to detect, interrupt and dismantle terrorists' networks, and thus affirmed that it should be the primary target of national actors - gathered for the workshop, as they have important roles to play.

Furthermore, Mr. Divett underscored the importance of robust, proactive and effective policies on countering the financing of terrorism, which have been widely acknowledged especially in the last 20 years. Among the key milestone policy instruments, he noted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999); the UN Resolution 1267 (1999); the UN Resolution 1373 (2001); and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), especially its special recommendations on CFT. At the level of the African Union, he noted the adoption of OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999); the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002); the Additional Protocol (2004); and the establishment of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in 2004. He explained that these Conventions and Resolutions, all shape the legal, policy, and institutional frameworks for countering the financing of terrorism, and especially for regulation of international cooperation and mutual legal assistance in investigation and prosecution.

As point in emphasis, he drew attention to four (4) critical challenges: first, the absence of an international consensus on the definition of terrorism, despite its use in these international frameworks and instruments; second, the rapid and continuous evolution of methods used in financing of terrorism, including the Hawala system, mobile payments, use of social media platforms, crypto-currencies, and illicit trafficking of all sorts of items including precious stones; third, the modest amounts of money sometime used in prosecuting terrorist attacks, which are too insignificant to detect; four, the challenges of coordination and cooperation among government agencies, private sector actors, law enforcement agencies, international organisations, civil society organisations as well as cross-border cooperation. Therefore, he observed that the workshop provides veritable opportunity for reflection on how these various agencies can collaborate on CFT, through intelligence sharing and coordination of efforts. Finally, he reiterated the readiness of UNODC in supporting national and regional actors.



## Tour of APSTA Situation Room

The tour of APSTA Situation Room was observed after the opening ceremony. During the tour, **Mr. Christian ICHITE, Deputy Executive Secretary and Programmes Coordinator of APSTA**, explained the Situation Room's raison d'être, underscoring the need for reliable data that facilitates rigorous conflict analysis, in contrast to the pervading shallow and simplistic analysis of conflicts across the continent in recent time. This, he inferred may account significantly for disoriented interventions as well as resilience and spread of threats like terrorism, for which the Sahel alone currently accounts for 48% of global deaths. He affirmed that the room is dedicated to monitoring conflicts and interventions across Africa, emphasizing that while several institutions monitor conflicts, only few if any monitor interventions systematically.

He explained that the project is being developed in two (2) phases. Phase one, focuses on data mining and Data Management. This phase includes the acquisition of data from pre-selected indicators and sources, analysis of the data and the generation of reports for diverse purposes. The second phase will focus on advanced data analytics and prognostics. He noted that the conceptualization of the Situation Room will facilitate the integration of systems thinking into conflict analysis. He asserted that through the instrumentality of the Situation Room, the role of APSTA in harmonization and standardization of training will be reinforced. Moreover, it will facilitate the Secretariat's responsibility as a think-tank, in support of member institutions and other training centres across Africa. It will also serve as platform for exchange by expert groups, either virtually or in-person.





## Presentations And Panel Discussions

In his introduction to the workshop sessions, **Mr. Julius SEIDENADER**, *specialist in counter terrorism, Terrorism Prevention Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC/TPB)*, recalled the approval of the United Nations General Assembly mandating the UNODCTPB to support Member States in the ratification and implementation of universal legal instruments against terrorism. He affirmed that UNODC is at the disposal of Member States for assistance in countering terrorism as well as for international cooperation in related fields.

In accordance with APSTA Secretariat Programme plan and under the Scientific Coordination of Professor SAIBOU ISSA, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Letters and Human Sciences (FALSH), University of Maroua, the presentations and panel discussions were structured in five parts:

- » **Part One** - Understanding the threats and risks related to terrorism and terrorism financing ;
- » **Part Two** - Modalities of terrorism financing in Africa and emerging dynamics in the modus operandi ;
- » **Part Three** - Legal and institutional frameworks for countering the financing of terrorism in West and Central Africa ;
- » **Part Four** - International tools for countering the financing of terrorism;
- » **Part Five** - Lessons and experiences on countering the financing of terrorism in West and Central Africa.

## Part One : Understanding the threats and risks related to terrorism and terrorism financing


*Moderated by Ms. Emmanuelle KLASSEN (Associate Programme Officer, Global Programme on Money Laundering, UNODC – Vienna, Austria).*

**Session 1 : The nature and emerging trends of terrorism and terrorist financing in Africa by Professor SAIBOU ISSA, Dean of Faculty of Arts Letters and Human Sciences, University of Maroua, Cameroon**

Professor SAIBOU ISSA began his presentation with an overview of the terrorist menace in Africa. He emphasized the circumstances of its origin and the diversity of the determinants that nourish the phenomenon of terrorism across the continent. In consideration of the ideology, economy, politics and the existence of conflict entrepreneurs, he affirmed the imperative of contextualisation as well as the interweaving of factors in regional environments marked by conflict systems. Thus, he stressed the problematic that derives from the nexus between the different forms of conflict and among the fragilities exploited by non-state armed groups in general and terrorists in particular.

He illustrated his presentation with cartographic and statistical analysis of terrorist activities which reflect their significance in the Sahel (taken in the broad sense) and in East Africa, as well as emanating from the equatorial forest and the Atlantic coast. He noted that the G5 Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), have mobilized regional responses alongside national efforts, and have managed to decimate the threat of terrorism substantially in respective regions. He however observed that the menace still remains very active. He therefore drew the participants' attention to the need to monitor and even anticipate, the criminal dynamics and itineraries of terrorism on the continent, which are backed by the two major terrorist conglomerates: Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, but nevertheless remain driven by undertones of indigenization.

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## NATURE ET TENDANCES ÉMERGENTES DU TERRORISME ET DU FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME EN AFRIQUE


**SAÏBOU ISSA**  
 UNIVERSITÉ DE MAROUA  
 CAMEROUN



### TROIS PRINCIPALES COMPOSANTES, TROIS GRANDES ZONES

- AQMI et affiliés à l'Ouest
- Filiales de l'EI disséminées
- Al Shabab et ses filiales sur la côte orientale
- Divers groupes nés des scissions et reconfigurations à travers la circulation des adeptes
- Métastase vers côte atlantique


#### GROUPES ISLAMISTES MILITANTS EN AFRIQUE



### L'AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE SURTOUT

- Divers facteurs favorables à la criminalisation et à la circulation interrégionale des membres des GAT
- Frictions géopolitiques et polarisation interne de lutte contre le terrorisme favorable aux GAT (Sahel)

#### ACTIVITE DES ISLAMISTES MILITANTS PAR THÉÂTRE



Consequently, Prof. Saibou affirmed that while external sources of funding and conventional modes of financing terrorism in Africa have been noted in various studies, including those by the financial action task forces (FATF), le groupe d'action contre le blanchiment d'argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC) and the Inter-governmental action group against money laundering in West Africa (GIABA) in particular, the fact remains that the resilience of terrorism and its prospects also depend on the ability of terrorists to innovate on the sources and mechanisms for collecting, consolidating and using funds. He further noted that the model of financing adopted by terrorists, results from the risks and practices based on diversification, flexibility and the exploitation of money laundering facilities within weak state fiscal systems, which are poorly regulated. In conclusion, he drew attention to the importance of mastering both the known counter mechanisms and standards, as well as endogenizing the responses, in order to adapt them to the methods of financing and the local dynamics of terrorism. Thus, he recommended among others, the inclusion of more services such as customs, animal husbandry and forestry, into countering the financing of terrorism across Africa.

**Session 2 : The international framework and standards for countering the financing of terrorism by Mr. Julius SEIDENADER, Counter Terrorism Specialist, Terrorism Prevention Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) - Vienna, Austria**


In his presentation, Mr. Seidenader recalled the mandate of the terrorism prevention branch of UNODC, particularly the ratification and implementation of the 19 different international legal instruments on preventing and countering terrorism. He further enumerated the international framework for countering the financing of terrorism, starting with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999. He also highlighted other frameworks including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1988 and 1989 (2012), 2178 (2014), 2135 (2015), 2368 (2017). To these are added several international texts relating to the fight against terrorism.

He noted however, that despite the existence of these international frameworks on countering terrorism and terrorism financing, there is not yet a consensus definition of terrorism. He subsequently alluded to and adopted the definition of terrorism provided in Art.2 of the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. He further underscored States' obligations, international cooperation and implementation tools, as contained in the 1999 Convention.


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He also noted that States have developed national tools to counter the financing of terrorism, and underscored fact that the 1999 Convention calls on States to exchange information systems provided by INTERPOL.


He affirmed that to effectively counter the financing of terrorism, it is essential to understand its operational cycle, which goes from raising funds, storing them as asserts or funds, moving these asserts/funds and using them. Finally, he underscored some challenges especially technical compliance with recommendations and lack of collaboration by law enforcement agencies as well as incomplete terrorism financing risk assessment, which he observed could be transformed into opportunities if well accomplished, and used in addressing both policy and strategy issues. He recommended the use of the UNODC Guidance Manual (2018), and reaffirmed the importance of States taking stock of compliance with standards combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism through mutual evaluations.




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## Funds or other assets (and more...)



**Case study 15: Sale of dry fish**

In April 2016, 11 BH members were arrested at a market in north west Nigeria with 463 bags of fish. Upon arrest, they confessed they were engaged in the business of selling fish in order to raise funds and support the activities of BH. Each bag of fish was worth NGN 50 000, with the estimated total value of the stock NGN23 150 000 (approximately USD77 166).

*Source: Nigeria*

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**Case study 16: Sale of kola nuts by BH supporter**

An investigation by law enforcement agencies led to the arrest of a man who supplied kola nuts (the fruit of the kola tree, high in caffeine) and other items to BH in a north eastern town of Nigeria. Upon arrest he possessed NGN1.1 million (approximately USD 3 500) in cash which he had earned from the sale of these items to BH.

*Source: Nigeria*

APSTA AFRICA


APSTA-SP

COL EMMANUEL GVADU

SALLE 1

Galaxy A32

**FATF, GABAC, GIABA (2016) Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa, p.17**  
<https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Terrorist-financing-west-central-africa.html>




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### Mandate of the Terrorism Prevention Branch

- Ratification and implementation of the legal framework
- Legislative assistance
- Strengthening international cooperation mechanisms
- Financing of terrorism (legislation, adjudication)
- Battlefield evidence
- Victims of acts of terrorism
- Links b/w terrorism and other crimes
- PVE
- FTF
- IEDs



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### UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014)






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### New financial technologies UNSC 2462 (2019)

- New financial technologies, products and services may offer significant economic opportunities, they also present a risk of being misused for terrorism financing purposes
- Identify and assess the money laundering or terrorist financing risks that may arise in relation to
  - (a) the development of new products and new business practices, including new delivery mechanisms
  - (b) the use of new or developing technologies for both new and pre-existing products. To manage and mitigate the risks emerging from virtual assets




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**Guidance manual for Member States on terrorist financing risk assessments**



UNODC (2018) Guidance manual for Member States on terrorist financing risk assessments  
[https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/CTF%20Manual%20Guidance\\_Manual\\_FT\\_Risk\\_Assessments.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/CTF%20Manual%20Guidance_Manual_FT_Risk_Assessments.pdf)

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK	THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	TRANSPORT-RELATED TERRORISM
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM	TERRORIST FINANCING	CBRN TERRORISM	HUMAN RIGHTS

## Part Two : The Modalities of Terrorist Financing in Africa : Emerging Dynamics in the Modus Operandi



*Moderated by Professor SAIBOU ISSA, Dean of FALSH, University of Maroua.*

### Session 3 : Overview of terrorist financing mechanisms in Africa by Mr. Abdou CHEFOU, Senior Law Enforcement Expert in the fight against terrorism, UNODC - Niger

In his presentation, Prof. Saibou affirmed that subsidiaries of Al Qaeda (JNIM, AQIM and Al-Shabab) and the Islamic State (ISWAP, EIGS and ISCAP) are the main terrorist threats in Africa. They raise funds through trade and other income-generating activities, NGOs, smuggling and drug trafficking; sources which are transnational and come from licit companies but equally emanate from illicit activities. They also use zakat, financial transactions among jihadists, kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, arms and drug trafficking. Among other actors in the financing of terrorism in Africa, the author underscored the role of charitable organisations and NGOs which are exploited by terrorists. He further noted that terrorism financing in Africa is being rapidly facilitated by terrorist and criminal networks engaged in various types of trafficking, especially from Latin America, via West Africa towards Europe.

He lamented the lack of adequate security particularly in the Sahel region including the north of Nigeria, Niger and Mali, which creates a favourable space for the trafficking of contraband goods and all sorts of merchandise. In addition, he noted that owing to the similarity and link between the mission and objectives of various terrorist groups operating in Africa, they equally show solidarity by lending or donating money to each other, in a bid to facilitate mutual interests. In conclusion, Mr. Chefou underscored weak presence of the State and corresponding lack of security in zones occupied by terrorists in the Sahel as major reason facilitating the zone ('ungoverned spaces') as corridor for illicit trafficking of all sorts. He also noted that illicit exploitation of natural resources in the zone account for about 64% of funds for financing conflicts and all forms of instability in the zone.

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**Session 4 : Financing of terrorism, risks in Central Africa and opportunities for disruption by Ms. Emmanuelle KLASSEN, Associate Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer, Global Programme against Money Laundering, UNODC - Vienna, Austria**

In her submissions, Ms Klassen presented the mandate of the Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism, emphasizing the need to strengthen the capacities of Member States as well as following-up for an effective implementation of measures in accordance with international standards. She noted that the Programme provides valuable technical assistance to States in Central Africa on countering the financing of terrorism. Furthermore, she explained the approach for financial investigations to detect the financing of terrorism, and underscored three (3) benefits, viz: first, the identification of the spread of the terrorist group; second, the identification and tracking of criminal proceeds; and third, the development of information and evidence that could be used in planning the disruption or during penal procedure. She noted among others that key elements in disrupting financial transactions include inter-agency cooperation, international cooperation, access to databases and public-private partnerships. In conclusion, she elaborated the methodology for disruption of terrorism financing, as a key tool of the UNODC, which involves establishing objectives, understanding the business model (Collection – Transfer – Conservation and - Utilization), identifying vulnerabilities and opportunities, disrupting measures and mitigating risk.



**UNODC**

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
## **Risques de Financement du Terrorisme en Afrique Centrale et opportunités de perturbation**

Conference APSTA sur le Financement du Terrorisme en Afrique de l'Ouest et Centrale  
Yaoundé, Cameroun, 1-2 Juin 2023



## Programme Mondial de Lutte Contre le Blanchiment d'Argent, les Produits du Crime et le Financement du Terrorisme (GPML)

**MANDAT:**  
 Renforcer la capacité des États membres à mettre en œuvre des mesures efficaces de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme (LBC/FT) conformes aux normes internationales.



### Assistance technique en Afrique Centrale




- Assistance technique en Afrique Centrale depuis 2012
- Pays prioritaires : Cameroun, Congo, République Centrafricaine, République Démocratique du Congo et Tchad
- Objectif: Réduire les risques à la sécurité et les économies nationales et régionales en renforçant la capacité à l'enquête et de perturbation en matière de financement du terrorisme
  - Formation des autorités compétentes et des experts
  - Outils techniques (installation goAML dans les pays prioritaires)
  - Mentorat opérationnel (court et moyen terme)
  - Soutien législatif
  - Ateliers de sensibilisation de haut niveau
- Progression selon les principaux piliers identifiés comme étant des priorités dans les rapports d'évaluation mutuelle du GABAC, les évaluations nationales des risques, et les consultations nationales



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GPML  
 Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism



### Exemple 1: Enquête sur la base de portefeuilles électroniques



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GPML  
 Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism

### Exemple 2: Enquête sur la base de DOS - Abus d'OBNL



**Session 5 : Terrorism financing linked to Mobile payments and Hawala in West and Central Africa by Mr. Julius SEIDENADER, Counter Terrorism Specialist, Terrorism Prevention Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Vienna, Austria**


In his presentation, Mr Seidenader noted the huge growth in the use of mobile payment systems in Africa with transaction value of over \$800billion and the subsequent abuse by terrorist groups. He underscored the growth of Hawala system of payments across Africa; Hawala is more traditionally used in Middle East and Afghanistan, and now spreading to many other parts of the world. He further underscored the debate on financial inclusion across Africa via banking systems and the continents preference for mobile payments instead of traditional banking channels. He affirmed the growth of transactions value by 22% between 2021 and 2022 in West and Central Africa, increasing from \$1trillion to around \$1.26 trillion, while the number of mobile agents grew from 12 million in 2021 to around 17 million in 2022 - a staggering 41% year-on-year increase, a growth much of which was in Nigeria where a liberalised regulatory regime has led to an increase in Mobile Money Payments.

He further noted the abuse of the use of electronic payment systems by almost all terrorist groups operating in Africa, as revealed in findings by GABAC, GIABA and FATF. In Cameroon, he noted that the financing of terrorism is facilitated by the pre-eminence of fiduciary money, the existence of informal types of Hawala and channels for transferring funds, as well as the absence of an effective mechanism to control cross-border physical transfers, the porosity of borders and the free movement of goods and people in an economic and monetary area shared between five borders. In conclusion, he recommended among others, the regulation of electronic payments; strengthening and adapting legislation to a rapidly developing framework; mandating a national supervisory agency; and improving cooperation among private sector, financial institutions and law enforcement authorities.




**UNODC**  
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

**Terrorist Financing linked to Mobile payments and Hawala in West and Central Africa**



**Trend of usage of mobile money payment systems in West and Central Africa I**



State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money (2023) <https://www.fatmi.com/ottv/> (26.06.2023).



**Trend of usage of mobile money payment systems in West and Central Africa II**

- Transaction values grew by 22% between 2021 and 2022, from \$1 trillion to around \$1.26 trillion.
- The number of mobile money agents grew from 12 million in 2021 to around 17 million in 2022 – a staggering 41% year-on-year increase. Much of this growth was in Nigeria where a liberalised regulatory regime has led to an increase in MMPS.


**Regional growth in 2022**

	Live services	Registered accounts	Active (30-day) accounts	Transaction volume	Transaction value (\$)
Sub-Saharan Africa	154	763 m + 17%	218 m + 15%	45 bn + 21%	832 bn + 22%


State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money (2023) <https://www.fatmi.com/ottv/> (08.05.2023).



**The case of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the DRC IV**



UNSC 1533 Group of Experts (2022) Midterm report S/2022/967



**Session 6 : The Exploitation of Mines and the financing of terrorism in the Sahel by Ms. Sofia DEMS, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Officer (UNODC/GPML)**

In her submissions, Ms Dems focused on the illegal exploitation of natural mineral resources by terrorist groups particularly in West Africa, for the purpose of raising funds. She affirmed the infiltration of terrorist groups in the global market for precious stones as well as their propensity to control artisanal mining sites and activities, by coercing local labourers in the mining sector to be part of their network as facilitators. She justified this quest to control mining sites with the geographical localization of terrorist groups in the Sahel, mostly around artisanal mining sties. She emphasized artisanal gold mining in particular, as a significant resource which can easily be stocked, transported across borders, and conveniently sold, as source of informal revenue which is not captured in State's fiscal systems, and therefore does not disrupt local economy significantly.

She noted that the absence of State supervision and lack of transparency emboldens the actors, facilitating Money Laundering. Moreover, she underscored multiple vulnerabilities of both artisanal miners and the informal mining sector coupled with porous borders, as enabling factors in the underlying artisanal mining ecosystem that facilitate the avoidance of due diligence. Thus, she recommended an understanding and analysis of these supply chain vulnerabilities including extraction, trading, transporting and exporting of these precious stones; as well as the need to enact several administrative actions, in order to curb this phenomenon.



# WORKSHOP REPORT

## Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Africa

1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023, APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon



PowerPoint Slide Show - UNODC Financial disruption briefing - Or et FT - PowerPoint

### L'exploitation manière et le financement du terrorisme dans le Sahel

Méthodes

- ❖ GAT dans le Sahel
- RAISE : indirect control, direct control and security fees
- USE: sustain operations, recruitment, food
- MOVE : fungibility of gold and prevalence of cash and MVTS
- STORE : gold

GOLD: local, sustainable, fungible, portable and stable commodity

- ❖ Local economies
- Boom of ASGM
- Importance of the gold sector in local and national economy
- CFT measures should preserve the livelihood of mining population and financial stability

**Violence and armed groups in Western Sahel**  
Mali, Burkina Faso and western Niger

Slide 2 of 8

PowerPoint Slide Show - UNODC Financial disruption briefing - Or et FT - PowerPoint

### UNDERSTANDING & ANALYSIS

#### Supply chain vulnerabilities

**Extraction**

- Informality and predominance of ASGM in the sector
- Lack of transparency over initial investment
- Absence of on-site inspections over mining permits and licensing

**Trades**

- Unlicensed collectors and traders
- High number of intermediaries and actors
- Cash-based transactions
- Weak design regulation and lack of ASU/CFT measures (ETCC/CCD, TRS) and supervision
- Lack of morally checks or checks on origin of funds

**Transport**

- Porous borders and smuggling corridors to refining and trading hubs
- Organized crime involved in trafficking schemes
- Lack of data sharing and reporting between customs, FIU and LEA
- Customs fraud

**Export**

- Absence of benefit owners
- Governance focus is crime of trafficking



## Part Three : The legal and institutional frameworks for Countering the Financing of terrorism in West and Central Africa

*Moderated by Mr. Julius SEIDENADER, Counter Terrorism Specialist, Terrorism Prevention Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Vienna, Austria*

### Session 7 : The legal and institutional framework for the fight against terrorism in West and Central Africa by Colonel Benoit DJAHA KONAN, GIABA

In his submissions, Col Djaha Konan noted that despite the absence of a consensus definition, there is a general understanding of the concept of terrorist financing, as the provision, collection, management or attempt to provide goods, financial or other assistance, directly or indirectly, voluntarily or not, intended for the partial or total commission of an act which constitutes an offense against the legal instruments in the fight against terrorism. It also includes any act intended to injure or kill civilians not taking direct part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict. He noted that the Anti Money Laundering - Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) Legal Framework provides for the prevention, detection, investigation, professional secrecy, repression and international cooperation in the area of AML/CFT.

He further noted that GIABA provides support to Member States through the Interministerial Committee for the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, in synergy and commitment for the apprehension of terrorists. He affirmed that these include the monitoring of cross-border movements, as well as the development of State programmes for detecting and profiling cases. Thus, he concluded that given the complexity and diversity of terrorist financing, national counter-terrorist financing policies should be strengthened with FATF standards, to improve national coordination mechanisms and inter-agency counter-terrorism cooperation.

WORKSHOP REPORT  
Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Africa  
1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023, APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon



# 1- Cadre juridique et institutionnel de lutte contre le financement du terrorisme en Afrique de l'Ouest



Col. KONAN DJAHA  
Secrétariat du GIABA  
bkonan@giaba.org  
Tel : +221 77 404 48 73

[www.giaba.org](http://www.giaba.org)

[@giabaecowas](https://www.facebook.com/giabaecowas)

[@GiabaEcowas](https://twitter.com/GiabaEcowas)

**COMPOSANTES DU PLAN D'ACTION 2020-2024 ANTI-TERRORISTE DE LA CEDEAO**

**COMPOSANTE : 3 (2)**

**Formation et Equipement des forces de défense et de sécurité à la lutte contre le terrorisme (\$ 272 961)**

- 3.1 Renforcer les capacités des fonctionnaires publics impliqués dans la lutte contre le terrorisme**
- 3.2 Équiper et former les unités constituées**
- 3.3 Mettre en commun les ressources d'instruction et de formation**

[www.giaba.org](http://www.giaba.org) | [@giabaecowas](https://www.facebook.com/giabaecowas) | [@GiabaEcowas](https://twitter.com/GiabaEcowas)



**Session 8 : Challenges and Approaches for law enforcement in Countering the Financing of Terrorism in West and Central Africa by Mr. Abdou CHEFOU, UNODC Senior Counter Terrorism Law Enforcement Expert, Niger**

In his presentation, Mr Chefou, on the basis of field experience asserts that terrorists require financing for both action and existence. He expounded various aspects of their operation requiring financing, such as logistics, remuneration of combatants and sympathisers, propaganda on social media and training. In their sources of financing, he included grants, money gotten from illegal activities, money laundering, ransoms gotten from kidnappings, seizure of donations made to NGOs in cash and kind. He noted that once collected, these funds are distributed and circulated through Hawala networks, NGOs, money transfers agencies and company bank accounts.

Therefore, he affirmed that during investigations, investigators have to focus on elements of evidence such as irregularities in transfers, transfers made to sensitive areas, non-respect of customs declaratory obligations, extortions and kidnappings. To these, he added judicial authorisations which are required to carry out search and verifications. He further listed some of the difficulties encountered including: identifying the destination/receiver and proving that the funds are actually meant for terrorist groups; and proving the complicity of the sender and intermediaries in transfers aimed at terrorist groups.


He affirmed that the main objective of these financial investigations is to ensure the rule of law, deprive criminals of illegal wealth, destabilise criminal networks, as well as identify and record events linked to money transfer. He further enumerated the process of financial investigations as well as presented some reflections on strategies for obtaining evidence, evaluation of the criminal environment and where to obtain financial information - emphasizing both local and international levels. Finally, he stressed the imperative of understanding the group's business model/financial model through interviews with members of the group. In his opinion, these should facilitate an increase in convictions pursuant to common law.

WORKSHOP REPORT  
 Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Africa  
 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023, APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME




**UNODC**  
**TPB** | Terrorism  
 Prevention  
 Branch




Défis et approches pour l'application de la loi dans la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centres

Les difficultés rencontrées



Evaluation de l'environnement Criminel:



iPhone (91)      Frank D. Owusu      Joy (Rwanda Peac...      +250785669931

## Part Four : International tools for Countering the financing of terrorism


*Moderated by Professor SAIBOU ISSA, Dean of FALSH at the University of Maroua*

**Session 9 : INTERPOL's tools and capacities in the fight against the financing of terrorism by Police Commissioner Mr. YOUSOUFA SAIDOU, Specialised Counter Terrorism Officer, Regional Bureau, INTERPOL Yaoundé Regional Office - Cameroon**

In his submission, Mr. Youssoufa Saidou affirmed INTERPOL as the biggest global police organization, noting that Article 3 of INTERPOL's statutes sets out its jurisdiction over only stipulated offences. He explained INTERPOL's global presence, bringing together 195 Member States through a highly secure police communications system that operates continuously throughout the year, and covering four (4) critical programmes, viz: cyber criminality; anti-terrorism; organized crime; and anti-corruption. He explained INTERPOL's strategies in countering the financing of terrorism including activities in identification of materials and monitoring of financial transactions and movements.

He noted that INTERPOL has resources that allow it to trace and seize terrorist financing through cooperation using their 19 databases. The presenter affirmed that INTERPOL supports the police and gendarmes in arrests while respecting the sovereignty of States. In conclusion, he recommended that given the changing modus operandi of terrorists, INTERPOL Member States have a duty to adapt and coordinate their actions.

WORKSHOP REPORT  
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Africa**  
 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023, APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon



**OUTILS OPERATIONNELS D'INTERPOL DANS LA LUTTE CONTRE LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME**

**OS YOUSOUFA SAÏDOU RCTN/AFRICA/BRYAO**

Yaoundé 02 Juin 2023

INTERPOL For official use only

PRESENTATION TITLE – CHANGE IN MASTER

**SOMMAIRE**

- I. PRESENTATION D'INTERPOL
- II. STRATEGIE D'INTERPOL DANS LA LUTTE CONTRE LE TERRORISME
- III. OUTILS ET CAPACITES POLICIERES D'INTERPOL DE LUTTE
- IV. APPUIS OPERATIONNELS
- V. CONCLUSION

PRESENTATION TITLE – CHANGE IN MASTER

**STRATEGIE D'INTERPOL DANS LA LUTTE CONTRE LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME**

INTERPOL aide les services chargés de l'application de la Loi et les cellules de renseignement financier, dans les pays membres, à traquer et à interrompre le flux financier et les soutiens financiers directs derrière les activités terroristes ceci grâce à ses outils et capacités opérationnelles dans ce domaine. Pour cela il faut une coopération stratégique et un soutien aux enquêtes

PRESENTATION TITLE – CHANGE IN MASTER

**OUTILS OPERATIONNELS DE LUTTE CONTRE LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME**

Notices et Diffusions

NOTICE ROUGE	NOTICE JAUNE	NOTICE BLEUE	NOTICE NOIRE	NOTICE VERT	NOTICE ORANGE
71 831	7 108	15 462	8 917		

PRESENTATION TITLE – CHANGE IN MASTER

**APPUIS OPERATIONNELS DANS LA LUTTE CONTRE LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME**

- ❖ Operations FIRST (2021 et 2022) Tchad (21), Cameroun (521) et Nigeria (868)
- ❖ Opération FLASH-PACT INTERPOL/AFRIPOL 2022 (6 Pays Afrique centrale et Occidentale)
- ❖ Opération TRIPARTITE SPIDER II (4pays)

**Session 10 : Other mechanisms for regional and international cooperation by Mr. Bernard KAMDOUM T. PIASSINA, Head of Unit, Agence Nationale d'Investigation Financiere (ANIF) Cameroon**

In his intervention, Mr. Kamdoum noted that the countering of terrorism financing is both multi-sectoral and transnational, hence the need for enhanced cooperation between actors, based on the rule of law. He affirmed global cooperation on the basis of the 1999 UN Convention; the UN Resolution 1373 as well as related Recommendations of FATF. In reference to regional or intercommunity cooperation in Central Africa, he recalled CEMAC Regulation of 11 April 2016, which introduced the technique to combat money laundering and counter terrorist financing; operationalized under the aegis of GABAC in Central Africa. In respect of international cooperation, he alluded to the Egmont Group's provision of access to Financial Information. He also affirmed the existence of judicial (Extradition) and Police (INTERPOL) cooperation. In conclusion, he drew attention to the absence of coordination committee for policies on AML/CFT at national level.



**APSTA - ONUDC**

**International workshop on International cooperation and capacity building in fight against terrorism in Africa**  
**Yaoundé , 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2023**

**COOPERATION EN MATIERE DE LUTTE CONTRE LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME**




**Bernard KAMDOUM T. PIASSINA**  
**Chef de Cellule à l'ANIF**

**PLAN**

**INTRODUCTION**

I- CADRE JURIDIQUE DE LA COOPERATION EN MATIERE DE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME

II- OPERATIONNALISATION DE LA COOPERATION

III- QUELQUES FREINS A LA COOPERATION

**CONCLUSION**

**II- OPERATIONNALISATION DE LA COOPERATION**

**A- Coopération nationale (Art. 79 du Rgt du 11avril 2016)**

ASSUJETIS

Autres sources

**CRF ANIF**

**Tribunaux Militaires (Commissaire du Gouvernement)**

**Autorités d'enquêtes:**

- DGSN
- DGRE
- SCRJ (SED)

**II- OPERATIONNALISATION DE LA COOPERATION**

**C- Coopération internationale (Art. 82 du Rgt du 11avril 2016)**

ANIF

→

CRF Etrangères

**Groupe Egmont**  
Des Cellules de Renseignement Financier

**Autres coopérations**  
Judiciaire: (entraide, extradition...)  
Policrière: **INTERPOL**

**II- OPERATIONNALISATION DE LA COOPERATION**

**B- Coopération intracommunautaire (Art. 80 du Rgt du 11avril 2016)**

CRF

→

CRF

GABAC

**ANIF**

- Cameroun;
- Centrafrique;
- Congo;
- Guinée Equatoriale;
- Tchad;
- CENAREF (RDC)

**Session 11 : Presentation of Western Union's Financial Intelligence Unit and perspective of cooperation with public partners by Ms. Noemie CHEVASSU (online) Officer in charge of Law Enforcement Outreach and investigations, Africa, Western Union**

In her presentation, Ms. Chevassu affirmed Western Union as one of the principal organisations of money transfers, making transfers of up to \$100billion per annum, as recorded in 2021. She explained that Western Union is present in over 130 countries, having a global network covering over 200 territories and countries. Regarding its operations in Africa, she confirmed that it operates through agents, since it lacks a licence in Africa, and therefore has no legal or juridical obligation to deal with or cooperate with States or law enforcement agents in Africa, including on matters of countering the financing of terrorism.

However, she explained that Western Union's Financial Intelligence Unit produces own criminal analysis and risk prevention, as well as informs law enforcement agents, with the objective of the protection of their clients and agents. She noted that Western Union partners with repressive services and NGOs including UNODC and INTERPOL, among others. She concluded with a case study demonstrating the success of Western Union's strategy, which allowed the identification and arrest of a terrorist in Kenya who carried out multiple financial transactions through the abuse of the Western Union as well as other related networks.

EXTERNAL RELEASE APPROVED – RELEASABLE TO (INSERT ENTITY)



**Western Union**

**Unité de renseignement financier**

**Section partenariat avec les forces de l'ordre**

# WORKSHOP REPORT

## Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Africa



1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023, APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon

EXTERNAL RELEASE APPROVED – RELEASABLE TO (INSERT ENTITY)

### Etude de cas: financier de l'EI au Kenya

En janvier 2018, une demande de renseignements de la part de partenaires a donné lieu à une enquête tactique auprès des consommateurs sur le financier basé au Kenya et son réseau.

- Entre octobre 2017 et janvier 2018, le financier a reçu 8 transactions WU à Mombasa, au Kenya, pour un montant total de 9 222 dollars, de la part de 8 expéditeurs en Europe occidentale, en Europe du Sud, en Afrique et au Moyen-Orient.
- En novembre 2017, le financier a envoyé une transaction de 825 dollars du Kenya vers la province du Sud-Kivu, dans l'est de la RDC, principale base d'opérations des ADF.
- Le réseau WU étendu du financier comprenait également des activités WU en Turquie, en Afghanistan, au Sénégal, en Danemark, en Allemagne, en France, en Finlande, au Kosovo, en Russie et au Kazakhstan.
- Les nationalités des personnes faisant partie du réseau du financier sont les suivantes : Syrie, Kenya, Mauritanie, Ouganda et autres nationalités d'Europe, d'Asie centrale et d'Asie du Sud.
- L'unité financière de WU a déposé les rapports réglementaires pertinents et a interdit le financier et ses contreparties dans le cadre de cette enquête.




Western Union | Financial Intelligence Unit

19

Classification Public

### L'Unité de renseignement financier (FIU)



Western Union | Financial Intelligence Unit

7

### WESTERN UNION EN AFRIQUE

#### Notre couverture

- 48000 LOCATIONS
- 52 PAYS
- 410 NETWORK AGENTS

#### Licence et remontée d'informations

- WU N'A PAS DE LICENSE
- WU OFFRE SES SERVICES SUR LA BASE DE CONTRATS AVEC LES "NETWORK AGENTS" QUI DETIENNENT LES LICENCES GRACE AUX REGULATEURS
- LES SARs SONT ENVOYÉES AUX NETWORK AGENTS QUI DOIVENT EFFECTUER LES REMONTÉES AUX FIU NATIONALES

03-08

OLED Dick

### Le programme s'étend aux enquêtes tactiques

Identifier, signaler, perturber et prévenir les activités criminelles à haut risque au-delà du niveau de l'agent et du consommateur.

Développer et maintenir une compréhension détaillée des typologies criminelles dans l'Union européenne.

Portée mondiale - couloirs, pays, régions, etc.

Cibler les menaces latentes et émergentes

Se concentrer sur les typologies les plus graves, notamment le terrorisme / les trafiquants / Traite des êtres humains / exploitation des enfants / trafic d'êtres humains / Organisations criminelles transnationales (gangs, cartels, etc.) / les marchandises de contrebande.

Produire des analyses de renseignements exploitables, prospectives et provenant de toutes les sources.


Méthodes analytiques et normes techniques de niveau international.

Collaborer avec les priorités et les opérations de la police judiciaire et les soutenir.

Par le biais des SAR, fournir des cibles de haute qualité, des données primaires et des renseignements aux bonnes personnes au bon moment.

Western Union | Financial Intelligence Unit

11



Western Union | Financial Intelligence Unit

### Etude de cas: financier de l'EI au Kenya

- Un groupe d'insurgés de longue date, les Forces démocratiques alliées (ADF) basées en RDC, a prêté allégeance à ISIS en 2018 ;
- ISIS a finalement inclus la RDC (et le Mozambique) sous la bannière de la "province d'Afrique centrale d'IS" en avril 2018.
- Un financier d'ISIS basé au Kenya a établi un vaste réseau de facilitation d'ISIS couvrant l'Afrique de l'Est, l'Europe, le Moyen-Orient et les Amériques, pour inclure le financement envoyé à l'ADF.
- Selon l'USG et d'autres rapports de sources couvertes, entre 2017 et début 2018, le financier a transféré plus de 150 000 dollars à travers son réseau en utilisant des comptes bancaires, des hawala et des sociétés de transfert.
- Le financier a été arrêté et son réseau a été démantelé en juillet 2018. Le gouvernement américain a désigné le financier et ISIS-RDC comme SDGT (Specially Designated Global Terrorist) en septembre 2018.



## Part Five : Lessons and Experiences on Countering Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa

*Moderated by Professor SAIBOU ISSA, Dean of FALSH, University of Maroua, Cameroon*

**Session 12 : Various lessons and experiences by Brigadier General ASSOUALAYE BLAMA, representing Major General Gold GU CHIBUSI, Commander of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), Lake Chad Basin**

In his submissions, Brig Gen Blama affirmed self-financing and external financing, as the main sources of financing for Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa. Terrorists rely on the collection of illicit taxes levied on cattle ranchers and fishermen as well as kidnappings for ransom. He also linked the Centre of Gravity of terrorists in the region to their unique relations with the local population. In conclusion, he recommended that to more effectively counter the financing of terrorism, it will be necessary to intensify measures against money laundering, intensify regional cooperation, and close porous borders exploited by terrorists.




**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**LOOTING / PILLAGE**  
**MAP SHOWING AREAS TERRORIST ATTACKS**

FROM MAR – MAY 23, 5 ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS WERE RECORDED AROUND GORE TALGOUTOUM VILLAGES, JIMINI VILLAGE TAYER AND GANSE VILLAGE, ZIVER VILLAGE, MAYO MOSKOTA. MOST OF THE VILLAGES ARE IN SECTOR 1 MNJT AND FALL WITHIN THE BORDER BETWEEN NIGERIA AND CAMEROON. SIMILARLY TERRORIST ATTACK WAS ALSO RECORDED IN BARWATI VILLAGE LOCATED 4KM E OF KEKENO TOWN IN KUKAWA LGA OF SECTOR 3. DURING THESE 3 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED AND SEVERAL OTHERS INJURED WHILE THE TERRORISTS CARTED AWAY FOOD STUFF AND LOGISTICS ITEMS.

LE 1ER MARS, 23 TERRORISTES PRÉSUMÉS ONT ATTAQUÉ DES NAVETTEURS LE LONG DE LA ROUTE ALI GAMBARI – GASARWA. AU COURS DE L'ATTAQUE, LES TERRORISTES ONT TUÉ LE CONDUCTEUR DE L'UN DES VÉHICULES. L'INCIDENT A ÉTÉ SIGNALÉ AUX TROUPES DU SECTEUR 3 DÉPLOYÉES AU POSTE AVANCE DE GAJIRAM. LES TERRORISTES ONT FUI AVANT L'ARRIVÉE DES TROUPES. LE VÉHICULE ET LE CADAVRE ONT ÉTÉ RÉCUPÉRÉS ET REMIS AUX MEMBRES DU SYNDICAT NIGÉRIAN DES TRAVAILLEURS DU TRANSPORT ROUTIER.



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**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**FORCE MULTINATIONALE MIXTE**



CBLT LCBC

**MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE**

**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**SOURCES DE FINANCEMENT**  
**- AUTO-FINANCEMENT**

1. PECHÉ ILLÉGALE ET VENTE DE POISSON FUMÉ
2. PILLAGE ET VOL DE BÉTAIL
3. TAXATION FISCALE DES POPULATIONS SUR LES ACTIVITÉS AGRICOLES, ÉLEVAGE, PÊCHE
4. TRAVAIL FORCÉ DES PERSONNES CAPTURÉES
5. ENLEVEMENTS CONTRE RANCONS

**- FINANCEMENTS EXTERIEURS**

**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**INTRODUCTION**



**BAKOURA/JAS FACTION**      **ISWAP FACTION**

**TERRORISTS FACTIONS IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN REGION**


**FACTIONS TERRORISTES DANS LA REGION DU BASSIN DU LAC TCHAD**

Source: <https://www.summeronline.com/happening-now/boko-haram-attacks-madugui-cb/>      Source: <https://insiderabia.com/how-isis-became-al-qaeda/>

**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**ILLEGAL FISHING AND SALE OF FISH / PÊCHE ILLÉGALE ET VENTE DE POISSON**



**SOURCES DE FINANCEMENT - AUTO-FINANCEMENT**

1. PILLAGE ET VOL DE BÉTAIL
2. PECHÉ ILLÉGALE ET VENTE DE POISSON FUMÉ
3. TAXATION FISCALE DES POPULATIONS SUR LES ACTIVITÉS AGRICOLES, ÉLEVAGE, PÊCHE
4. TRAVAIL FORCÉ DES PERSONNES CAPTURÉES
5. ENLEVEMENTS CONTRE RANCONS

**- FINANCEMENTS EXTERIEURS**

ON 11 MAY 23, OWN ISR RECOGNIZED ABOUT A HUNDRED CANOES ON ISLANDS OF LAKE CHAD FROM THE BHT ENCLAVES. A JOINT OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED BY THE SQUADRON ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GARDY OF KABLEWA AND THE BN AT BAROUA. TROOPS RECOVERED TROLLEYS CARRYING 3904 BAGS OF DRY FISH AND ARRESTED 126 INDIVIDUALS AT NIGHT. THE 370 TROLLEYS WERE DESTROYED WHILE THE 3904 BAGS OF FISH WERE CONFISCATED.

LE 11 MAI 2023, LES IMAGES ISR AMIENS ONT IDENTIFIÉ UNE CENTAINE DE PIROGUES SUR LES ÎLES DU LAC TCHAD DEPUIS LES ENCLAVES BH. UNE OPERATION CONJOINTE A ALORS ÉTÉ MENÉE PAR LES ÉLÉMENTS DE LA GARDE NATIONALE DE KABLEWA ET DU BATAILLON DE BAROUA. LES TROUPES ONT RÉCUPÉRÉ DE NUIT 370 CHARRETTES TRANSPORTANT 3904 SACS DE POISSON SÉCHÉ, 126 INDIVIDUS. LES 370 CHARRETTES ONT ÉTÉ DÉTRUITES TANDIS QUE LES 3.904 SACS DE POISSON ONT ÉTÉ CONFISQUÉS

SOURCE: MNJTF ALBUM

**MNJTF RESTRICTED**

**SOURCES DE FINANCEMENT**

- **AUTO-FINANCEMENT**
  1. PECHE ILLEGALE ET VENTE DE POISSON FUME
  2. PILLAGE ET VOL DE BETAIL
  3. TAXATION FISCALE DES POPULATIONS SUR LES ACTIVITES AGRICOLES, ELEVAGE, PECHE
  4. TRAVAIL FORCE DES PERSONNES CAPTUREES
  5. ENLEVEMENTS CONTRE RANCONS
- **FINANCEMENTS EXTERIEURS**

MNJTF RESTRICTED

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**Session 13 : Addressing the Terrorism Financing in Africa: challenges of mobilising resources and implementing the regional strategy to fight against terrorism and its financing by Mr. Etienne TABI MBANG – Director of Studies, GABAC)**


In his brief intervention, Mr TABI MBANG observed that the CEMAC sub-region suffers several, often highly organised rebel incursions by groups located mainly in the DRC, Chad and CAR. He noted that over the years, phenomena such as cybercrime and the use of cryptocurrency have become more rampant, which reveals innovation by criminal networks. He further explained that in view of supporting Member States in the region to set up national strategies, national risk assessments have been initiated and the implementation processes are already complete in the six Member States. He concluded with an emphasis on international cooperation, noting that platforms for exchanges have been established, comprising GABAC, GIABA, UNODC and the World Bank.



## **FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME EN AFRIQUE CENTRALE : ACQUIS - CONTRAINTES - PERSPECTIVES**

02 JUIN 2023

PRÉSENTÉ PAR ETIENNE TABI MBANG, DIRECTEUR DES ETUDES DU GABAC



## Conclusion

At the end of the presentations, discussions and exchanges, the main recommendations that emerged from this two (2) day workshop are as follows :

***In order to strengthen the strategic and operational capacities of actors and stakeholders involved in the prevention and countering of the financing of terrorism, especially institutional agents and field officers, stakeholders should :***

- » Ensure the continuous training of actors and stakeholders, on risks of the financing of terrorism, financial investigations and prosecutions or lawsuits ;
- » Update knowledge and skills in prosecution services periodically, with the evolution in terrorism, and mutations in modus operandi of its financing ;
- » Popularize and disseminate standards and best practice, ensuring the flexibility, consistency and harmonisation of regional and community judicial procedures on matters of preventing and countering the financing of terrorism ;
- » Establish mechanisms for national and regional coordination of policies on countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism, notably to facilitate inter-agency information sharing.

***In order to ensure the detection and freezing of funds destined for purposes of the financing of terrorism, stakeholders should :***

- » Ensure the implementation of targeted financial sanctions mechanisms related to terrorism in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 ;
- » Strengthen capacities for research on the problematic of financing of terrorism, and ensure that competent authorities have access to databases linked to illicit financial flows;
- » Reinforce cooperation with the private sector by ensuring that various actors are aware of their obligations on matters of countering money laundering and the financing of terrorism, the communication of the lists of sanctions and sharing early warning indicators;

- » Establish partnerships with Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) to ensure an understanding of the risks in the civil society sector, ensure the implementation of risk-based preventive measures and ensure the creation of awareness ;
- » Leverage more financial intelligence locally and internationally in preventing and countering the financing of terrorism, including the collection as well as management of proofs and evidence.

As a guiding principle, stakeholders should also ensure that mechanisms for countering the financing of terrorism are adapted to the economic and social context, based on risks, in order to promote financial inclusion and minimise the negative consequences on legitimate activities, especially of the Non-Profit Organisation sector.

Moreover, consequent upon supporting the implementation of these recommendations, it is desirable that APSTA and its member institutions, UNODC and the international community continue to encourage this type of event (workshop) for sharing best practice and fostering regional and international collaboration.

At the end of the workshop, APSTA expressed its profound gratitude to all those who, as partners, experts and participants, made it possible to achieve the objectives of this event.

The international workshop on "**Countering the financing of terrorism in West and Central Africa**" ended with the presentation of certificates of participation; the reading of the Final Declaration by **Professor SAIBOU ISSA, Scientific Coordinator of the Sessions**; and closing remarks by **Mrs. Christine KOTNA, Branch manager UNODC, Yaoundé**; as well as remarks and closure of the workshop by **APSTA Chairperson, Colonel SOULEYMANE SANGARE**.

In her closing remarks, **Ms. Christine KOTNA**, noted that States and regional economic communities lack sufficient resources, and also experience weak coordination of polices and laws on countering terrorism. Thus, she recommended as imperative, the pooling together of resources and the coordination of efforts, all aimed at effectively countering this scourge. In this regard, she affirmed UNODC's readiness to support the capacity building of actors.

**Colonel SOULEYMANE SANGARE**, in his remarks and prior to declaring the workshop closed, congratulated all experts and participants for the quality of proceedings and

recommendations. He also commended the Executive Secretary of APSTA and her team for their diligence in organising yet another successful high-level international workshop and Open Day event.



*Updated & Edited, 22 June 2023 by Mr. Christian ICHITE, Programmes Coordinator/Deputy Executive Secretary of APSTA, APSTA Secretariat.*

*Draft Report submitted, 02 June 2023 by :*

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» *Docteur ETAMBA Gilbert, Enseignant à l'Institut Panafricain pour la Paix et le Développement, Afrique de l'Ouest (Rapporteur) ;*

» *Monsieur NENENGA Driscole, Assistant de Recherche et de Traduction à l'Ecole Internationale des Forces de Security - EIFORCES (Rapporteur).*

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WORKSHOP REPORT  
Countering the Financing of Terrorism in Africa  
1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023, APSTA Secretariat, Yaounde, Cameroon



